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INTRODUCTION 
The year 2002 brought some significant changes to the Federal 
Circuit:  the addition of a new judge, Sharon Prost,1 and the issuance 
of two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court reversing the Federal 
Circuit’s decisions.  These decisions have had an impact on the 
Federal Circuit—Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, 
Inc.2 limited the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction and Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushki Co.3 criticized the Federal Circuit in its 
application of the controversial doctrine of equivalents. The Federal 
Circuit’s docket continues to grow with the increased importance 
placed on intellectual property, as evidenced by the breadth and 
number of patent law decisions published by the Federal Circuit in 
2002.  The 2002 opinions are summarized here by subject matter. 
I. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
The Federal Circuit addressed numerous procedural issues in its 
decisions, including the subject matter jurisdiction of the district 
courts, personal jurisdiction in patent cases, standing, collateral 
estoppel, various trial procedures, and the procedures of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).  The most notable 
decision on a procedural issue did not come from the Federal 
Circuit, but concerned the Supreme Court’s view of the Federal 
Circuit’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases. 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
In general, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
over any case where the subject matter jurisdiction of the district 
court is based, in whole or in part, on a dispute arising under the 
patent laws of the United States.4  However, in 2002, the Supreme 
Court determined that the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the 
Federal Circuit did not extend to every case in which a patent dispute 
arises.5 
In Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,6 the 
Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit does not have 
                                                          
 1. Nominated to be Circuit Judge by President George W. Bush on May 22, 
2001, confirmed by the U.S. Senate September 21, 2001, and assumed duties of the 
office on October 3, 2001.  Judge Prost sat on a panel for the first time in January 
2002. 
 2. 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002). 
 3. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000). 
 5. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 834, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805. 
 6. Id. at 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801. 
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jurisdiction based on a patent infringement counterclaim; rather, the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is fixed with reference to that of the 
district court.7  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, a district court has subject 
matter jurisdiction of cases “arising under” the patent laws.8  In 
Holmes, the Supreme Court determined that the well-pleaded 
complaint rule governs resolution of whether the district court has 
jurisdiction under § 1338, and that the rule does not allow for a 
counterclaim to serve as the basis for the district court’s “arising 
under” jurisdiction.9  The Justices did not accept that the phrase 
“arising under” should be interpreted differently in assessing the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction in order to effectuate the congressional 
goal of ensuring patent-law uniformity.10  As a result, the Supreme 
Court stated that the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit is limited to cases in which the patent dispute is apparent on 
the face of the complaint alone.11 
Consistent with the decision in Holmes, the Federal Circuit held in 
Telcomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Sieman’s Rolm Communications, Inc.12 
that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal solely 
predicated on the existence of a patent infringement counterclaim.13  
In this case, the plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment on plaintiff’s allegations of monopolization and 
attempted monopolization under the Sherman Antitrust Act.14  The 
complaint did not allege a cause of action arising under the patent 
laws; rather, only the defendant raised a patent issue in the case.15  As 
a result, the Federal Circuit transferred the case to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.16 
In Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc.,17 the Federal Circuit again 
explored the boundaries of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction and 
addressed whether it had jurisdiction over an appeal based on the 
Declaratory Judgment Act for non-infringement of a patent.18  
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes, the Federal 
Circuit looked to whether the declaratory judgment complaint 
                                                          
 7. Id. at 834, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805. 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). 
 9. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 831, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803-04. 
 10. Id. at 833-34, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 11. Id. at 834, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805. 
 12. 295 F.3d 1249, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 13. Id. at 1252, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608. 
 14. Id. at 1250-51, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 15. Id. at 1251, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 16. Id. at 1252, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608. 
 17. 310 F.3d 1360, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 18. Id. at 1366-67, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914-15. 
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alleged an action arising under the patent laws.19  The Federal Circuit 
indicated that in the context of declaratory judgments, “the plaintiff’s 
complaint arises under federal law if the cause of action that the 
declaratory defendant threatens to assert arises (or would arise) 
under federal law.”20  The Federal Circuit explained that in the case 
of a complaint seeking a declaration of non-infringement, the action 
threatened by the declaratory defendant would be a patent 
infringement action and would clearly arise under patent law.21  
Consequently, the Federal Circuit found that Golan’s declaratory 
judgment allegations in his complaint for non-infringement of a 
patent conferred jurisdiction on the court and noted that Pingel’s 
patent infringement counterclaims were irrelevant when determining 
whether the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction in this case.22 
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the U.S. District Courts 
United States district courts have limited subject matter 
jurisdiction.23  They may hear cases where there is a federal question,24 
such as a dispute arising under the patent laws,25 or controversies 
among parties having a diversity of citizenship.26 
During the past year, the Federal Circuit addressed several aspects 
of district court subject matter jurisdiction, including how a case is 
determined to “arise under” the patent laws, whether a case should 
be brought in the Court of Federal Claims, and whether a case is 
properly brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act. 
In Pixton v. B&B Plastics, Inc.,27 the Federal Circuit considered 
whether a district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Pixton’s 
patent infringement action.28  As discussed above, under the relevant 
jurisdictional statute, a district court has subject matter jurisdiction of 
cases arising under the patent laws.29  In this case, Pixton assigned his 
patent for plastic fishing lures to the defendant, B&B Plastics.30  
Subsequently, Pixton alleged that B&B breached the agreement and 
                                                          
 19. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914-15. 
 20. Id. at 1367, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of State of 
Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 18 (1983)). 
 21. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915. 
 22. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 25. Id. § 1338(a). 
 26. Id. § 1332(a). 
 27. 291 F.3d 1324, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 28. Id. at 1325-26, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
 30. Pixton, 291 F.3d at 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
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sued B&B for infringement.31  The district court concluded that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the underlying action 
sounded entirely in contract principles.32  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit stated that a court must consider “whether the plaintiff has 
stated, in a well-pleaded complaint, a claim arising under the patent 
laws” to determine whether § 1338 jurisdiction attaches.33  The 
Federal Circuit explained that this must be determined from the 
plaintiff’s statement of his claim.34  The Federal Circuit then 
indicated that Pixton’s complaint was well-pleaded and clearly set out 
an action for patent infringement.35  The Court explained further 
that federal jurisdiction “is not lost simply because the most efficient 
approach at trial may be to address the license defense first.”36  As a 
result, the Federal Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the 
case back to the district court for trial.37 
In Toxgon Corp. v. BNFL, Inc.,38 the Federal Circuit considered 
whether a district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a case 
where the alleged infringement resulted from activities authorized by 
the United States for its sole benefit.39  In response to the filing of a 
patent infringement suit by the plaintiff, the defendants moved to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
asserting that the infringement occurred “under the authority of and 
for the sole benefit of the United States.”40  Defendants argued that 
the plaintiff’s claims must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), a law that restricts the remedy for 
infringement by the United States to monetary compensation.41  
Among other things, the statute also relieves a federal contractor of 
liability where the contractor uses or manufactures an infringing 
invention for the United States.42  The Federal Circuit held that 
§ 1498(a) provides an affirmative defense in a suit between private 
litigants, rather than a jurisdictional bar, and that it would therefore 
                                                          
 31. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
 32. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
 33. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945 (quoting Jim Arnold v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 
F.3d 1567, 1576, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1127) (citations omitted). 
 34. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945 (quoting Jim Arnold v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 
F.3d 1567, 1576, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1127) (citations omitted). 
 35. Id. at 1327, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946. 
 36. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946 (citations omitted). 
 37. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946. 
 38. 312 F.3d 1379, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 39. Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147 (citations omitted in original). 
 40. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (allowing a 
motion for judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter). 
 41. Toxgon Corp., 312 F.3d at 1380, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147-48 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
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be inappropriate to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(1).43  
Instead, the Federal Circuit stated that where appropriate, a defense 
arising under § 1498(a) should be resolved by summary judgment 
under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.44 
The Federal Circuit faced a similar issue in Madey v. Duke 
University.45  The district court dismissed a portion of Madey’s claim 
for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Duke University’s use of 
Madey’s patents arose under the authority of a government research 
grant and the case should have been brought in the Court of Federal 
Claims.46  The Federal Circuit reversed the case, determining that the 
district court erred in not applying Federal Circuit law and by 
providing no findings or analysis upon which to base a review of the 
decision.47 
In Vanguard Research, Inc. v. PEAT, Inc.,48 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s determination that there was not a case 
or controversy sufficient for jurisdiction under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.49  In so doing, the Federal Circuit stated that “a 
patentee’s present intentions do not control whether a case or 
controversy exists,” even though a party may indicate that it never 
expressly authorized, nor intended to authorize, a suit for patent 
infringement.50  Instead, the proper question is whether the plaintiff 
seeking a declaratory judgment “had a reasonable apprehension” that 
the patentee would sue for patent infringement at some future date.51  
In this case, by filing an earlier suit in state court over the same 
technology and indicating to the plaintiff’s customers that the 
plaintiff was using a patented technology without a license, the 
defendant demonstrated a “‘willingness to protect that technology.’”52  
Thus, the Federal Circuit explained that the filing of a patent 
                                                          
 43. Toxgon, 312 F.3d at 1382, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 44. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149; see FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing for 
summary judgment). 
 45. 307 F.3d 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 46. Id. at 1353-54, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739-40. 
 47. Id. at 1359-60, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744-45. 
 48. 304 F.3d 1249, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 49. Id. at 1250, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370; see 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) 
(allowing a court to declare the rights or legal relations of any interested party, 
whether or not further relief is or could be sought, in a case of actual controversy 
within its jurisdiction). 
 50. Vanguard Research, 304 F.3d at 1255, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374 (citing 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 956, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1310, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 51. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 52. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374 (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 956, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
1987)). 
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infringement claim would be “another logical step in its quest to 
protect its technology.”53 
C. Personal Jurisdiction 
A district court must have jurisdiction over the parties to a case in 
order to properly adjudicate their claims.54  A court may exercise its 
power over a defendant if the defendant is present in the forum state 
or if the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 
state to the extent that the assertion of power will not “offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”55 
In assessing the authority of the district courts over the parties to 
an action, the Federal Circuit issued opinions concerning the effect 
of a forum selection clause in a technology agreement, the effect of 
negotiating a license in a state, the effect of a waiver of personal 
jurisdiction, and what factors satisfy the minimum contacts test of 
personal jurisdiction. 
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,56 the Federal Circuit had the 
opportunity to address the effects of a forum selection clause in a 
technology agreement on personal jurisdiction.57  The district court 
granted a preliminary injunction to Monsanto prohibiting McFarling 
from using plant genes and seed obtained from crops grown from 
Monsanto’s patented soybean seed.58  McFarling tried to use plant 
genes and seed obtained from crops grown from Monsanto’s 
patented herbicide-resistant Roundup Ready® soybean seed the 
previous year.59  Monsanto required their seed distributors to have 
purchasers sign a technology agreement saying that they will not save 
any seeds for the next season.60  Monsanto brought suit in U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri pursuant to the 
forum selection clause in that agreement.61  Based on that clause, the 
Federal Circuit determined that jurisdiction in Missouri was proper 
because of “contractual consent”.62  The Federal Circuit explained 
that McFarling’s voluntary failure to read the back of the contract, 
                                                          
 53. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 54. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that the 
Due Process Clause does not contemplate state power to make a binding judgment 
against an individual or corporation with which the state has no contacts, ties, or 
relations). 
 55. Id. 
 56. 302 F.3d 1291, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 57. Id. at 1294, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. 
 58. Id. at 1293, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 59. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 60. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 61. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 62. Id. at 1295, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64. 
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which contained the forum selection clause, did not entitle him to an 
exemption from the effects of the clause.63 
In Depreynyl Animal Health, Inc. v. University of Toronto Innovations 
Foundation,64 the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a decision by 
the district court not to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.65  The Federal Circuit explained that its law governs the 
issue of personal jurisdiction in patent-related cases, but regional 
circuit law governs the determination of whether non-infringement 
and invalidity claims fall within the scope of an arbitration clause of a 
license agreement between the parties.66  The Federal Circuit stated 
that the negotiation of a patent license agreement of a U.S. patent in 
Kansas, albeit with a choice of law clause selecting Canadian law, 
satisfied the minimum contacts requirement and constituted 
sufficient purposeful availment of the U.S. patent law to make 
jurisdiction in Kansas proper.67  The Federal Circuit also held that, in 
view of international comity, the Kansas district court should stay the 
proceedings pending the outcome of the ongoing Canadian 
arbitration.68 
In Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Technologies, Ltd.,69 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that PMR 
waived its personal jurisdiction defense by filing claims against new 
defendants.70  The Federal Circuit based its determination on the fact 
that, in filing its Answer, Class-Action Counter-Claim, and First 
Amended Complaint, PMR asserted infringement claims against six 
counter-claim defendants that previously were not involved in any 
infringement suit related to the patent at issue.71  The Federal Circuit 
reasoned that, because the new claims did not arise out of the same 
transaction or occurrence (even though they were based on 
infringement of the same patent), and because such action was not 
authorized by the joinder rules, the attempted joinder constituted a 
waiver of the opportunity to challenge personal jurisdiction relating 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 1295-96, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.  In the dissent, Judge Clevenger 
noted that the technology agreement (which contained the forum selection clause) 
was a contract of adhesion.  Id. at 1300, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Clevenger, J., 
dissenting).  Judge Clevenger stated that the terms of an adhesion contract should 
not be permitted to overcome the constitutional right to due process that underlies 
the personal jurisdiction requirement.  Id. at 1301-02, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168. 
 64. 297 F.3d 1343, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 65. Id. at 1346, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 66. Id. at 1348-49, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 67. Id. at 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 68. Id. at 1358, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715. 
 69. 292 F.3d 1363, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 70. Id. at 1366, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 71. Id. at 1371-72, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
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to the pending claims in the action against the party seeking to add 
additional claims.72 
In Hildebrand v. Steck Manufacturing Co.,73 the Federal Circuit 
reversed and remanded a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, 
invalidity, and tortious interference because the trial court erred in 
concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over Hildebrand.74  The 
Federal Circuit applied Federal Circuit law in analyzing the lower 
court exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant 
in a patent infringement case.75  The Federal Circuit indicated such  
jurisdiction over a non-consenting party outside the forum state I 
proper if that party is “amenable to service of process under the 
appropriate long-arm statute [and] the culmination of the party’s 
activities within the forum state satisfies the minimum contact 
requirement of the due process clause.”76  The Federal Circuit 
determined that Hildebrand’s offers to do business and warning 
letters, coupled with offers to negotiate with plaintiffs, rose only to 
the level of soliciting business.77  According to Ohio law, mere 
solicitation of business by a foreign person does not constitute 
transacting business in the state.78 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that Hildebrand did not 
satisfy the first prong of the personal jurisdiction test.79  The Federal 
Circuit also concluded that the second prong of the personal 
jurisdiction test was not satisfied because Hildebrand’s contacts with 
the forum were minimal.80  The Federal Circuit explained that 
“[f]airness and reasonableness demand that a patentee be free to 
inform a party who happens to be located in a particular forum of 
suspected infringement without risk of being subjected to a lawsuit in 
that forum.”81 
D. Standing 
Federal courts may only decide actual cases or controversies.82  
Accordingly, the courts have imposed standing requirements in order 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 1372, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 73. 279 F.3d 1351, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 74. Id. at 1353, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697. 
 75. Id. at 1354, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698. 
 76. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698. 
 77. Id. at 1355, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698. 
 78. Id. at 1354, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698. 
 79. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698. 
 80. Id. at 1355-56, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699-1700. 
 81. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699 (citing Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-
Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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to ensure that only actual cases or controversies are litigated.83  In its 
only case addressing standing during this past year, the Federal 
Circuit determined that the plaintiff’s lack of standing to sue did not 
affect the defendant’s right to bring counterclaims related to unfair 
competition, tortuous interference, and attorney fees. 
In H.R. Technologies, Inc. v. Astechnologies, Inc.,84 the district court 
determined that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue for patent 
infringement because it did not own the relevant patent, and 
therefore granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the entire case 
without prejudice, including the defendant’s counterclaims.85  After 
determining that the district court’s decision was an appealable final 
order, the Federal Circuit held that the district court properly 
dismissed the plaintiff’s infringement action without prejudice 
because the plaintiff could simply execute a valid assignment to show 
ownership of the patent in question.86  The Federal Circuit also 
affirmed the dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim for non-
infringement because it also turned on the question of ownership.87  
However, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court 
improperly dismissed the defendant’s counterclaims that were not 
affected by the standing defect because those claims did not depend 
upon ownership of the patent.88  As a result, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded the district court’s 
decision.89 
E. Collateral Estoppel 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents parties from 
litigating an issue of fact or law that was decided in a prior suit.90  
                                                          
 83. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he 
core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III.”). 
 84. 275 F.3d 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 85. Id. at 1381, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272-73. 
 86. Id. at 1383-84, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275. 
 87. Id. at 1386, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276. 
 88. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276. 
 89. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 90. See Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that “under 
the doctrine of issue preclusion, an issue may not be litigated if . . . :  (1) the issue is 
the same as that involved in a prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the 
determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party 
against whom estoppel is invoked was represented in the prior action.”); Grosz v. City 
of Miami Beach, 82 F.3d 1005, 1006 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that collateral estoppel 
can foreclose relitigation of an issue of fact or law where that issue was fully litigated 
and decided in a prior suit). 
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Issue preclusion is not intended to “create vested rights in decisions 
that have become obsolete or erroneous over time”.91 
In Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Manufacturing Corp.,92 the Federal 
Circuit held that a non-final judgment could not be given preclusive 
effect even when Vardon had not exhausted its appellate remedies, 
including moving for certification of interlocutory appeal under Rule 
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, substituting the reissue 
patent at an appropriate time, or suspending the reissue proceedings 
before the USPTO.93  Earlier, the district court granted partial 
summary judgment on the grounds that Karsten did not infringe 
certain claims of Vardon’s ‘941 patent.94  Two months after the court 
granted partial summary judgment in Karsten’s favor, the ‘950 reissue 
patent was issued.  Vardon surrendered the ‘941 patent in order to 
obtain the ‘950 reissue patent, thereby mooting the summary 
judgment on the ‘941 patent and extinguishing Vardon’s right to 
appeal.95  Subsequently, the district court held that Vardon was 
collaterally estopped from asserting the reissue patent ‘950 against 
Karsten because Vardon failed to preserve its right to appeal the 
partial summary judgment.96  The Federal Circuit explained that the 
decision with respect to the ‘941 patent claim was not final because it 
was not immune to reversal or modification.97  Consequently, the 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Vardon’s 
complaint.98 
Similarly, in Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp.,99 the Federal Circuit held that 
Bayer was not collaterally estopped from suing Biovail.100  In the prior 
action, the district court construed the claim in light of an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), whereas in the later 
action, information regarding actual products manufactured in 
accordance with the ANDA was submitted.101  The Federal Circuit 
determined that the district court was required to construe the claim 
with respect to measurement of manufactured products as opposed 
to the specification contained in the ANDA that was the subject of the 
                                                          
 91. Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948). 
 92. 294 F.3d 1330, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 93. Id. at 1334, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471. 
 94. Id. at 1332, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469. 
 95. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469. 
 96. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470. 
 97. Id. at 1334, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471. 
 98. Id. at 1335, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472. 
 99. 279 F.3d 1340, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1675 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 100. Id. at 1342, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 101. Id. at 1343, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677-78. 
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prior action.102  Further, with respect to manufactured products made 
in accordance with the ANDA specification of the prior action, the 
Federal Circuit held that “infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(2)(A)103 by submission of an ANDA is not synonymous with 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)104 by a commercial product 
[and, therefore, the patentee should] have a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue of infringement by the commercial product” 
despite a finding of non-infringement under § 271(e)(2)(A).105  
Specifically, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court’s 
prior construction of the claims of the patent at issue did not address 
the issues presented in the later case.106  As a result, the Federal 
Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment.107 
The Federal Circuit addressed a related issue in Ecolab Inc. v. 
Paraclipse, Inc.108  In that case, the Federal Circuit stated that a consent 
judgment between parties as to a certain product did not preclude 
the defendant from challenging the validity of the patent in a 
subsequent action alleging infringement by a new and different 
product.109  The Federal Circuit indicated that the provisions of a 
consent judgment are to be construed narrowly and a party does not 
waive its right to challenge the validity of a patent as to future accused 
products absent clear intent to do so.110  In that case, the language of 
the consent judgment was not clear because the defendant merely 
agreed that the patent in suit was valid.111  Further, the record in the 
case showed that the accused devices at issue were not “‘essentially 
the same’” in the prior case and the later suit.112  As a result, the 
Federal Circuit remanded the case for a new trial where the 
defendant was entitled to challenge the validity of the patent.113 
                                                          
 102. Id. at 1349, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 103. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that it is an act of infringement to 
submit an application for a patent for a drug already claimed or the use of which is 
already claimed in a patent). 
 104. Id. § 271(a) (stating that whoever without the proper authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention is infringing that patent). 
 105. Bayer AG, 279 F.3d at 1350, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 106. Id. at 1349-50, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682-83. 
 107. Id. at 1350, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 108. 285 F.3d 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 109. Id. at 1377, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359-60. 
 110. Id. at 1376, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359 (quoting Diversey Lever, Inc. v. 
Ecoloab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350, 1352, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1062, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
 111. Id. at 1377, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359. 
 112. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359 (citation omitted in original). 
 113. Id. at 1378, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360. 
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F. Trial Procedures 
The Federal Circuit addressed various trial and post-trial 
procedural issues during the 2002 calendar year, including the 
appropriate timing of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the 
effect of erroneous jury instructions on claim construction, and the 
appropriate timing of a motion for relief from judgment. 
In Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil 
Co.,114 the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court erred in 
converting its grant of a new trial to a judgment as matter of law 
(“JMOL”) because the plaintiffs did not move for a JMOL before the 
case was submitted to the jury.115  Thus, plaintiffs were not entitled to 
move for JMOL after the jury returned its verdict.116 
In Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc.,117 the Federal Circuit held that the 
district court erred by erroneously instructing the jury in a patent 
infringement trial regarding issues of claim construction.118  
Particularly, the Federal Circuit noted that the claim for a lighted 
insect trap requires only that a housing “contain” a surface that 
reflects light, and because the ordinary meaning of “contain” is “to 
have within,” it was error to instruct the jury that the reflecting 
surfaces required by the claim were limited to surfaces located on the 
inside wall of the trap’s housing cover.119  The Federal Circuit stated 
that because there was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict of 
infringement under a correct interpretation of the claim, the plaintiff 
suffered prejudice from the district court’s error, and thus was 
entitled to a new trial.120 
In Fiskars Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co.,121 the Federal Circuit 
concluded that a request for relief from judgment twenty-one months 
after entry of that judgment should be denied.122  There, Hunt filed a 
motion for relief of judgment pursuant to Rules 60(b)(5) or (6) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,123 seeking to vacate the damages 
awarded based on new evidence allegedly showing that Fiskars was 
                                                          
 114. 308 F.3d 1167, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 115. Id. at 1187, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559. 
 116. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559. 
 117. 285 F.3d 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 118. Id. at 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350. 
 119. Id. at 1374, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357. 
 120. Id. at 1376, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358. 
 121. 279 F.3d 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 122. Id. at 1379, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852. 
 123. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) (providing relief when “it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application”); id. 60(b)(6) (providing relief 
from a final judgment “for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment”). 
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not entitled to lost profits.124  The Federal Circuit held that Rule 
60(b)(6) was available only in extraordinary circumstances, which 
were not present in the immediate case.125  The Federal Circuit also 
rejected Hunt’s argument that the damages for lost profits should be 
reassessed after the trial “if market data probative of acceptability 
becomes available once a non-infringing alternative replaces the 
infringing product in the marketplace.”126  As a result, the Federal 
Circuit agreed with the district court that evidence arising nearly two 
years after trial does not create the level of extraordinary 
circumstance necessary to invoke Rule 60(b)(6).127  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion 
to reopen the case and vacate a damages judgment nearly two years 
after entry of that judgment.128 
G. USPTO Procedures 
The Federal Circuit had occasion to address certain USPTO 
procedures in Blacklight Power, Inc. v. Rogan.129  In that case, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia, finding that the Director of the USPTO had the 
authority to withdraw Blacklight’s patent application from issue, 
following Notice of Allowance, payment of the issue fee, and 
notification of the issue date.130  The USPTO withdrew Blacklight’s 
application because there was concern that the patent application set 
forth a proposition contrary to the known laws of physics and 
chemistry, thus raising serious patentability problems.131  
On appeal, Blacklight argued that 35 U.S.C. § 151 compelled 
issuance of the patent because it states that a patent should be issued 
when the fee is paid.132  Moreover, Blacklight argued that 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.313, the regulation that the USPTO relied on to withdraw the 
application, contravenes the language of § 151.133  The USPTO 
responded that its actions were proper because § 151 begins with the 
                                                          
 124. Fiskars, 279 F.3d at 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852-53. 
 125. Id. at 1382, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 126. Id. at 1383, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 127. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 128. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 129. 295 F.3d 1269, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 130. Id. at 1270-71, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535. 
 131. Id. at 1272, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536. 
 132. Id. at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537; 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
 133. Blacklight Power, 295 F.3d at 1272, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536; see Rules of 
Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.313(b) (2002) (explaining that once the issue 
fee is paid, the USPTO will not withdraw an application from issue for any reason 
unless:  (1) there is a mistake by the USPTO; (2) there is an illegality in the application; 
(3) one or more claims are not patentable; or (4) there is interference). 
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conditional clause:  “If it appears that applicant is entitled to a patent 
under the law”; however, here, Blacklight was not entitled to a patent 
under the law.134  The Federal Circuit agreed with the USPTO, holding 
that, while the words “shall issue” impose a duty, the preface of § 151 
makes that duty conditional.135   Section 151 does not bar the USPTO 
from interrupting the sequence of action if it reasonably believes that 
this condition in the opening clause is not met, and thus, § 151 does 
not prohibit the USPTO from withdrawing a patent application after 
the issue fee is paid.136  Blacklight argued that the USPTO did not 
make a final determination of unpatentability when it withdrew the 
application.137  The USPTO stated that, although it could not make a 
final determination because the application was in Pennsylvania being 
prepared for patent printing, a related patent was reviewed and found 
to be unpatentable.138  The district court found that at the time the 
patent was withdrawn regulation § 1.313(b)(3) did not require a final 
pronouncement.139  The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that when 
there is a time restraint, the USPTO does not have to conclusively 
determine the outcome of a patent application because of the 
complexity of the examination process and the potential for human 
error.140 
H. Deference Owed to the USPTO 
In denying a petition for rehearing en banc in Dethmers 
Manufacturing Co. v. Automatic Equipment Manufacturing Co.,141 the 
dissenting judges remarked upon the deference owed to the USPTO 
in its administration of its own procedural rules and the impact of 
that deference on the presumption that a patent is valid.142  In the 
underlying case, the panel decision invalidated certain reissue claims 
based on a USPTO procedural rule that specified the content of a 
reissue oath or declaration.143  One dissenting opinion argued that 
“once a patent issues, non-compliance with a procedural rule 
                                                          
 134. 35 U.S.C. § 151; Blacklight Power, 295 F.3d at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1537. 
 135. Blacklight Power, 295 F.3d at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537. 
 136. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537. 
 137. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537. 
 138. Id. at 1271-72, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536. 
 139. Id. at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537. 
 140. Id. at 1273, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537. 
 141. 293 F.3d 1364, 1365, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  There 
was a six-six split amongst the judges.  Judges Newman, Lourie, Gajarsa, Dyk, Prost, 
and Linn chose to hear the case en banc.  Judges Mayer, Michel, Rader, Clevenger, 
Schall, and Bryson declined to hear the case en banc.  Id. 
 142. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318. 
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administered by [the USPTO] within the agency’s statutory authority 
and found, by virtue of the grant of the patent, to have been satisfied 
during prosecution,” is irrelevant.144  The dissent further indicated 
that, as the result of the holding in the case, an examiner’s 
misapplication of a USPTO procedural rule may invalidated a patent, 
contrary to the proposition of deference toward patent issues and 
supported by “a ground of invalidity not included in the exclusive list 
of grounds set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 282.”145  Accordingly, the dissent 
concluded that the holding failed to recognize the statutory 
presumption of validity to which every issued U.S. patent is entitled.146  
A second dissent argued that the USPTO should be afforded more 
deference in this particular area because a reviewing court is “ill-
equipped to determine whether the USPTO received the information 
that it deems necessary for an examination.”147 
I. Miscellaneous Procedural Issues 
In Genetech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc.,148 the Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment for non-infringement 
based on an erroneous claim construction.149  However, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s order barring Genetech from 
proceeding on a theory of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents because Genetech failed to allege such theories in its 
claim charts as required under the Local Rules for the Northern 
District of California.150  Specifically, the Federal Circuit noted that 
the philosophy behind amending claim charts is decidedly 
conservative and designed to prevent the “‘shifting sands’” approach 
to claim construction.151  Thus, despite Genetech’s argument that it 
interpreted the local rule as requiring a claim chart listing whether 
the claimed infringement is literal or under the doctrine of 
equivalents, and that Amgen had prior notice of equivalence 
arguments and therefore was not prejudiced, the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 1366, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318. 
 145. Id. at 1366, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318; 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (establishing 
four defenses for an action involving the validity or infringement of a patent). 
 146. Dethmers Mfg., 293 F.3d at 1366, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (Linn, J., 
dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 1367, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 148. 289 F.3d 761, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 149. Id. at 764, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1642. 
 150. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 151. Id. at 774, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649 (quoting Amtel Corp. v. Info Storage 
Devices, Inc., 1998 WL 775115 at 2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1998)) (quotation omitted). 
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upheld the order because there were no allegations of legal or factual 
error, and the district court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous.152 
In TechSearch L.L.C. v. Intel Corp.,153 the Federal Circuit found that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in its appointment and 
use of a technical advisor.154  Predicting how the regional circuit 
would decide this issue of first impression, the Federal Circuit 
outlined the parameters for the use of a technical advisor.155  The 
Federal Circuit explained that the district court must:  “[1] use a fair 
and open procedure for appointing a technical advisor and address 
any allegations of bias, partiality, or lack of qualifications in the 
candidates; [2] clearly define and limit the technical advisor’s duties, 
presumably in a writing made known to all parties; [3] guard against 
extra-record information; and [4] make explicit []the nature and 
content of the technical advisor’s tutelage concerning the 
technology.”156  In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit noted 
that the district court established sufficient protective measures to 
ensure that the advisor did not improperly influence the district 
court’s consideration of the evidence.157  The district court’s failure to 
subject the technical advisor to cross-examination by the parties did 
not constitute reversible error because the advisor, unlike an expert 
witness for the parties, may not be relied upon as source of 
evidence.158  Furthermore, the record did not suggest that the advisor 
conducted independent experiments or research that could have 
been used to resolve disputed issues of fact.159 
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY 
In 2002, the Federal Circuit continued to address several important 
issues relating to patentability and validity.  For example, on a few 
occasions the Federal Circuit confirmed the existence of “prosecution 
history laches,” holding that unreasonable and unexplained delay in 
prosecution may be applied to bar enforcement of patent claims.160  
The Federal Circuit also rejected attempts to expand the applicability 
                                                          
 152. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649. 
 153. 286 F.3d 1360, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 154. Id. at 1379, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462. 
 155. Id. at 1378, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 156. Id. at 1379, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461-62 (quoting Ass’n of Mexican Am. 
Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 611 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 157. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462-63. 
 158. Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463. 
 159. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463. 
 160. See, e.g., In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d 1362, 1367, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1448, 1452 
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 
277 F.3d 1361, 1364-68, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1517-20 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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of inherent anticipation, noting that inherent anticipation is not a 
substitute for a well-reasoned obviousness analysis.161  The following 
section presents a general overview of some of the more important 
cases from 2002 addressing issues relating to patentability and validity. 
A. 35 U.S.C. § 102162 
1. Anticipation 
“Invalidity based on ‘anticipation’ requires that the invention is not 
in fact new.”163  Anticipation may be supported by a single reference 
describing the claimed invention with enough detailed precision to 
establish the subject matter as existing in the prior art.164 
In Verve L.L.C. v. Crane Cams, Inc., the patent in suit related to 
improved push rods for internal combustion engines.165  The Federal 
Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing to consider 
extrinsic evidence in construing the phrase “substantially constant wall 
thickness” and in determining that the phrase was indefinite.166  The 
Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s holding on summary 
judgment that the patent in suit was invalid based on anticipation, 
holding that the plaintiff’s Japanese patents on their face did not show 
the push rods of the patent in suit.167  In particular, unlike the patent in 
suit, the Japanese push rods were not wider at the mid-portion but 
were of a uniform lengthwise diameter.168  Accordingly, on these 
undisputed facts, the Federal Circuit held that “no reasonable trier of 
fact could find that [the patent was] anticipated by the Japanese 
references.”169 
                                                          
 161. See, e.g., Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1297, 63 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1597, 1600-01 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 162. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (describing the conditions for patentability).  A 
person is entitled to a patent unless:  (a) the invention is used or patented already; 
(b) the invention was in public use or for sale more than one year prior to the date 
of application; (c) the invention is abandoned; (d) the invention was patented in 
another country prior to the date of application in the United States; (e) the 
invention was described in another patent application; (f) the subject matter was not 
in fact invented by the applicant; or (g) the invention was first the work product of 
another person.  Id. 
 163. Verve L.L.C. v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 
66 F.3d 299, 302, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1101, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 164. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 165. Id. at 1117, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052. 
 166. Id. at 1120, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 167. Id. at 1120-21, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054-55. 
 168. Id. at 1121, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054-55. 
 169. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
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The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of inherent anticipation on 
several occasions in 2002.  Under the doctrine of inherency, even 
though an element is not expressly disclosed in a prior art reference, 
the reference is still “deemed to anticipate a subsequent claim if the 
missing element ‘is necessarily present in the thing described in the 
reference, and if it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary 
skill.’”170  Inherent anticipation requires that the missing descriptive 
material is “necessarily present” in the prior art, not merely probably 
or possibly present.171 
In Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co.,172 the two parties were competitors in 
the school bus mirror market.  Each owned a patent and each claimed 
that the other infringed its patent.  In particular, Rosco’s design patent 
related to an oval, highly convex, cross-view mirror with a black, flat 
metal backing.  Mirror Lite’s utility patent related to an oval cross-view 
mirror with a varying radius of curvature along the major axis of the 
convex ellipsoid mirror lens.  In a bench trial, the district court found, 
inter alia, Rosco’s design patent was invalid as functional and obvious, 
and Mirror Lite’s utility patent was invalid as anticipated under 35 
U.S.C. §§ 102(e) and 102(g).173   With respect to Mirror Lite’s utility 
patent, the district court found the claims invalid under § 102(e) based 
on anticipation by an earlier-filed U.S. application and under § 102(g) 
based on prior invention “‘by another.’”174  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that when determining the 
invalidity of patent claims, each claim must be considered separately.175   
In particular, each claim of a patent shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of the other claims.176   Here, the Federal 
Circuit held that the lower court erred by failing to explicitly address 
and analyze each claim.177    
The district court also found that the design patent inherently 
disclosed the invention of the utility patent under § 102(e), allowing 
one skilled in the art to read the design patent as disclosing a mirror 
with a varying radius of curvature based on the inherent nature of 
those characteristics.178 The district court concluded that “‘one skilled 
                                                          
 170. Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676, 
1680 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268, 
20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 171. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 172. 304 F.3d 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 173. Id. at 1376, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 174. Id. at 1381, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681 (quoting U.S.C. § 102 (g)(2)(2000). 
 175. Id. at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 176. Id. at 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (quoting U.S.C. § 102 (g)(2)(2000). 
 177. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 178. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (quoting Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 139 F. 
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in the art could produce the results claimed in the [utility patent] 
simply by practicing the [design patent], i.e., the result flows naturally 
from the express disclosure of the design patent whether or not others 
are aware of it.’”179  The Federal Circuit held that the district court 
erred because no evidence was presented suggesting that the design 
patent inherently discloses to one of ordinary skill a mirror with a 
varying radius of curvature along the major axis. 180 
The district court also found certain claims of the utility patent were 
invalid under § 102(g)181 in view of Rosco’s pre-1992 products, thus 
concluding that Rosco made the invention of the utility patent before 
the critical date.182  In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit 
held that uncorroborated testimony of prior inventorship is 
insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence of conception 
of the invention prior to the critical data.183 
In Trintec Industries, Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp.,184 the Federal Circuit 
vacated and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
that the patent at issue was invalid as inherently anticipated.185  The 
Federal Circuit determined that a prior art catalogue that taught the 
use of a color printer did not inherently anticipate a claim that recited 
a color photocopier.186  Although the Federal Circuit conceded that 
the difference may be “minimal and obvious,” it noted that 
“obviousness is not inherent anticipation.”187 With respect to another 
asserted claim, the Federal Circuit determined that the prior art 
catalog did not inherently teach the required claim element of 
creating artwork on a computer.188  The Federal Circuit remanded the 
case noting that because obviousness seemed to be the actual question 
at issue, it could only be properly addressed with a fully developed 
record.189 
                                                          
Supp. 2d 287, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 179. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (quoting Rosco, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 300). 
 180. Id. at 1381, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680-81. 
 181. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.  A patent is invalid if “before [the 
applicant’s] invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another 
who had not abandoned, suppressed or concealed it.”  35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000). 
 182. Rosco, 304 F.3d at 1381, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
 183. Id. at 1382, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
 184. 295 F.3d 1292, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1597 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 185. Id. at 1297, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601. 
 186. Id. at 1296, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600. 
 187. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600 (citing Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529, 
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 188. Id. at 1297, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600-01. 
 189. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601. 
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2. On-sale bar and public use 
An inventor is entitled to a patent unless the invention was in 
public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to the 
date of application for the patent in the United States. 190 
In Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc.,191 Allen Engineering 
and Bartell both produced concrete riding trowels used to smooth the 
surface of new concrete.192  The Federal Circuit held in this case that 
the district court failed to properly construe claim limitations and 
failed to make adequate findings on infringement.193  In addition, the 
Federal Circuit held that the district court failed to apply the proper 
legal test in considering whether Allen’s sales of the Red Rider trowel 
more than one year prior to the filing date of the patent in suit 
constituted an on-sale bar to the patenting of the invention.194  Thus, 
the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s finding that the patent 
in suit was not invalid based on an on-sale bar.195   
With respect to on-sale bar, the Court noted that “to establish an on-
sale bar, it must be shown that the device that was ‘sold fully 
anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered the claimed 
invention obvious by its addition to the prior art.’”196  Allen argued that 
the Red Rider was sold only for experimental reasons and that it was 
not ready for patenting.197 In determining whether or not Allen’s sales 
were experimental or sufficient to constitute an on-sale bar, the 
Federal Circuit evaluated the record under the well-established two-
prong test set forth in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics Inc.198  
Under the “Pfaff test,” to constitute an on-sale bar, it must be shown 
that the subject product was both (1) the subject of a commercial offer 
for sale not primarily for purposes of experimentation, and (2) ready 
for patenting.199  The first prong of this test “involves a determination 
of whether a commercial offer for sale occurred, applying traditional 
contract law principles.”200 It also involves an assessment of whether the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction show that the transaction 
                                                          
 190. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 191. 299 F.3d 1336, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 192. Id. at 1342, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.  
 193. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 194. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.  
 195. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 196. Id. at 1352, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778 (quoting Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. 
Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1358, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294, 1296-97 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (quotation omitted). 
 197. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 198. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 199. Id. at 67, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47. 
 200. Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1352, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
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was not primarily for purposes of experimentation.201  This prong is 
satisfied “by proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or 
by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared 
drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently 
specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the 
invention.’”202  The on-sale bar is evaluated claim-by-claim, barring 
some claims but not others.203 
The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding 
that Red Rider sales did not trigger an on-sale bar solely because the 
Red Rider was in an experimental stage.204  As the Federal Circuit 
noted, this conclusion alone is insufficient, stating “What is important 
to an assessment of the commercial versus experimental significance of 
a sale is not necessarily the posture of the invention’s overall 
development, but the nature or purpose of the particular use to which 
the invention that is the subject of that sale is to be put.”205 The proper 
question posed by the experimental use doctrine, using the first prong 
of the Pfaff on-sale bar test, does not ask whether the invention was in a 
developmental or experimental stage when the sale allegedly took 
place; but whether the purpose of the inventor at the time of that sale, 
“as determined from an objective evaluation of the facts surrounding 
the transaction,” was to further development or experimentation.”206  If 
there is sufficient evidence that a device was sold for experimentation 
purposes, the first prong of Pfaff would not be satisfied and there 
would be no need to consider “whether the device was an embodiment 
of the claimed invention or whether the invention was ready for 
patenting at the time of the sales.”207  In vacating the district court’s 
decision, the Federal Circuit instructed the lower court to assess 
whether the surrounding circumstances show that the transaction was 
not primarily for purposes of experimentation.208  In so doing, the 
district court should consider the principles enumerated in EZ Dock v. 
Schafer Systems, Inc. and in the present case.209 
                                                          
 201. Id. at 1352-53, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.  
 202. Id. at 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779 (quoting Pfaff, 525 U.S. 55, 48 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641.  
 203. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 204. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 205. Id. at 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 206. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780 (quoting Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 
178 F.3d 1378, 1384 n.1, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055, 1059 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 207. Id. at 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 208. Id. at 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 209. Id. at 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778-79 (citing EZ Dock, 276 F.3d 1347, 
1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see infra notes 236-39 and 
accompanying text (describing the holding of EZ Dock that evidence of experimental 
use operates to negate application of the statutory on-sale bar). 
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In Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad,210 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the claim 
of invalidity of Konrad’s patents under the public use and on-sale bars 
of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).211  In so doing, the Federal Circuit determined 
that Konrad made no discernable effort to maintain the confidentiality 
of his inventions after showing them to others prior to the critical 
date.212  The Federal Circuit further found that Konrad presented no 
objective evidence to support an argument for experimental use.213  
With respect to the on-sale bar, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
Konrad’s purchase order constituted a commercial offer for sale 
because the one party to the purchase order did not so control the 
other party as to keep the invention out of the public’s hands.214 
In In re Kollar,215 the Federal Circuit reversed the USPTO Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) determination that Kollar’s 
patent application was barred under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).216  Kollar’s 
patent application was directed to a process for preparing a dialkyl 
peroxide by reacting one or more alcohols and/or an olefin with a 
monoalkyl hydroperoxide in the presence of an acidic catalyst.217  The 
Board sustained a rejection of the claims under § 102(b) based on a 
sale of the technology by Redox Technologies, a company owned by 
Kollar, to Celanese Corporation.218  The Federal Circuit upheld the 
Board’s determination that the claimed invention was ready to patent 
under Pfaff because of Kollar’s reduction to practice.219 
The Federal Circuit determined that the Board erred in finding that 
the invention was the subject of a commercial offer for sale under the 
first prong of Pfaff.220  Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that under 
the Celanese contract, Redox agreed to share technical information 
regarding the claimed process during the “R&D Phase” in exchange 
for annual royalty payments.221  The Federal Circuit said that although 
the Celanese agreement “specifically contemplates that ‘resultant 
products’ manufactured using the claimed process could potentially be 
sold,” the agreement does not indicate that a product derived from the 
                                                          
 210. 295 F.3d 1315, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 211. Id. at 1318, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581-82. 
 212. Id. at 1321, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584. 
 213. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584. 
 214. Id. at 1324, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586. 
 215. 286 F.3d 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 216. Id. at 1328, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426. 
 217. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426. 
 218. Id. at 1328-29, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426-27. 
 219. Id. at 1330, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (citation omitted in original). 
 220. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
 221. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (citation omitted in original). 
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process was in fact offered for sale.222  Rather, the court reasoned that 
the agreement was a license to Celanese under all future patents 
concerning Kollar’s invention and that granting a license to an 
invention does not alone trigger the on-sale bar of § 102(b).223  The 
Federal Circuit held that “the right to commercialize’ the invention 
granted to Celanese in the form of a license pursuant to the agreement 
was insufficient” to bar Kollar’s patent application claims under 
§ 102(b).224 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted the Board’s failure to 
distinguish between a claim to a tangible item—a product, device, or 
apparatus—and a claim to a process—a series of acts or steps, and held 
that the Board erred in failing to recognize that a process is not sold in 
the same sense as a tangible item.225  The Federal Circuit found that 
the know-how describing the process may be sold, i.e., giving a buyer 
the freedom to carry out the process pursuant to the terms of an 
agreement.  However, this does not constitute a sale of the invention 
under § 102(b) because the process has not used as a result of the 
transaction.226  Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board 
conclusion that the license to a process under a future patent, along 
with a description of the process, constitutes a sale of the subject 
matter of the patents.227 
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,228 the Federal Circuit reversed 
and remanded a district court ruling in favor of the defendants that 
the patent at issue was invalid on the basis of prior use and 
unenforceablity.229  The Federal Circuit found that there was no 
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict that the claims at issue 
were invalid because of prior use, as the record was devoid of evidence 
proving that the apparatus satisfied every limitation of the claimed 
invention.230 The Federal Circuit also held that uncorroborated oral 
testimony presented to show prior public use did not rise to the level of 
“clear and convincing evidence necessary to invalidate the patent for 
prior public knowledge.”231 
                                                          
 222. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (citation omitted in original). 
 223. Id. at 1330-31, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
 224. Id. at 1331, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (citation omitted in original). 
 225. Id. at 1332, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429. 
 226. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429. 
 227. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429. 
 228. 292 F.3d 728, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 229. Id. at 731, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252. 
 230. Id. at 738, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257-58. 
 231. Id. at 743, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
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In Dana Corp. v. American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc.,232 the Federal 
Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the 
claim of patent invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).233  In vacating the 
grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit stressed that the trial 
court “should determine ‘whether the subject of the barring activity 
met each of the limitations of the claim, and thus was an embodiment 
of the claimed invention’” as required by § 102(b).234  Further, the 
Federal Circuit reiterated that dependant claims “cannot be 
invalidated in a wholesale fashion,” but must be individually presumed 
valid and independently evaluated, because “dependent claims 
necessarily add limitations to claims from which they depend and may 
therefore not be subject to the same asserted grounds of invalidity.”235 
As previously noted, the Federal Circuit in EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer 
Systems Inc.,236 also addressed the on-sale bar rule.  In this case, the 
district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
declaring EZ Dock’s patent relating to a floating dock invalid because 
the dock in question was on sale in this country more than one year 
before the filing date. 237  On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded the case, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the 
on-sale bar was inapplicable insofar as the sale was for an experimental 
use.238  In finding that the sale could have been for experimental and 
not commercial use, the court noted that the single sale at issue was 
made without advertisement, the buyer paid less than full price, and 
the inventors visited the site location where the device was installed.239   
In New Railhead Manufacturing Co. v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co.,240 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas that invalidated New Railhead’s patents on 
a drill bit and a method of horizontal drilling under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b).241  With regard to the patent for a horizontal drilling method, 
the district court found that a third party, Mr. Freeman, was permitted 
to use the method more than a year prior to patent application.242  
Though New Railhead argued that Mr. Freeman’s use was 
                                                          
 232. 279 F.3d 1372, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 233. Id. at 1374, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609. 
 234. Id. at 1375-76, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611 (quoting Scaltech, Inc. v. 
Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 178 F.3d 1378, 1383, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
 235. Id. at 1376, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611-12. 
 236. 276 F.3d 1347, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 237. Id. at 1350, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291. 
 238. Id. at 1353-54, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293. 
 239. Id. at 1352-53, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292-93. 
 240. 298 F.3d 1290, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 241. Id. at 1292, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 242. Id. at 1297-98, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848-49. 
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experimental, the Federal Circuit found that his use of the patented 
method was public because the drilling was at a commercial jobsite on 
public land next to an interstate highway.243  Despite the fact that the 
inventor continued to modify the drill bit itself, Mr. Freeman’s use of 
the patented method met every claim limitation of the method 
patent.244  Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the drilling method 
was in public use and the patent was invalid under section 102(b).245 
Judge Dyk, dissenting-in-part, stated that the drill bit was inextricably 
intertwined with the method of drilling so that experimental use of the 
bit constituted experimental use of the method.246  He went on to say 
that the use of the method was not public because it was confidential.247  
The test for secret public use is whether the inventor (as opposed to a 
third party) makes a profit from the use, and in this case there was no 
such profit.248 
B. 35 U.S.C. § 103—Obviousness249 
Obviousness is a legal conclusion based on underlying facts of four 
general types, all of which must be considered by the trier of fact:  
(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary 
skill in the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and 
the prior art; and (4) any objective indicia of non-obviousness.250 
“Determination of obviousness cannot be based on the hindsight 
combination of components selectively culled from the prior art to fit 
the parameters of the patented invention.”251  In addition, the 
motivation to follow particular sources and select and combine 
particular elements must be taught or suggested by the prior art, the 
nature of the problem to be solved, or the general knowledge one 
ordinarily skilled in the field.252 
                                                          
 243. Id. at 1298, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849. 
 244. Id. at 1299, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850. 
 245. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850. 
 246. Id. at 1301, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 247. Id. at 1300, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850-51. 
 248. Id. at 1301, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851. 
 249. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (establishing conditions on patentability for non-
obvious subject matter).  A patent cannot be obtained if the differences between the 
subject matter to be patented and the prior art are so minimal that the subject 
matter, as a whole, would have been obvious to a person of normal skill in the art.  
Id. 
 250.  See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 
467 (1966). 
 251.  Crown Operations Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia, Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1376, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1917, 1922 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 
159 F.3d 534, 546, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 252.  Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922 
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In Novo Nordisk A/S v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,253 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a Southern District of New York jury verdict that Novo 
Nordisk’s patents for a pen-shaped insulin delivery system for diabetics 
were invalid as obvious.254  The diameter of the needle used in the 
system was central to the case.  The claims-at-issue were directed to an 
insulin-delivery pen with a needle that was thinner than twenty-nine 
gauge (the higher gauge, the thinner the needle).255  The prior art 
included pen systems with lower gauge needles and systems not 
involving pens but with higher gauge needles.256  The Federal Circuit 
found that there was a motivation to combine technologies and create 
a pen with a thinner needle to reduce pain.257  The Federal Circuit also 
stated that Becton’s arguments about patent monopolies and 
overworked, inexperienced, and error-prone patent examiners did not 
warrant a new trial, because Novo Nordisk failed to object at trial or 
raise these issues by post-trial motion.258 
In In re Sastry,259 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s 
determination that Sastry’s claimed invention was obvious.260  The 
invention was a method for treating and preventing the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).261  The invention required two 
peptides, the first being a cytotoxic T lymphocyte (“CTL”)-inducing 
peptide and the second being selected from a group of peptides that 
assist the immune response elicited by the first peptide by ensuring 
that the body maintains a large population of uninfected T helper 
cells.262  
The Board sustained a rejection of all of Sastry’s claims as being 
obvious over Arlinghaus (which teaches the first peptide) in 
conjunction with references that teach the second peptide.263  On 
appeal, Sastry conceded that the first and second peptides were taught 
by the prior art, but argued that there was no motivation to combine 
the references.264  The Federal Circuit held that Arlinghaus provided a 
roadmap for combining the peptides by disclosing two peptide-based 
compositions that have CTL-inducing properties and that contain 
                                                          
 253. 304 F.3d 1216, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 254. Id. at 1218, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 255. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 256. Id. at 1218-19, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525-26. 
 257. Id. at 1219, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526. 
 258. Id. at 1220, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526-27. 
 259. 285 F.3d 1378, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 260. Id. at 1379, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 
 261. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 
 262. Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437. 
 263. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437-38. 
 264. Id. at 1381, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438. 
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peptides that satisfy the requirements of Sastry’s second peptide, 
including eliciting a low-level antibody-mediated response.265  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that Arlinghaus could have been used as an 
anticipatory reference but because it disclosed two compositions that 
induce CTL activation and included specific peptides within the scope 
of the second peptide of Sastry’s claim, Arlinghaus could be viewed as 
providing the necessary motivation to combine the peptides of the 
other references as well.266 
In In re Lee,267 the USPTO combined two references in a 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103 rejection, while discounting the need for “‘any specific hint or 
suggestion in a particular reference’” to support the combination.268  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board 
decision, noting that the “‘common knowledge and common sense’” 
that the Board relied on to reject the application is not the type of 
“specialized knowledge and expertise contemplated by the 
Administrative Procedure Act.”269 
In Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.,270 Ficosa appealed the 
denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law for non-
infringement, the grant of summary judgment for a best mode 
violation, and the denial of its JMOL motions on the invalidity of the 
two patents at issue.271  With regard to obviousness, the Federal Circuit 
determined that Ficosa did not present evidence in support of its belief 
that the nature of the problem itself supplied the necessary motivation 
to combine.272  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of invalidity.273  With 
respect to anticipation, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, explaining that anticipation does not permit an additional 
reference to supply the missing claim limitation.274 
C. 35 U.S.C. § 112 
The patent laws require that the patent specification contain a 
written description of the invention and of the manner and process 
                                                          
 265. Id. at 1382, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 266. Id. at 1383, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439-40. 
 267. 277 F.3d 1338, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 268. Id. at 1343-44, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (citation omitted in original). 
 269. Id. at 1344, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435 (citation omitted in original); see 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557 (2000) (outlining the requirements for 
initial decisions and agency review). 
 270. 299 F.3d 1313, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 271. Id. at 1318, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 272. Id. at 1334, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 273. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 274. Id. at 1335, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
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of making and using it, in such a manner as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to make and use the invention, and must set forth 
the best mode contemplated by the inventor for carrying out his 
invention.275   The specification must conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.276  If a patent 
does not satisfy the written description, enablement, best mode or 
definiteness requirements, the patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112. 
1. Written description 
In New Railhead Manufacturing L.L.C. v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co.,277 
the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision to invalidate New 
Railhead’s patents on a drill bit and a method of horizontal drilling 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).278  With regard to the drill bit patent, the 
Federal Circuit found that the related provisional application failed to 
provide a written description, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1), for 
the claimed angled relationship between the drill bit and its 
housing.279  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that New Railhead’s 
commercial sales constituted a § 102(b) bar because the drill bit patent 
is not entitled to claim the priority filing date of the provisional 
application.280  
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,281 the Federal Circuit granted a 
petition for rehearing and reversed its prior decision, which held that a 
deposit of biological materials in a public depository will not satisfy the 
written description requirement.282  The Federal Circuit held, as a 
matter of first impression, that a reference to a deposit of genetic 
material in a patent specification may be sufficient to describe the 
material in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112.283 
In doing so, the Federal Circuit relied on USPTO Guidelines stating 
that the written description requirement can be met where disclosed 
functional characteristics are coupled “‘with a known or disclosed 
                                                          
 275. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000) (stating the written description, enablement 
and best mode requirements). 
 276. See id. (stating the definiteness requirement). 
 277. 298 F.3d 1290, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 278. Id. at 1292, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 279. Id. at 1294-95, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846. 
 280. Id. at 1297, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. 
 281. 296 F.3d 1316, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 282. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated, 296 F.3d 1316, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d  (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 283. Enzo Biochem, 296 F.3d at 1330, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617-18; see 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 (2000) (requiring a written description of the invention). 
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correlation between function and structure.’”284  The Federal Circuit 
remanded the case back to the district court to determine “whether a 
person of skill in the art would glean from the written description, 
including information obtainable from the deposits of the claimed 
sequences, subsequences, mutated variants, and mixtures sufficient to 
demonstrate possession of the generic scope of the claims.”285  The 
Federal Circuit also remanded the factual determination of whether 
the disclosure provided by the three deposits would sufficiently 
describe the asserted claims to a person knowledgeable in the art.286 
In Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Products, Inc.,287 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that 
Cameron’s ‘707 patent was not infringed under the doctrine of 
equivalents288 and reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment that the ‘119 patent was invalid for failing to meet the 
written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.289  The 
patents in question involved equipment used on sub-sea wellheads.290  
With regard to the invalidity claim, the district court held that the 
‘119 patent lacked sufficient written description to support a particular 
aspect of the invention because it was not described in the 
specification.291  The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, 
determining that inventors are entitled to claim their inventions in 
more than one way.292  The ‘119 patent’s drawings disclosed the 
disputed embodiment sufficiently to support the written description 
requirement, because “drawings constitute an adequate description if 
they describe what is claimed and convey to those of skill in the art that 
the patentee actually invented what is claimed.”293 
2. Enablement 
In Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,294 
the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded a 
decision of the District Court of Delaware, finding non-infringement of 
                                                          
 284. Enzo Biochem, 296 F.3d at 1324, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613 (quoting 
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the U.S.C. 112, P1, “Written 
Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001)). 
 285. Id. at 1327, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615. 
 286. Id. at 1327-28, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615. 
 287. 291 F.3d 1317, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 288. Id. at 1321, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849. 
 289. Id. at 1322, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850. 
 290. Id. at 1318, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847. 
 291. Id. at 1320, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. 
 292. Id. at 1322-23, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849. 
 293. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850-51. 
 294. 308 F.3d 1167, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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Union Carbide’s patents.295  With respect to an invalidity claim based 
on non-enablement, the Federal Circuit concluded that in view of the 
presumption that a patent is valid, Shell’s evidence that Union Carbide 
failed to reduce to practice a slightly different catalyst was not relevant 
to the question of whether the particular catalyst in the claims was 
enabled.296  Consequently, the Federal Circuit held that the district 
court properly overturned the jury’s verdict of non-enablement by 
granting a new trial.297 
Chief Judge Mayer, dissenting on the enablement issue, argued that 
Union Carbide’s records, which listed hundreds of ineffective catalysts, 
showed that to generate an “efficiency enhancing” catalyst as claimed 
would require “undue experimentation”.298  In arguing to uphold the 
jury’s verdict that the claims were not enabled, Chief Judge Mayer 
relied on Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc.299 and Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co.,300 which indicate that if a significant number 
of combinations covered by a claim are inoperative, then the claim 
might be invalid.301 
In Crown Operations International, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc.,302 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that 
Solutia’s ‘511 patent was not anticipated and vacated the court’s grant 
of summary judgment that Solutia’s ‘258 patent was not invalid for lack 
of enablement and written description.303  In affirming the district 
court, the Federal Circuit rejected Crown’s argument that if a prior art 
reference disclosed the same structure as claimed by a patent, a 
property resulting from that structure should be assumed.304  The 
Federal Circuit reasoned that for a limitation to be inherently 
disclosed, “it must necessarily be present and a person of ordinary skill 
in the art would recognize its presence.”305  However, the presence of 
the property cannot be shown by probabilities and possibilities.306  
The district court held that Solutia’s ‘258 patent was enabled, but 
the Federal Circuit found that the district court failed to consider 
                                                          
 295. Id. at 1171, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547. 
 296. Id. at 1186, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 297. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558-59. 
 298. Id. at 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 299. 256 F.3d 1298, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 300. 750 F.2d 1569, 244 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 301. Union Carbide, 308 F.3d at 1192-93, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563 (citing Durel, 
256 F.3d at 1306-07, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244; Atlas, 750 F.2d at 1576-77, 24 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 414). 
 302. 289 F.3d 1367, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1917 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 303. Id. at 1370, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918. 
 304. Id. at 1377, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922. 
 305. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922-23. 
 306. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
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Crown’s evidence that the ‘258 patent contained ambiguities that 
raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether the invention 
could be practiced without undue experimentation.307  Further, the 
Federal Circuit felt that inoperative embodiments resulting from the 
ambiguities were further evidence that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to the enablement claim.308 
3. Best mode 
In Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,309 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey concerning a 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) patent lawsuit based on 
Schein Pharmaceutical’s filing an ANDA for generic Ciprofloxacin 
(“Cipro”).310  Bayer AG filed a series of applications also claiming 
Cipro.311  As to the patent at issue, Schein argued that Bayer could not 
claim priority stemming back to an earlier application because that 
application failed to meet the best mode requirement.312 
The Federal Circuit analyzed all seven cases where it held claims 
invalid for failure to satisfy the best mode requirement and found the 
cases all involved a “failure to disclose a preferred embodiment” or a 
“failure to disclose a preference that materially affected making or 
using the invention.”313  The Federal Circuit found that the inventor’s 
preferred way of making an intermediate compound had no material 
effect on the properties of the end product and failure to disclose that 
method was not a best mode violation.314  In doing so, the Federal 
Circuit rejected appellants’ argument (based on a misinterpretation of 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.315), that the best mode of 
obtaining novel subject matter necessary to practice the invention must 
be disclosed.316 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rader stated that he would simply 
affirm the district court decision because “the best mode requirement 
‘does not compel disclosure of an unclaimed method.’”317  Judge Rader 
would not widen the “best mode net,” as did the majority, to capture 
                                                          
 307. Id. at 1379, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924. 
 308. Id. at 1380-81, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925-26. 
 309. 301 F.3d 1306, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 310. Id. at 1308, 1311, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002, 1004. 
 311. Id. at 1310-11, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-04. 
 312. Id. at 1313, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 313. Id. at 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
 314. Id. at 1321-22, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 315. 251 F.3d 955, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 316. Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1322, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013. 
 317. Id. at 1323, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013 (Rader, J., concurring) (quoting 
Bayer AG & Bayer Corp. v Schein Pharm., 129 F. Supp. 2d. 705, 721 (D.N.J. 2001)). 
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the properties of the claimed invention and any material effect or 
impact on those properties.318  He explained that the best mode 
requirement is self-enforcing; failure to meet its requirements creates 
the risk that someone will discover and patent a best mode, thereby 
obtaining a blocking patent.319  Judge Rader would limit the best mode 
requirement to the “scope of the claimed invention” per the provisions 
of 35 U.S.C. § 112, because the current requirement is at best a “trap 
for the uninformed applicant.”320 
In Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.,321 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the best mode requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.  In this 
case, Ficosa appealed, inter alia, the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment finding there was no best mode violation of a patent 
directed to a serviceable clip core coupling used as a component of a 
two-piece shift cable in certain GM vehicles.322 
On appeal, Ficosa argued that the inventor knew of a “best way” of 
practicing the invention with a particular thickness and hardness of the 
clip, but failed to disclose it.323  Teleflex argued that the thickness and 
hardness of the materials of the clip are specific to the particular 
commercial embodiment, e.g., GM requirements.324  The Federal 
Circuit noted that compliance with the best mode requirement is a 
question of fact requiring a two-pronged inquiry.325 The subjective first 
prong focuses on the inventor’s state of mind when filing the patent 
application, and is directed to whether the inventor considered one 
mode of practicing the invention to be superior to all other modes at 
that time.326 The objective second prong asks if the inventor adequately 
disclosed the mode considered to be superior.327  With respect to this 
two-prong test, “‘the best mode inquiry is directed to what the 
applicant regards as the invention, which in turn is measured by the 
claims.’”328 
The Federal Circuit, noting that the best mode requirement does 
not extend to production details or customer requirements, 
                                                          
 318. Id. at 1324, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014. 
 319. Id. at 1325, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014-15. 
 320. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015. 
 321. 299 F.3d 1313, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374. 
 322. See supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text (describing the Teleflex 
holding). 
 323. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1329, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383 (citation omitted in 
original). 
 324. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383. 
 325. Id. at 1330, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 326. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 327. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384-85. 
 328. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383 (quoting Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer 
Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 100, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
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determined that the alleged best mode information relating to 
hardness of the clip involved unclaimed subject matter relating to 
production details dictated by customer requirements.329   Accordingly, 
the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in 
concluding that the alleged best mode related to customer 
requirements and was therefore not a best mode violation.330  As a 
result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment.331 
4. Indefiniteness 
In Verve L.L.C. v. Crane Cams, Inc.,332 with respect to indefiniteness, 
the Federal Circuit determined that the claims on appeal were directed 
to push rods for engines with a wall thickness that is substantially 
constant.333  According to the district court, the specification and 
prosecution history did not support the term “substantially” and was 
not adequately defined.334  The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that 
the lower court erred in ruling that the intrinsic evidence of the 
specification and prosecution history are the sole sources of meaning 
for words when used in a technologic context.335  Specifically, the 
Federal Circuit held that: 
It is well established that when the term “substantially” serves 
reasonably to describe the subject matter so that persons in the 
field of the invention would understand its scope, and to 
distinguish the claimed subject matter from the prior art, it is not 
indefinite.  Understanding of this scope may be derived from 
extrinsic evidence without rendering the claim invalid.  The 
summary judgment record offered no basis for departing from 
these general rules.336 
In All Dental Prodx v. Advantage Dental Products, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed in part and reversed in part a summary judgment decision, 
finding that Advantage’s patent for a method for making a custom 
dental impression complied with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1-2.337  The claim 
language in dispute was “original unidentified mass.”338  All Dental sold 
tablets that were oval-shaped and flat and could be molded onto a 
                                                          
 329. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 330. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 331. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 332. 311 F.3d 1116, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 333. Id. at 1119, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 334. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 335. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 336. Id. at 1120, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 337. 309 F.3d 774, 776-77 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1945, 1946-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 338. Id. at 779-80, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948-49. 
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tooth to take an impression.339  The Federal Circuit stated that while 
the disputed language may not be a “model of clarity,” it is easily 
understood when put in the context of the specification.340  The 
Federal Circuit noted that the specification does not need to describe 
the subject matter in the exact terms used in the claims, it must simply 
indicate to persons skilled in the art that, as of the filing date, the 
applicant invented what is now being claimed.341  
With respect to definiteness, the Federal Circuit held that the 
prosecution history aided in clarifying the meaning of “original 
unidentified mass” because Advantage twice distinguished their 
invention over the prior art based on that limitation.342  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that the prosecution history made it clear that 
“original unidentified mass” meant that the object lacked any specific 
form and thus the claims were not indefinite.343  As a result, the Federal 
Circuit held that All Dental did not infringe Advantage’s patent 
because All Dental’s tablets had a specific form and shape.344 
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s holding that Cardiac Pacemaker’s patent 
was invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112.345  The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding that the patent did not 
disclose the corresponding structure to a recited third means for 
performing the dual functions of monitoring the ECG signal and 
activating the charging means.346  In so doing, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the argument that the physician could be the corresponding 
structure or that the physician connected multiple structures that 
performed the claimed functions because, among other things, the 
claim language did not permit separate structures to perform the 
functions with a physician’s input.347  Indeed, the Federal Circuit noted 
that the intrinsic evidence required the undisclosed corresponding 
structure to perform both dual functions recited.348 
                                                          
 339. Id. at 777, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946-47. 
 340. Id. at 779, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. 
 341. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948 (quoting Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 
1038, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)). 
 342. Id. at 780, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949. 
 343. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949. 
 344. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949. 
 345. 296 F.3d 1106, 1107 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1725, 1726 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 346. Id. at 1114, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730-31. 
 347. Id. at 1116-18, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1732-34. 
 348. Id. at 1116, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1732. 
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D. Reexamination 
In In re Bass,349 the Federal Circuit held that the USPTO was 
permitted to consider references identified and discussed in a first 
reexamination proceeding in other reexamination proceedings, even 
though the patentee received a Notice of Intent to Issue 
Reexamination Certificate (“Notice”) in the first proceeding.350  Under 
35 U.S.C. § 303(a), the Federal Circuit held that “previously 
considered prior art from a prior proceeding could not raise a 
substantial new question of patentability.”351  As such, the patentee 
argued that the examiner’s obviousness rejection based on such 
references in a second reexamination proceeding was improper.352  
The Federal Circuit, however, held that the USPTO can reconsider an 
earlier action until a matter is completed.353  The Notice did not 
preclude the USPTO from further reconsideration and review of the 
matter, including basing a rejection on references identified in the first 
reexamination proceeding, because a reexamination is complete only 
upon the statutorily mandated issuance of a reexamination 
certificate.354 
E. Reissue 
In In re Doyle,355 the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a 
decision by the Board, finding that the Board erroneously rejected the 
pending claims in Doyle’s reissue application by extending the Orita 
doctrine.356  In the initial prosecution, Doyle’s application was subject 
to a nine-way restriction requirement.357  After the prosecution and 
issuance of the elected claims, but before the two-year statutory limit, 
Doyle applied for a broadening reissue patent.358  During reissue 
prosecution, Doyle conceded that the reissue genus claims read on, 
                                                          
 349. 314 F.3d 575, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 350. Id. at 576, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157. 
 351. Id. at 577, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157 (citing In re Portola Packaging, 110 
F.3d 786, 791, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1295, 1300) (Fed. Cir. 1997); see 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) 
(2000) (allowing the Director to determine whether there is a substantial new question 
of patentability within three months following the filing of a request for 
reexamination). 
 352. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157. 
 353. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157. 
 354. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157. 
 355. 293 F.3d 1355, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 356. Id. at 1356, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162; see In re Orita, 550 F.2d 1277, 1280 
n.7, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 148 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that the applicant did 
not demonstrate an error justifying the reissuance of a patent solely because the patent 
examiner was authorized to cancel non-existent claims). 
 357. In re Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1356, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 358. Id. at 1356-57, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
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but were broader than the non-elected claims of the original 
prosecution.359  The Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of the 
reissue claims based on a failure to specify an error correctable by 
reissue under the Orita doctrine.360  
The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether failure to present a 
“claim broad enough to read on, or link, two or more groups of claims 
subject to a restriction requirement, is an error correctable by 
reissue.”361  The Federal Circuit found that such an error was 
correctable by reissue.362  Orita prevents reissue applicants from 
“obtaining substantially identical claims to those of non-elected groups 
identified in a restriction requirement” if  the  claims could not have 
been prosecuted in the application from which they were restricted.363  
The Federal Circuit held that Orita was inapplicable to the case at bar 
because Doyle’s new claims were not identical or substantially similar 
to the non-elected claims.364  As a result, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that since Doyle could have prosecuted his claims with the elected 
group without conflicting with the restriction requirement–-due to the 
fact that they are linking claims–-the Board erred in not allowing him 
to do so.365 
F. Design Patent 
In Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co.,366 both Rosco and Mirror Lite asserted 
their patents against each other.  Rosco owned a design patent, while 
Mirror Lite owned a utility patent.  The Federal Circuit reversed the 
lower court with respect to the utility patent holding that the design 
patent did not inherently anticipate the utility patent.  With respect to 
the design patent, the district court held that the design patent was 
functional and obvious, and therefore invalid.367 The Federal Circuit, 
reminding the lower court of its obligations to establish a record with 
findings of fact and separate conclusions of law, reversed in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded the case to the district court to address 
various fact-finding issues.368   
In reversing, the Federal Circuit noted that Mirror Lite did not show 
by clear and convincing evidence that there were no designs that had 
                                                          
 359. Id. at 1357, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 360. Id. at 1358, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. 
 361. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. 
 362. Id. at 1361, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 363. Id. at 1359, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 364. Id. at 1360, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 365. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 366. 304 F.3d 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 367. Id. at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678. 
 368. Id. at 1376, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.  
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the same functional capabilities as Rosco’s design.369  In evaluating a 
design patent, the Court applied a stringent standard for invalidating a 
design patent on grounds of functionality:  the design of a useful 
article is deemed functional where “the appearance of the claimed 
design is ‘dictated by’ the use or purpose of the article.”370 “When there 
are several ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture, 
the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental 
purpose.”371 In this case, the Federal Circuit determined that the mere 
fact that the mirror claimed in the design patent exhibited a superior 
field of view over a single predecessor mirror “does not establish that 
the design was ‘dictated by’ functional considerations, as required by 
LA. Gear.”372  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that Mirror Lite had 
not shown by clear and convincing evidence that there were no 
designs, other than the one shown in Rosco’s patent, that have the 
same functional capabilities as Rosco’s oval mirror.373  Thus, it could 
not be said that the design patent was dictated by functional 
considerations.  The Federal Circuit reversed the district court and 
held that the patent in suit was not shown to be invalid on functionality 
grounds.374  
G. Interference and Priority of Invention  
In Slip Track Systems, Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc.,375 the Federal Circuit 
vacated and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
of priority.376  The Federal Circuit also reversed the dismissal of the 
cross-complaint and affirmed the denial of leave to amend the 
complaint.377  As a preliminary matter, the Federal Circuit noted that, 
while the district courts handling interfering patent suits under 35 
U.S.C. § 291 do not have to define the interfering subject matter in a 
way similar to a count defined by the USPTO under 35 U.S.C. § 135, 
the courts are required to define the bounds of the interfering subject 
matter in a single description.378  
                                                          
 369. Id. at 1378-79, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 370. Id. at 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom 
McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 
1993)) (citation and quotation omitted). 
 371. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc., 988 F.2d at 1123, 25 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (citation omitted in original). 
 372. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 373. Id. at 1378-79, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 374. Id. at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 375. 304 F.3d 1256, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1423 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 376. Id. at 1260, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425. 
 377. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425. 
 378. Id. at 1264, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428; see 35 U.S.C. § 291 (2000) (allowing 
an owner of an interfering patent relief against the owner of another patent); id. § 135 
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The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s determination of 
priority, finding that the lower court erroneously used the clear and 
convincing standard.379  Using the correct preponderance of the 
evidence standard, the Federal Circuit reasoned that in a case where 
the necessity of testing is more uncertain and where there is other 
uncontroverted evidence that the inventor knew that the invention 
would work for its intended purpose, it is inappropriate to grant 
summary judgment based on the lack of testing alone.380  The Federal 
Circuit noted that while testing is not itself a requisite for reduction to 
practice, it may be required to show that a prototype demonstrates that 
an invention suits its intended purpose.381  In this case, the specific 
question remanded to the district court was whether an “embodiment 
made of different materials demonstrates that the invention would 
work for its intended purpose.”382  
In Manning v. Paradis,383 the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO 
Board’s decision awarding judgment to the senior party, Paradis, in an 
interference.384  The sole issue considered was whether the junior party, 
Manning, reduced to practice the subject matter of the count before 
the filing date of the senior party.385  The Federal Circuit noted the 
well-settled rule that “‘[i]n order to establish an actual reduction to 
practice, the inventor must prove that (1) he constructed an 
embodiment or performed a process that met all the limitations of the 
interference count; and (2) he determined that the invention would 
work for its intended purpose.’”386  After construing the count to 
include a limitation of the intended purpose stated in the preamble, 
the Federal Circuit determined that Manning did not know that the 
invention would work for its intended purpose at the time of his 
alleged reduction to practice.387  The Federal Circuit based its decision 
on his counsel’s virtual concession on the issue at oral argument and 
the Federal Circuit’s review of a journal article authored by Manning 
and relied upon to establish his priority date, which showed that at that 
                                                          
(outlining the procedures for an infringement action). 
 379. Slip Track Sys., 304 F.3d at 1261, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426. 
 380. Id. at 1267, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430-31. 
 381. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. 
 382. Id. at 1268, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. 
 383. 296 F.3d 1098, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 384. Id. at 1099, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 385. Id. at 1100, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 386. Id. at 1102, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684 (quoting Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 
F.3d 1321, 1327, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 387. Id. at 1103-05, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685-86. 
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time he did not know the invention would work for its intended 
purpose.388 
In Berman v. Housey,389 the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO 
Board’s interference decision entering judgment in favor of Housey 
and dismissing Berman’s unpatentability motion as moot.390  First, the 
Federal Circuit addressed whether the Board properly dismissed 
Berman’s unpatentability motion.  Berman argued that the Board 
improperly decided Housey’s preliminary motion of lack of interfering 
subject matter before its unpatentability motion.391  The Federal Circuit 
held that 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) is a threshold issue best addressed by the 
Board at the preliminary stage of an interference before proceeding 
on the merits.392  Accordingly, the Board properly refused to consider 
Berman’s unpatentability motion once it determined that § 135(b) 
barred its proffered interfering claim.393  The Federal Circuit rejected 
Berman’s argument that the Board was required to address the 
unpatentability motion because of 35 U.S.C. § 6, which provides in 
relevant part that “[t]he [Board] . . . shall determine priority and 
patentability of invention.”394  The Federal Circuit found that the 
legislative histories of §§ 6 and 135(a) indicates that those provisions 
address only what the Board is empowered to consider, without 
establishing an affirmative obligation to perform.395  
With respect to the second issue addressed by the Federal Circuit—
the termination of the interference under § 135(b) due to the failure 
to declare such interference within a year of the issuance of the 
allegedly interfering patent—the Federal Circuit barred Berman’s 
claim.396  The Federal Circuit found that Berman waived its right to 
contend, on appeal, that claim sixty-four was not barred.397  At the 
Board level, Berman did not contest the fact that claim sixty-four was 
directed to the same or substantially the same subject matter as 
Housey’s patents that issued more than a year before claim sixty-four 
was proffered for interference.398  Instead, Berman only argued that its 
claim twenty-seven (which was filed within the one year time period) 
                                                          
 388. Id. at 1105, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686. 
 389. 291 F.3d 1345, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 390. Id. at 1347, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024. 
 391. Id. at 1350-51, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026-27. 
 392. Id. at 1351, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. 
 393. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. 
 394. Id. at 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029, see 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2000) . 
 395. Id. at 1353-54, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 396. Id. at 1354-55, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 397. Id. at 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 398. Id. at 1354-55, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
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was the same or substantially the same as its claim sixty-four.399  
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that because Berman never argued 
at the Board that claim sixty-four is not directed to the same or 
substantially the same subject matter as the relevant claims in Housey’s 
patents, Berman waived that argument and could not raise it on 
appeal.400  
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Berman’s contention that 
because it filed claim sixty-four within one year of the later Housey 
patent (“Housey III”), an interference should be declared with that 
patent.401  The Federal Circuit held that Housey’s earlier patent claims 
“constitute a proper basis for barring claim sixty-four under § 135(b), 
and the subsequent issuance of Housey III cannot revive claim sixty-
four once it lost its right to patentability” with respect to the earlier 
Housey patents.402   
In Adang v. Fischhoff,403 the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-
in-part, and remanded the USPTO Board’s decision against Adang, the 
senior party in the interference.404  The Board found the application to 
be non-enabling and that actual reduction to practice was not proven 
before Fischhoff’s priority date.405  The invention involved genetically 
modifying tomato plants to protect against certain types of insects.406  
The Federal Circuit held that the Board erred in its count 
construction, noting that “[i]t is too great a leap to mandate that, in 
order to come within the scope of the count, expression of a gene 
‘capable of encoding’ a protein must be shown to produce only that 
protein.”407  Further, the Board’s construction was too narrow, resulting 
in neither Fischhoff nor Adang presenting an example sufficient to 
satisfy the limitations of the count.408  However, the Board’s decision of 
non-enablement was supported by substantial evidence.  The Board 
determined that a person skilled in the art would not expect success in 
transferring the technique to a different tomato plant without undue 
experimentation.409  Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s 
claim construction,410 affirmed the decision of non-enablement with 
                                                          
 399. Id. at 1355, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 400. Id. at 1355, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 401. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 402. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 403. 286 F.3d 1346, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1504 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 404. Id. at 1347, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505. 
 405. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505. 
 406. Id. at 1347-48, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505-06. 
 407. Id. at 1354, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510 (citation omitted in original). 
 408. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510. 
 409. Id. at 1355-56, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511. 
 410. Id. at 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
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regard to one of Adang’s CIP applications,411 and remanded to 
determine whether Adang could establish entitlement to a priority 
date based on another CIP application at issue.412 
In Griffin v. Bertina,413 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s 
decision awarding priority to the senior party, Bertina.414  The 
invention at issue was a method for diagnosing thrombosis by 
obtaining a nucleic acid containing the codon for human Factor V 
from a test subject and assaying for the presence of a point mutation 
that indicates an increased risk for thrombosis.415  Griffin attempted to 
establish an actual reduction to practice prior to Bertina’s accorded 
date.416  On appeal, Griffin argued that the count should be construed 
as limited only to its manipulative steps.417  Therefore, Griffin asserted 
that he completed those manipulative steps, thus reducing the count 
to practice prior to Bertina’s priority date.418  The Federal Circuit 
disagreed, stating that the count is limited by the preamble  because it 
gives “meaning and purpose” to the manipulative steps.419  For 
example, the Federal Circuit pointed out that, while the first step 
stated that the test nucleic acid should be obtained from a “test 
subject,” without the preamble’s stated objective of diagnose 
thrombosis, the term “test subject” was meaningless.420  The Federal 
Circuit also found that a party attempting to prove that it need not be 
required to establish reduction to practice of every characteristic listed 
in the count due to their alleged inherency must prove that such 
inherent qualities add nothing to the count beyond the other cited 
limitations.421  Therefore, the Federal Circuit stated that Griffin’s 
argument regarding performing the steps inherently diagnosing 
thrombosis fails.422  The Federal Circuit held that the relationship 
between the point mutation and an increased risk of thrombosis is 
material to the patentability of the count because it indicates the 
purpose of the method.423  Thus, because Griffin lacked appreciation 
for the utility of the point mutation as actually correlating with an 
                                                          
 411. Id. at 1360, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
 412. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
 413. 285 F.3d 1029, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 414. Id. at 1030, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 415. Id. at 1030-31, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 416. Id. at 1031, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 417. Id. at 1032, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433. 
 418. Id. at 1032-33, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433. 
 419. Id. at 1033, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. 
 420. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (citation omitted in original). 
 421. Id. at 1034, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. 
 422. Id. at 1034-35, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434-35. 
 423. Id. at 1034, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434-35. 
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heightened risk of thrombosis, it failed to prove a successful reduction 
to practice.424 
In Scott v. Koyama,425 the junior party, Scott, sought to establish a 
priority date in the United States by proving that he was in possession 
of the invention of the count in the United States before Koyama’s 
Japanese filing date.426  Scott presented evidence of a conception date, 
diligence, and actual reduction to practice.427  In particular, Scott 
offered evidence of daily activity over a period of seventeen days 
involving planning construction of a manufacturing facility to practice 
the process of the count.428  As the Federal Circuit noted, an 
interference proceeding commences with a determination of the 
parties’ effective filing dates.429  The “senior party,” the party with the 
earlier effective filing date, will prevail unless the junior party 
establishes entitlement to an earlier date.430  The Board found Scott’s 
evidence insufficient to establish actual reduction to practice.431  The 
Federal Circuit agreed that this evidence did not establish actual 
reduction to practice, but, in reversing the Board decision, held that 
this evidence should have been considered as evidence of reduction to 
practice.432 
In Brown v. Barbacid,433 the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the 
Board’s decision in this interference case, holding that:  (1) the 
ultimate burden of proof with respect to priority always remains on the 
junior party;434 (2) the Board, with respect to authentication, must 
weigh evidence from the vantage point of one skilled in the art;435 
(3) independent evidence must corroborate the inventor’s testimony 
of conception or actual reduction to practice and this evidence is 
reviewed by the Federal Circuit under “rule of reason” analysis to 
determine sufficient corroboration;436 (4) an inventor does not 
establish a conception date if the physical and testimonial evidence 
relating to that date does not include an element of the count;437 (5) in 
                                                          
 424. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 425. 281 F.3d 1243, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 426. Id. at 1246, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 427. Id. at 1246-48, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858-59. 
 428. Id. at 1247, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858-59. 
 429. Id. at 1246, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 430. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 431. Id. at 1247-48, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. 
 432. Id. at 1248-49, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858-59. 
 433. 276 F.3d 1327, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 434. Id. at 1332-33, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238-39.  But see id. at 1340, 61 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243 (“[T]he junior party bears no burden of proof as to the 
senior party’s dates of conception and reduction to practice.”). 
 435. Id. at 1333-34, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239-40. 
 436. Id. at 1334-35, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240. 
 437. Id. at 1335-36, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240-41. 
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determining the date of conception, physical evidence containing all 
elements of the count requires no further corroboration to 
demonstrate the content of the physical evidence itself–-the Board 
must then consider evidence relating to reasonable diligence in 
reduction to practice;438 and (6) where the senior party’s brief did not 
rely on testimonial evidence, the Board is correct in declining to 
consider the testimony with respect to the party’s conception and 
reduction to practice.439 
H. Patent Term 
In Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Technology, Inc.,440 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, 
holding that the patent at issue was valid until December 3, 2003 as a 
result of the Uruguay Rounds Agreements Act (“URAA”).441  In April 
2001, Carlsbad notified Bayer that it submitted an ANDA on 
ciprofloxacin.442  Bayer filed suit against Carlsbad, asserting that the 
patent at issue was valid until December 9, 2003.443  Carlsbad 
counterclaimed that the patent was valid only until October 1, 2002 
because of a terminal disclaimer that Bayer filed before passage of the 
URAA.444  The Federal Circuit determined that the URAA amendment 
automatically changed the expiration date of the earlier patent on 
which the terminal disclaimer was based.445  As a result, the patent at 
issue was entitled to the later date.446 
I. Inventorship 
In Trovan Ltd. v. Sokmat SA., Irori,447 the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded a decision by U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California, holding the district court did not properly construe the 
claims at issue, thereby necessitating resolution of factual questions 
regarding inventorship.448  In this case, Trovan and Sokymat agreed to 
work together to optimize production of Trovan’s transponders.449  
The Federal Circuit first reiterated that when a patent either includes 
                                                          
 438. Id. at 1336-37, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241-42. 
 439. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242. 
 440. 298 F.3d 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 441. Id. at 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046. 
 442. Id. at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047. 
 443. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047. 
 444. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047. 
 445. Id. at 1382-83, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049-50. 
 446. Id. at 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049-50. 
 447. 299 F.3d 1292, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 448. Id. at 1294, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865. 
 449. Id. at 1298, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867. 
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names other than the true inventors or omits names of the true 
inventors, it is rendered invalid.450  However, the presumed validity of a 
patent creates a presumption that the named inventors are the only 
inventors.451  As a result of this presumption, correcting the misjoinder 
or nonjoinder of inventors requires clear and convincing evidence.452  
Here, the district court found Gustafson (Sokymat) to be the inventor 
of the ‘410 patent because Trovan could not prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Hadden and Zirbes, Trovan employees, were 
co-inventors.453  However, the Federal Circuit stated that the fact that 
the ‘410 patent contained claims that overlapped those of the ‘855 
patent, which issued to Hadden and Zirbes, did not mean that 
Gustafson was a co-inventor of the ‘855 patent.454  The Federal Circuit 
then interpreted the claims regarding inventorship of the ‘855 patent 
and determined that the factual record was incomplete.455  
Consequently, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for the district 
court to determine proper inventorship by determining each party’s 
contributions to the invention.456  Judge Michel dissented, stating that 
although the district court may have erred in its claim construction, it 
amounted only to harmless error.457  
In University of West Virginia v. VanVoorhies,458 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the 
plaintiff University’s claim that a co-inventor to certain patent 
applications breached his duty to assign inventions developed when 
he was a graduate student at the University.459  In its opinion, the 
Federal Circuit first acknowledged that while contract law questions 
are matters of state law, the problem of whether a patent application 
is a continuation-in-part of an earlier-filed patent application (thus 
covered by a previously executed assignment) is a matter for federal 
patent law.460  Moreover, the Federal Circuit held that under the 
University’s patent policy, the defendant was obligated to assign a 
patent application to the University even in the absence of a contract 
expressly requiring such assignment.461  In affirming the district 
                                                          
 450. Id. at 1301, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 451. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 452. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (citing Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 
Inc., 105 F.3d 976, 979-80, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782, 1785-86 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 453. Id. at 1303, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72. 
 454. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72. 
 455. Id. at 1304-10, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872-77. 
 456. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877. 
 457. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877 (Michel, J., dissenting). 
 458. 278 F.3d 1288, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 459. Id. at 1291-92, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450. 
 460. Id. at 1296-97, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 461. Id. at 1298, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
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court’s rejection of the defendant’s argument that a previously 
executed assignment was invalid, the Federal Circuit clarified that 
although the doctrine of assignor estoppel precludes challenges to 
the validity of a patent itself, it does not bar challenges to the legality 
of a contract assigning the patent.462  Finally, the Federal Circuit held 
that an inventor’s act of providing technical information to the 
University’s patent counsel and executing documents for a patent 
application prosecution did not give rise to an attorney-client 
relationship.  Thus, the Federal Circuit deemed disqualification 
unnecessary when the University and the defendant investor’s 
interest became adverse.463 
In Thompson v. Haynes,464 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s holding denying each party’s claim for correction of 
inventorship to remove the other party’s employee as a co-inventor.465  
Thompson entered into an agreement with Fluid Controls to develop 
a fluid conducting swivel concept.466  Fluid Controls was issued a 
patent on this concept, and for a period of time, Thompson served as 
a distributor for the patented fluid conducting swivels.467  
Subsequently, Thompson ended the distributor relationship and 
began manufacturing his own swivels, and upon threat of suit by 
Fluid Controls, Thompson filed suit for a declaratory judgment of 
non-infringement.468  Fluid Controls counterclaimed alleging 
infringement, violation of the Lanham Act,469 and violation of state 
unfair competition law.470  The district court found Thompson guilty 
of violating the Lanham Act and state deceptive trade practices act 
and awarded Fluid Controls injunctive relief, costs, attorneys’ fees, 
and damages consisting of lost sales and Thompson’s profits, both 
trebled.471  On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that “the 
burden on each party was to show facts supported by clear and 
convincing evidence that the other person listed as an inventor had 
not in fact contributed to the conception of the invention.”472  Thus, 
each party’s clear and convincing evidence that its employee 
                                                          
 462. Id. at 1301, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457. 
 463. Id. at 1303-04, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 464. 305 F.3d 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 465. Id. at 1372, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 466. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 467. Id. at 1372-73, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 468. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 469. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000). 
 470. Thompson, 305 F.3d at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 471. Id. at 1373-74, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53. 
 472. Id. at 1384, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661. 
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contributed to the invention misapprehended the burden on it.473  As 
a result, the district court properly found that neither party presented 
clear and convincing evidence that the other party’s employee should 
be removed as inventor and thus properly refused to correct the 
inventorship to the patent in suit.474 
J. Prosecution History Laches 
In Symbol Technology, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research 
Foundation,475 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding 
that, as a matter of law, the defense of prosecution laches was not 
available.476  The Federal Circuit held that “the equitable doctrine of 
laches may be applied to bar enforcement of patent claims that are 
issued after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution 
even though the applicant complied with pertinent statutes and 
rules.”477  In so doing, the Federal Circuit rejected the arguments that 
(1) the doctrine was limited to interference actions under the Webster 
Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electrical Co.,478 and its progeny;479 (2) that the 
Patent Act of 1952 forecloses the application of prosecution laches;480 
and (3) that two of the Federal Circuit’s non-precedential opinions 
rejecting prosecution laches defense should be binding on the Federal 
Circuit.481   
In In re Bogese II,482 the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the 
USPTO Board finding that Bogese surrendered his right to a patent 
due to prosecution history laches.483  The Federal Circuit found that 
the USPTO is authorized to reject a patent application when the 
applicant fails to advance prosecution of his application for an 
unreasonably long period of time, provided the USPTO gives notice of 
the potential consequence of failure.484  Here, the Federal Circuit 
quoted approvingly the Board’s finding that the appellant’s conduct in 
                                                          
 473. Id. at 1384, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661. 
 474. Id. at 1384, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661. 
 475. 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 476. Id. at 1363, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 477. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 478. 264 U.S. 463 (1924). 
 479. See Symbol Tech., 277 F.3d at 1365, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (stating that in 
Webster, the Court based their decision on the reasonableness of the prosecution’s 
delay, not on whether there was interference). 
 480. See id. at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518-19 (explaining that the 
legislative history suggests that the drafters did not intend the Patent Act of 1952 to 
preclude the defense of prosecution laches). 
 481. Id. at 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520. 
 482. 303 F.3d 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1448 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 483. Id. at 1363, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449. 
 484. Id. at 1367-68, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53. 
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delaying issuance of his patent, thereby extending its term, was “‘so 
egregious in defeating the policy of the patent laws of promoting 
science and the useful arts as to be presumed unreasonable.’”485  
Similarly, the Federal Circuit approved the Board’s holding that 
forfeiture of a patent is appropriate when someone, “‘intentionally or 
by reason of culpable neglect, is guilty of action which unduly 
postpones the time the public would be entitled to the free use of the 
invention.’”486  In fact, the Federal Circuit viewed the USPTO authority 
to punish undue delay as “even broader than the authority of a district 
court to hold a patent unenforceable.”487 
In dissent, consistent with her opinion in Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. 
Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation.488 Judge Newman 
stated that the court has given patent examiners “a new power to deny 
a patent on the ground that the applicant dawdled too long in 
prosecution.”489  Judge Newman found this holding inconsistent with In 
re Henriksen,490 where the Court of Customs and Patents Appeals said 
that there is no statutory basis for fixing an arbitrary limit on the 
number of prior applications in a chain of co-pending applications for 
purposes of claiming priority.491  Judge Newman saw the USPTO’s 
equitable power as limited to relieving distress, not causing it.492  
Interestingly, she explained that fixing that limit to twenty years from 
filing will make persistent filing rarer, but simultaneously contended 
that the USPTO’s new power will increase the burden on all applicants 
in order to punish a rare transgressor.493 
III. INFRINGEMENT 
In 2002, the Federal Circuit considered numerous appeals 
concerning patent infringement.  Central to its infringement 
decisions was often construing a claim.  For the most part, the court 
followed the basic tenets of claim construction and relied on the 
                                                          
 485. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451 (quoting Ex parte Bogese II, slip op. at 
33-34, No. 86-1699, 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 16, 1987)). 
 486. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451 (quoting Ex parte Bogese II, slip op. at 
35-36, No. 86-1699, 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 16, 1987)). 
 487. Id. at 1367-68 & n.5, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53 & n.5. 
 488. 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 489. In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 490. 399 F.2d 253, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 224 (C.C.P.A. 1968). 
 491. Id. at 254, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 225. 
 492. In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d at 1371, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 493. Id. at 1372-73, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
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ordinary meaning of a claim term or intrinsic evidence to determine 
the meaning of a claim.   
Ironically, it was the Supreme Court, not the Federal Circuit, that 
handed down the most important decision concerning infringement 
this year, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.494  In this 
case, the Court considered the scope of the doctrine of equivalents as 
limited by the prosecution history of a patent in suit.  The Court 
reversed the Federal Circuit and held that any amendment could 
narrow the scope of equivalents, but that truly cosmetic amendments 
would not create such a narrow scope. 
In addition to claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents, 
the Federal Circuit had occasion to address the issues of literal 
infringement, inducement of infringement, and design patent 
infringement.  What follows is an overview of some of the 
infringement cases that the court decided in 2002. 
A. Claim Construction 
Construing the claims at issue is the first step in an infringement 
analysis.495  As a general rule, terms in a patent claim receive their 
plain, ordinary, and accepted meaning within the community of 
those of ordinary skill in the relevant art.496  There is a “heavy 
presumption” that favors the use of this accepted meaning.497  
However, if the patentee chooses to use terms in some other manner, 
this presumption may be overcome and the Federal Circuit may 
depart from this customary meaning.498  Accordingly, it is necessary to 
review the specification to determine whether the patentee assigned 
any special meaning to claim terms.499  The specification is the best 
source to determine the meaning of a disputed term.500  However, in 
consulting the specification, the interpretative process may not 
                                                          
 494. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
 495. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996); Allen 
Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1344, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 
1772 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
 496. Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1065, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 497. Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 498. Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1366, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1173, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 
1575, 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 499. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 
1313, 1325, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 500. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577; Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 
1325, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380. 
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import limitations from the specification into the defining language 
of the claims.501  Additionally, if in evidence, the Federal Circuit may 
consider the prosecution history, which is often of critical importance 
in determining the meaning of a claim.502 
1. Interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of claims 
In two related cases, Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. Warner 
Lambert Co.503 (“Inverness I”) and Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. 
Princeton Biomeditech Corp.504 (“Inverness II”), the Federal Circuit 
vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-
infringement on the grounds of an erroneous claim construction.505  
The patents-at-issue in both cases involved a pregnancy-testing 
device.506  In Inverness I, the Federal Circuit indicated that the 
construction of the phrase “mobility . . . is facilitated” from Inverness 
II also applied in this case.507  In Inverness II, the Federal Circuit noted 
that the district court construed the phrase to mean that a “sugar, or 
a material that includes sugar as an ingredient . . . must help or 
improve the release of the labeled reagent from the test strip.”508  The 
Federal Circuit, in Inverness II, disagreed with this interpretation and 
concluded that the claim phrase must be given its ordinary meaning 
of “capacity to make movement easier.”509  The Federal Circuit started 
its construction with the use of dictionaries to determine the ordinary 
meaning of the claim terms.510  The Federal Circuit relied on standard 
English-language dictionaries rather than specialized, technical 
dictionaries because the parties did not argue that the term had an 
established specialized meaning.511  Further, the Federal Circuit 
indicated that it looked to dictionary definitions that were applicable 
                                                          
 501. Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1053, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1474, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 502. Id. at 1053, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476; Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1577. 
 503. 309 F.3d 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 504. 309 F.3d 1365, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 505. Inverness II, 309 F.3d at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927; Inverness I, 309 
F.3d at 1374-75, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933. 
 506. Inverness II, 309 F.3d at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927; Inverness I, 309 
F.3d at 1375, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934. 
 507. Inverness I, 309 F.3d at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935-36. 
 508. Inverness II, 309 F.3d at 1368, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929 (emphasis 
removed) (quoting Conopco, Inc. v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., No. 97-6254 at 8 
(D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2000). 
 509. Id. at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
 510. Id. at 1369-70, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
 511. Id. at 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
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on the date the patents were issued in construing the claim.512  In 
choosing between multiple definitions, the Federal Circuit relied on 
the patent disclosure to differentiate between proper and improper 
meanings.513  The Federal Circuit further indicated that when a claim 
term is used in more than one claim, it should be construed 
consistently.514  In assessing the prosecution history, the Federal 
Circuit did not find “a clear and unambiguous disclaimer of a claim 
scope” that required deviation from the ordinary meaning of the 
claim term.515  
Additionally, in Inverness I, the Federal Circuit discussed the 
construction of the words “on” and “onto.”516  The district court 
construed those words as requiring surface disposition.517  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that those words encompass both surface 
and internal positioning and therefore vacated the district court’s 
judgment.518  Applying the same process as used in Inverness II, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that there are two pertinent definitions 
and that the words may be interpreted to include both alternatives.519  
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit allowed the appellants to raise an 
argument for the first time on appeal because it provided additional 
support for the claim construction the appellants previously 
argued.520  Finally, the Federal Circuit determined that the 
prosecution history did not preclude the use of more expansive 
dictionary definitions encompassing surface and internal 
positioning.521 
In Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,522 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and remanded the district court’s 
construction of various terms.523  In doing so, the Federal Circuit 
reinforced the propriety of courts using dictionaries, encyclopedias 
and treatises to determine the ordinary and customary meaning of 
claim terms.524  The Federal Circuit went on to say that: 
                                                          
 512. Id. at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
 513. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa 
per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 514. Id. at 1371, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931. 
 515. Id. at 1372, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932. 
 516. Inverness I, 309 F.3d 1373, 1377-78, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933, 1936-37 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
 517. Id. at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 518. Id. at 1382, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 519. Id. at 1378-79, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936-37. 
 520. Id. at 1380-81, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 521. Id. at 1382, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 522. 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 523. Id. at 1197, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 524. Id. at 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. 
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Dictionaries are always available to the court to aid in the task of 
determining meanings that would have been attributed by those of 
skill in the relevant art to any disputed terms used by the inventor 
in the claims . . . .  Indeed, these materials may be the most 
meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better 
understanding both the technology and the terminology used by 
those skilled in the art to describe the technology.525   
In Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. v. Dynamic Details, Inc.,526 the 
Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment of non-
infringement based on claim construction.527  The patent at issue was 
for an accurate method of high-speed drilling of small holes in circuit 
boards.528  The district court construed the term “circuit boards” to 
“‘require multiple, separated workpieces, [but] not a system for 
processing a single workpiece.’”529  Based on the language of the 
claim, the specification, and the prosecution history, the Federal 
Circuit determined that the term “circuit boards” does not require 
separated workpieces.530  Despite a depiction in the specification of an 
embodiment that processes physically separate pieces, the Federal 
Circuit did not believe the specification restricted the claim language 
to require separate circuit boards or workpieces.531  Interestingly, the 
Federal Circuit relied on a dictionary to determine that the word 
“multiple” does not require separateness.532 
In Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil 
Co.,533 the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and 
remanded the District Court of Delaware’s finding of non-
infringement of Union Carbide’s patents.534  Union Carbide’s patents 
contained efficiency equations for ethylene-oxide silver catalysts.535  
With respect to the claim construction of one patent, the district 
court interpreted the claims as requiring the infringing party to 
actually use the equation in creating its catalyst, rather than simply 
requiring that the party’s catalyst be used to satisfy the equation.536  
                                                          
 525. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. 
 526. 307 F.3d 1343, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 527. Id. at 1345, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 528. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 529. Id. at 1348, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (citation omitted in original). 
 530. Id. at 1348-50, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783-85. 
 531. Id. at 1349, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784. 
 532. Id. at 1350, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785. 
 533. 308 F.3d 1167, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 534. Id. at 1171, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547. 
 535. Id. at 1171-73, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547-49. 
 536. Id. at 1174, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549. 
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Consequently, the district court construed “characterizable by” to 
mean “determined from.”537 
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit noted that the general rule 
creates a presumption that claim terms mean what they say and 
courts should construe them according to their ordinary and 
accustomed meaning.538  However, the Federal Circuit explained that 
the “heavy presumption” favoring ordinary meaning can be overcome 
if a different meaning is clearly and deliberately put forth in intrinsic 
evidence.539  Relying on a dictionary, the Federal Circuit found that 
the definition of “characterizable” is “capable of being characterized” 
and “characterize” is defined as “to describe the essential character or 
quality of . . . to be a distinguishing characteristic of.”540  From this, 
the Federal Circuit deduced that the ordinary meaning of 
“characterizable by an efficiency equation” was “capable of being 
described by an efficiency equation.”541  This would be the accepted 
meaning “unless the intrinsic evidence clearly redefines the claim 
term to put one reasonably skilled in the relevant art on notice that 
Union Carbide intended to assign the term a different meaning.”542  
After examining the prosecution history and specification, the 
Federal Circuit held that there was no justification to depart from 
“the ordinary meaning of the claim language.”543  With respect to the 
claim term “an efficiency-enhancing amount . . . of a mixture of 
[salts],” the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that this 
meant that the “salts themselves must increase the efficiency of the 
catalyst.”544  Because the Federal Circuit interpreted some of the 
claims differently from the district court, the Federal Circuit 
remanded the cases to determine infringement according to the 
proper claim construction.545  
In CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,546 the Federal Circuit vacated 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement 
                                                          
 537. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549. 
 538. Id. at 1177, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551. 
 539. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1551. 
 540. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1552. 
 541. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 542. Id. at 1177-78, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552 (“We have previously held that, 
in redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the ordinary 
meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim 
term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee 
intended to so redefine the claim term.” (citing Bell Atl. Network Servs., 262 F.3d 
1258, 1268, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 543. Id. at 1177-78, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 544. Id. at 1180, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554. 
 545. Id. at 1190, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1561-62. 
 546. 288 F.3d 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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based on the district court’s erroneous claim construction of the term 
“reciprocating member” as limited to a single-component straight bar 
in the plaintiff’s patent for an elliptical trainer.547  In reaching its 
decision, the Federal Circuit reiterated that there is a strong 
presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary 
meaning.548  The Federal Circuit stated that generally it will interpret 
a term to cover all known structural variation “‘if an apparatus claim 
recites a general structure without limiting that structure to a specific 
subset of structures.’”549  The Federal Circuit noted that its precedents 
show that dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary 
meaning.550 
The Federal Circuit further held that a party accused of 
infringement may overcome the presumption of ordinary meaning 
and narrow a claim term.551  However, it is not enough for the 
accused party to simply indicate a preferred embodiment because a 
patentee is not required to describe every possible embodiment of 
the invention in the specification.552  A narrowing of claims may be 
achieved in several ways:  (1) where the patentee acts as his own 
lexicographer; (2) where the patentee distinguishes the term from 
the prior art in the specification, drawings, or prosecution history; 
(3) where the patentee’s chosen term “so deprives the claim of 
clarity” that resorting to intrinsic evidence is necessary for a definite 
meaning; and (4) where a claim term invokes a means-plus-function 
analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.553  None of the narrowing 
methods was applicable here.554  Instead, the Federal Circuit looked 
                                                          
 547. Id. at 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659. 
 548. Id. at 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citations omitted). 
 549. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa 
per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1234, 1250, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 550. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citing Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 
274 F.3d 1336, 1344, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851, 1855 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (defining the 
ordinary meaning of “portion” as encompassing both a one-piece and a two-piece 
structure using Random House Unabridged Dictionary)); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 
1250, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122 (holding that a term’s meaning may come from a 
“relevant dictionary” as long as the definition does not contradict the plain meaning 
of the patent disclosure); Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1427, 44 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary to define “assembly”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 
1584 n.6, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1580 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that 
technical treatises and dictionaries, though extrinsic to integrated patent documents, 
are legitimate resources which help judges to better understand underlying 
technology and interpret claim terms, so long as such definitions do not contradict 
definitions ascertained by reading patent documents). 
 551. CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citations 
omitted). 
 552. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662. 
 553. Id. at 1366-67, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662-63 (citations omitted). 
 554. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662-63. 
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to the ordinary meaning of “reciprocating member” based on a 
dictionary definition to determine the scope of the claims.555  The 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision because the 
district court imported limitations from the specifications into the 
claims in its claim construction.556 
Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.557 concerned a patent for 
shift cable components used in motor vehicles.558  At issue was the 
term “clip” as used in the claims.559  The judge adopted a narrow 
construction of “clip” but the jury found the claims to be infringed.560  
Ficosa appealed the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of 
law on the non-infringement issue and the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision.561  The Federal Circuit first stated that the 
claim’s words are interpreted “in light of the intrinsic evidence from 
the record, including the written description, the drawings, and the 
prosecution history, if in evidence.”562  Intrinsic evidence may offer 
context and clarification regarding the meaning of claim terms and is 
an important source for the legally operative meaning of language in 
dispute.563 
However, in assessing claim construction, the Federal Circuit stated 
that the number of embodiments disclosed in the specification 
cannot be determined by the meaning of disputed terms.564  As the 
Federal Circuit explained in CCS Fitness, the party accused of 
infringement cannot overcome the presumptive deference to a 
term’s ordinary meaning simply by referencing the preferred 
embodiment, structures, or steps disclosed in the specification or 
prosecution history.565  As a result, the Federal Circuit determined 
that the claim at issue was not limited to the preferred embodiment 
disclosed in the specification.566  The Federal Circuit held that claim 
terms assume “ordinary and accustomed” meanings unless the 
claimant showed an intention to employ a modified definition in the 
intrinsic record “using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or 
restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”567  
                                                          
 555. Id. at 1367, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 556. Id. at 1370, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 557. 299 F.3d 1313, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 558. Id. at 1318, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 559. Id. at 1319, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 560. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 561. Id. at 1318, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 562. Id. at 1324-25, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380. 
 563. Id. at 1325, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380. 
 564. Id. at 1327, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 565. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 566. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 567. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
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Although the Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred 
in its claim construction, it found the error harmless on the issue of 
infringement because the claim included a broader scope of subject 
matter than the jury construction.568  Thus, if Ficosa infringed the 
district court’s narrowly construed claim, it also infringed the Federal 
Circuit’s broader claim.569 
In Neomagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc.,570 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded the district court’s 
entry of summary judgment of non-infringement of Neomagic’s ‘955 
and ‘806 patents.571  The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s 
construction of the term “coupling” in the ‘955 patent to require that 
the voltage applied to the substrate be different from that applied to 
the logic circuit.572  The Federal Circuit used a technical dictionary 
definition of “coupling” to demonstrate the ordinary meaning of the 
term.573  Because the accused devices tap both the substrate and logic 
circuit at the same voltage, the Federal Circuit found that they did 
not infringe the ‘955 patent as a matter of law.574 
With regard to the ‘806 patent, the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded the district court’s construction of “power supply” because 
the district court improperly relied upon the accused device to arrive 
at that definition.575  The Federal Circuit noted that “it is well-settled 
that claims may not be construed by reference to the accused 
device.”576  Finally, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s 
construction of “negative voltage with respect to” as referring to 
absolute voltage.577  The Federal Circuit interpreted the term to refer 
to relative voltage based on the plain meaning of the claim, which it 
viewed as being consistent with the specification.578 
In Middleton, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,579 the 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment of 
non-infringement because the district court applied an erroneous 
                                                          
 568. Id. at 1328-29, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383. 
 569. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383. 
 570. 287 F.3d 1062, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 571. Id. at 1075-76, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
 572. Id. at 1072, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 573. Id. at 1071, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488. 
 574. Id. at 1072-73, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 575. Id. at 1073-74, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489-90. 
 576. Id. at 1074, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita 
Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118, 227 U.S.P.Q. 577, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en 
banc)). 
 577. Id. at 1075, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91. 
 578. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
 579. 311 F.3d 1384, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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claim interpretation based on the meaning of “uniform.”580  The 
claimed invention was a floor finishing material including a 
“uniform” film of clear plastic material.581  The Federal Circuit noted 
that the term “uniform flexible film” apparently did carry any special 
technical meanings and the accepted meaning of “uniform” is 
“having always the same form.”582  The Federal Circuit looked to the 
specification and found that it defines “flexible” as “bendability of the 
sheet but [] not . . . stretchability.”583  Furthermore, the Federal 
Circuit stated that “film” obviously means the clear plastic material 
referred to in the patent disclosure.584  Finally, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that usage and context within the claim itself were the 
most important indicators of the meaning of a term.585  “Uniform” 
could thus mean “uniform in irregularity” as well as “uniform in 
thickness.”586  As a result, a textured surface that was non-uniform in 
thickness could infringe the patent provided that the irregularities 
are uniform.587 
2. The use of the specification and prosecution history in interpreting claims 
In All Dental Prodx v. Advantage Dental Products, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part a summary judgment decision of 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.588  The 
claim language in dispute was “original unidentified mass.”589  All 
Dental sold tablets that were oval-shaped and flat and could be molded 
onto a tooth to take an impression.590  The Federal Circuit stated that 
while the disputed language “was not a model of clarity,” it was easily 
understood when put in the context of the specification.591  The 
Federal Circuit noted that the specification did not need to describe 
the subject matter in the exact terms used in the claims, but simply 
needed to indicate to persons skilled in the art that, as of the filing 
date, the applicant invented what was now being claimed.592  
                                                          
 580. Id. at 1385-86, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 113839. 
 581. Id. at 1385, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 582. Id. at 1387, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (citing WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1290 (1985)). 
 583. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 584. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 585. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 586. Id. at 1389, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 587. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 588. 309 F.3d 774, 776, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1945, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 589. Id. at 778-79, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948-49. 
 590. Id. at 777, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
 591. Id. at 779, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. 
 592. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948 (quoting Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 
1038, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
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In Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enterprises, Inc.,593 the Federal 
Circuit vacated and remanded the decision by the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Ohio denying Guttman’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction because the district court based its decision on 
an erroneous claim construction.594  The patent at issue involved the 
use of a inkjet copy machine to make edible copies of photographs to 
put on cakes.595  Guttman claimed that the novelty of the patent 
stemmed from the conventional wisdom that edible sheets were too 
delicate to go through hot and tortuous path of an inkjet copier and 
that the inventor fashioned the idea to adhere the edible sheet to a 
carrier sheet, and then send it through the manual feed path of a 
conventional inkjet copier with the heaters removed or disabled.596  
The Federal Circuit construed “photocopy machine,” finding that 
insofar as the specification explicitly contemplated that a “photocopy 
machine” could have scanning and reproduction components in 
separate housings, the district court erred in limiting the claims to 
“conventional” photocopy machines.597  As a result, a scanner 
combined with an inkjet printer could be a “photocopy machine” 
under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation.598  Because the intrinsic 
evidence made the claims unambiguous, the district court erred by 
failing to construe the terms in dispute in accordance with that 
evidence.599  The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district 
court for further proceedings based upon the proper claim 
construction.600 
In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.,601 the Federal Circuit reversed 
the district court’s patent infringement award, holding that no 
reasonable jury could find that Baystate infringed a properly 
construed claim of Bowers’ patent.602  Here, Bowers developed and 
received a patent for a template that works in conjunction with a 
computer aided design program named CADKEY, made by Cadkey, 
Inc.603  Subsequently, Bowers took a license for a copyrighted product 
called Geodraft and packaged the two products in a “Designer’s 
                                                          
 593. 302 F.3d 1352, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 594. Id. at 1354, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 595. Id. at 1354-55, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 596. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 597. Id. at 1359-61, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-09. 
 598. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-08. 
 599. Id. at 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308-09. 
 600. Id. at 1363, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 601. 302 F.3d 1334, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 602. Id. at 1338, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065-66. 
 603. Id. at 1338-39, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066-67. 
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Toolkit” that was released in 1990 with a shrink wrap license.604  
Bowers presented the product to Baystate and offered to establish a 
business relationship, but Baystate rejected Bowers’ offer and 
developed a product with similar features as Bowers’ Designer’s 
Toolkit.605  Baystate subsequently purchased Cadkey, Inc., effectively 
eliminating the market for Bowers’ Designer’s Toolkit.606 
The Federal Circuit held, inter alia, that the district court erred in 
its claim construction and reversed the jury verdict of patent 
infringement.607  Relying on the specification and reexamination 
history, the Federal Circuit construed the limitation to mean securing 
said templates in a fixed orientation to said tablet whereby said 
pointing device can select a working function in a single movement 
of the said button”608 to mean that “each of the indicia associated with 
the sub-menu of a main-menu group must represent a working 
function accessible with a single movement of the pointer button 
(e.g., as opposed to access through a further selection via a drop-
down menu).”609  Applying this construction to the “undisputed” 
evidence that the accused product utilized drop-down menus, the 
Federal Circuit held that the record showed that the patent in suit 
was not literally infringed.610  The Federal Circuit noted that, because 
the patentee did not assert infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents, it would not consider it on appeal. 611 
In Bionx Implants, Inc. v. Linvatec Corp.,612 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the claim construction decision by the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, but vacated that court’s order 
entering summary judgment and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.613  The patent-at-issue related to a surgical fastener that 
is particularly adapted to repairing tears in the meniscus of the 
knee.614  On appeal, Bionx argued that the district court adopted too 
restrictive a construction of the term “rigid,” which is used in each of 
the asserted claims.615  The district court’s construction required that 
the claimed suture be “sufficiently rigid to push through meniscus 
                                                          
 604. Id. at 1339, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 605. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 606. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 607. Id. at 1338, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 608. Id. at 1347, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 609. Id. at 1349, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
 610. Id. at 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 611. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 612. 299 F.3d 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 613. Id. at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145-46. 
 614. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. 
 615. Id. at 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. 
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tissue without a pre-cut channel for the suture to follow.”616  Bionx 
disagreed, arguing that “rigid” should apply to “any shaft that is 
capable of being pushed through tissue, regardless of whether the 
tissue is pre-channeled.”617  The Federal Circuit construed “rigid,” in 
the context of a surgical fastener designed to repair tears in the knee, 
to mean “rigid enough to be pushed directly through the semi-hard 
cartilage of a meniscus [a part of the knee] without any precutting 
[i.e. a precut channel through the tissue].”618  The Federal Circuit 
based its interpretation on the prosecution history in which the 
patentee distinguished a flexible suture on the basis that it could not 
be “‘pushed into body tissue without the use of a needle.’”619  
With respect to the issue of infringement, the Federal Circuit 
found that videotaped evidence showing use of the device with a 
cannula (where a cannula is not normally used with the accused 
infringer’s device, but where use of a cannula was within the context 
of use contemplated by the patent) could constitute evidence 
relevant to the question of whether the accused device was rigid.620  
Therefore, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.621 
In Honeywell Inc. v. Victor Co. of Japan, Ltd.,622 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling that the 
accused products did not infringe the patent claims.623  However, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that some of the 
accused products were the subjects of a license agreement.624  In 
deciding the infringement issue, the Federal Circuit relied heavily on 
the definition of the claim term “contiguous” that the inventor 
offered during prosecution of the case before the USPTO.625  The 
Federal Circuit determined that the district court erred by not 
according enough weight to the inventor’s own definition, stating 
that “[i]t is well settled that a patentee may define a claim term either 
in the written description of the patent, or, as in the present case, in 
the prosecution history.”626  A definition is often offered during 
                                                          
 616. Id. at 1381, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146-47. 
 617. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147. 
 618. Id. at 1380-82, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146-48. 
 619. Id. at 1381-82, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (citation omitted in original). 
 620. Id. at 1382-83, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148-49. 
 621. Id. at 1383, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 622. 298 F.3d 1317, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1904 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 623. Id. at 1328, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 624. Id. at 1329, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 625. Id. at 1323-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908-09. 
 626. Id. at 1323, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (citing Mycogen Plant Sci. v. 
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prosecution as a response to a rejection and is entered along with a 
narrowing amendment.627  Such a definition limits the claim’s scope 
and prevents a patentee from subsequently recapturing what had 
been surrendered.628  While an inventor’s definition has no narrowing 
effect, it is relevant to the inventor’s interpretation of a term.629  
However, the Federal Circuit rejected the broadest implication of 
Honeywell’s claim construction arguments as contrary to the most 
expansive dictionary definition of the term “contiguous.”630  The 
Federal Circuit also reviewed the specification and prosecution 
history to assist in determining the meaning of the claim 
limitations.631  It concluded that nothing in the specification or 
prosecution history warranted a narrow reading of the claims-at-
issue.632  
In Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc.,633 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part the summary judgment of 
non-infringement decision by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia.634  The claims on appeal involve a method and 
apparatus for playing a “fantasy” football computer game.635  The 
claim limitation in dispute was “wherein said players in said first and 
second groups receive bonus points.”636  The Federal Circuit 
construed the term “bonus points” to mean “additional points 
awarded beyond those given in an actual football game for unusual 
scoring plays, such as when a player scores in a manner not typically 
associated with his position.”637  The Federal Circuit noted that in 
conjunction with the ordinary meaning of the claim term, the 
                                                          
Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1327, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 627. Id. at 1323-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (citing as an example, Southwall 
Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1677 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 628. Id. at 1324, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 629. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(indicating that the record is often critical to determining a claim’s meaning); E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1438, 7 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the prosecution history 
“must be examined to ascertain the true meaning of what the inventor intended to 
convey in the claims”)). 
 630. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 631. Id. at 1325-26, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909-10. 
 632. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909-10. 
 633. 287 F.3d 1108, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 634. Id. at 1111, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 635. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 636. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567. 
 637. Id. at 1114, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
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specification also supported the district court’s definition.638  The 
specification stated that “[c]omputerized football points are awarded 
for touchdowns, field goals, and points after touchdowns.  Bonus 
points were also awarded based upon the difficulty of the play.”639  As a 
result, “bonus points” was interpreted as points awarded for a scoring 
play above the points such a scoring play would earn in an actual 
football game.640 
 In its infringement analysis, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
Yahoo! did not infringe the patent because the term “miscellaneous 
points” indicated only an unusual play, with no additional points 
awarded beyond those given for such a play in a real football game.641  
The Federal Circuit also concluded that ESPN did not infringe the 
patent because their game awarded no additional points beyond 
those awarded in a real football game.642  Furthermore, the Federal 
Circuit acknowledged that ESPN’s fantasy football game awarded a 
points depending on the type of scoring play, the game did not award 
poins based upon the position of the scoring player.643  
 With respect to SportsLine’s game, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because 
under the proper infringement analysis, there existed a genuine issue 
of material fact.644  The Federal Circuit held that in order to infringe 
Fantasy’s patent, the software code underlying the accused game 
must be written in such a way as to allow a user to utilize the function 
of awarding bonus points for unusual plays without having to modify 
the code.645  The SportsLine game allowed for position-specific 
scoring by creating different scoring configurations for each 
position.646  As a result, the Federal Circuit determined that the 
SportsLine game directly infringed the “computer playing football” 
limitation of Fantasy’s patent.647  The Federal Circuit also determined 
that it was unclear whether kickers could be awarded points for an 
out-of-position score.648  Thus, the Federal Circuit remanded the case 
                                                          
 638. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 639. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 640. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 641. Id. at 1116, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 642. Id. at 1116-17, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 643. Id. at 1117, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 644. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 645. Id. at 1118, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
 646. Id. at 1119, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
 647. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
 648. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
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to the district court to determine whether the SportsLine product 
supports awarding bonus points to kickers in a second group.649  
 In Pickholtz v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc.,650 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-
infringement, but affirmed the district court’s denial of Pickholtz’s 
motion for infringement.651  In so doing, the Federal Circuit held that 
the district court erred when it construed the term “computer” to 
exclude peripherals.652  The Federal Circuit determined that 
Pickholtz used the terms “computer” and “computer system” in the 
specification synonymously and that nothing in the patent itself 
explained their relationship or indicated any difference in 
meaning.653  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found that the lower 
court in error in concluding that the “intrinsic evidence 
unambiguously imparted different meanings to the terms.”654  Since 
“computer” can be defined through intrinsic evidence alone, the 
Federal Circuit found no need to rely on extrinsic evidence,655 which, 
would not have been conclusive in any event.656  Interestingly, the 
Federal Circuit determined that nothing in the prosecution history 
indicated that the terms have different meanings, although a prior 
art patent used the terms differently.657  The Federal Circuit did not 
discuss whether the prior art patent should be treated according to 
how a person of ordinary skill would understand the terms.658 
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc.,659 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s preliminary injunction 
against Interface to prevent Interface from infringing Tate’s patent 
claims to raised access flooring panels.660  Interface appealed only the 
lower court’s conclusion regarding the likelihood of success based on 
the merits of Tate’s infringement claim.661  The Federal Circuit 
rejected Interface’s argument that the lower court’s interpretation of 
the term “border,” which “encompass[es] the simple beveled edges in 
the accused floor panels” was an erroneous construction.662  In doing 
                                                          
 649. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 650. 284 F.3d 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 651. Id. at 1367-68, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341. 
 652. Id. at 1373-74, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345-46. 
 653. Id. at 1373, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 654. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 655. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 656. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 657. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 658. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 659. 279 F.3d 1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 660. Id. at 1360, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 661. Id. at 1364, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 662. Id. at 1370-72, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656-58. 
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so, the Federal Circuit found that a person possessing ordinary skill 
in the art of raised access floor panels would know that the term 
“border” referred to “the area or zone forming an edge or trim 
framing the decorative surface of the panel.”663  Moreover, in 
reviewing the patent, the Federal Circuit found that the specification 
or claims did not require that the“border” be or single layered.664  
The Federal Circuit reiterated that it would not read in limitations 
from elsewhere in the specification when the original claim terms 
were clear, as in the case at issue.665  Thus, the Federal Circuit held 
that Interface’s panels infringed Tate’s patent and Tate therefore met 
the likelihood of success on the merits portion of the preliminary 
injunction test.666 
3. The role of the preamble in interpreting claims 
The claims at issue in Epcon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, 
Inc.667 related to a method and apparatus for providing gas assistance 
to an injection molding process.668  The Federal Circuit first rejected 
Bauer’s argument that the preamble limits the scope of the claims.669  
The Federal Circuit found that Epcon’s claims were in Jepson form, 
which allows a patentee to use the preamble to recite “‘elements or 
steps of the claimed invention which are conventional or known.’”670  
In Rowe v. Dror,671 the Federal Circuit found that “[w]hen this form is 
employed, the claim preamble defines not only the context of the 
claimed invention, but also its scope.”672  Following Rowe a patentee 
choosing the Jepson form of the claim supports an intention “to use 
the preamble to define, in part, the structural elements of his claimed 
invention.”673  Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the preamble 
served as a limitation since the patentee used a Jepson-type claim.674  
                                                          
 663. Id. at 1370, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 664. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 665. Id. at 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657 (citations omitted). 
 666. Id. at 1372, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 667. 279 F.3d 1022, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 668. Id. at 1025, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472. 
 669. Id. at 1029, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (citing Applied Materials, Inc. v. 
Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1572-73, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152, 88 U.S.P.Q. 
478, 481 (C.C.P.A. 1951)). 
 670. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (quoting Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 
127 F.3d 1420, 1426, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (quotation 
omitted). 
 671. 112 F.3d 473, 479, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 672. Epcon, 279 F.3d at 1029, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (citing Rowe, 112 F.3d 
at 479, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553). 
 673. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (quoting Kegel Co., 127 F.3d at 1426, 44 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127. 
 674. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (citation omitted). 
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The Federal Circuit also used a technical dictionary to help formulate 
the proper construction of the terms “supply of stored gas,” 
“substantially,” and “venting.”675  The Federal Circuit garnered further 
support for its construction by reviewing the specification and finding 
it to be consistent with its interpretation.676 
The Federal Circuit stated that the term “substantially” was used in 
two of Epcon’s patent claims in slightly different contexts, i.e., 
“substantially below,” and “substantially constant.”677  The Federal 
Circuit noted that “the same term or phrase should be interpreted 
consistently where it appears in claims of common ancestry.”678  
However, it found that Epcon’s claims implicated a more precise 
statement of the axiom—“[a] word or phrase used consistently 
throughout a claim should be interpreted consistently.”679  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that there was a “subtle but significnt 
difference” in the two uses of the term“substantially”.680  The phrase 
“substantially constant” denoted language of approximation, while 
the phrase “substantially below” signified language of magnitude.681  
Due to the differing uses of the term , the Federal Circuit held that 
“substantially” might have differing constructions in the two 
phrases.682 
In Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc.,683 the Federal 
Circuit remanded the district court decision for failure to construe 
the claim limitations and make adequate findings on infringement.684  
The Federal Circuit provided the district court with guidance on 
claim construction on remand.685  In particular, the Federal Circuit 
focused on the preamble of the claims-in-suit.686  It noted that each of 
the claims began with the same preamble, namely “[a] self-propelled, 
fast steering motorized riding trowel for finishing a concrete 
                                                          
 675. Id. at 1029-32, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475-77. 
 676. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475-77. 
 677. Id. at 1030-31, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476. 
 678. Id. at 1030, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476 (citing Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. 
Co., 192 F.3d 973, 980, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Abtox, Inc. 
v. Exitron Corp., 131 F.3d 1009, 1010, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735, 1735-36 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997); Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 632, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 679. Id. at 1030-31, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476 (citing Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. 
Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1465, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1421, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 680. Id. at 1031, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476. 
 681. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476. 
 682. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1476. 
 683. 299 F.3d 1336, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 684. Id. at 1346, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 685. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 686. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
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surface.”687  The Federal Circuit noted that claims are not normally 
limited by the preamble,688 but may be “‘when the claim drafter 
chooses to use both the preamble and the body to define the subject 
matter of the claimed invention.’”689  The claim preamble should be 
construed as limiting if it is “‘necessary to give life, meaning and 
vitality’” to the claim.690  The Federal Circuit instructed that this 
construction be made on a case-by-case basis, in light of the overall 
claim.691 
Allen Engineering interpreted the term “fast steering” to be a claim 
limitation.692  Bartell Industries asserted that the term was laudatory 
and only set forth the purpose of the claimed invention.693  The 
Federal Circuit held that “fast steering” was a relative term 
unaccompanied by any interpretive reference in either the claims or 
the specification.694  Lacking a frame of reference, the indicated that a 
person of skill in the relevant art would not understand “fast steering” 
meant in this context.695  The Court held that “fast steering” “failed to 
give life, meaning and vitality to the claimed structure” and could not 
be construed as a claim limit.696  The Federal Circuit held that the 
expression should be used only to construe the intended purpose of 
the claimed combination without creating a limitation of the 
meaning.697 
In Catalina Marketing International v. Coolsavings.com,698 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and 
remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-
infringement of Catalina’s patent directed to a system for dispensing 
                                                          
 687. Id. at 1346, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 688. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (citing DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 
1322 n.3, 226 U.S.P.Q. 758, 764 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 689. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting Bell Communications Research, 
Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816, 
1820 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 690. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152, 
88 U.S.P.Q. 478, 480-81 (C.C.P.A. 1951)). 
 691. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754, 4 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Applied Materials, Inc. v. 
Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1572-73, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Whether a preamble stating the purpose and 
context of the invention constitutes a limitation . . . is determined on the facts of 
each case in light of the overall form of the claim, and the invention as described in 
the specification and illuminated in the prosecution history.”). 
 692. Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1346, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 693. Id. at 1347, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 694. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 695. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 696. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting Kropa, 187 F.2d at 152, 88 
U.S.P.Q. at 480-81). 
 697. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 698. 289 F.3d 801, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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coupons to consumers at remote terminals connected to a host 
computer system.699  The Federal Circuit held that the district court 
improperly treated the preamble as a limitation to the asserted 
claim.700  In so doing, the Court held that the phrase “‘located at 
predesignated sites such as consumer stores’” is not a limitation 
because the patentee did not rely on the phrase in defining the 
invention or understanding terms or limitations in body of the 
claim.701  The Federal Circuit further held that the applicant’s 
statements during prosecution that its invention involved terminals 
“located in stores” for the distribution of coupons “on site,” did not 
suggest a clear reliance on the preamble to distinguish the prior art 
and, therefore, did not constitute a limitation.702  In addition, the 
phrase merely suggested the use of the apparatus without affecting 
the structure or operation of the claim itself.703  In contrast, the 
inclusion of the same phrase in the body of another claim necessarily 
limited that claim.704 
4. Miscellaneous claim interpretation issues 
In Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc.,705 the Federal Circuit vacated 
and remanded a summary judgment decision by the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington based on the Federal 
Circuit’s finding that the district court’s claim interpretation was not 
supported by the record.706  Beckson’s patent was directed to a 
portlight window for a boat.707  The district court’s non-infringement 
holding was based on its construction of the term “sloping drain 
groove,” as “a highly specific U-shaped drain channel of constant 
diameter/width.”708  The Federal Circuit held that the district court 
improperly narrowed the scope of claim on one of the patents in suit 
by importing limitations from the specification and from dependent 
claims.709  The Federal Circuit held that the term “sloping drain 
groove” only required a sloping artificial channel to carry water, 
which is not limited to long, narrow U-shaped entities.710  Because 
                                                          
 699. Id. at 804-05, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782. 
 700. Id. at 810, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786-87. 
 701. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786. 
 702. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786. 
 703. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786. 
 704. Id. at 810-11, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787. 
 705. 292 F.3d 718, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 706. Id. at 720, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031-32. 
 707. Id. at 720-21, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032. 
 708. Id. at 723, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 709. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 710. Id. at 723-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
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infringement is a question of fact, the Federal Circuit stated that an 
appellate court cannot generally determine infringement and must 
instead remand the case to the district court, with the new claim 
construction, for such an infringement determination.711 
In Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc.,712 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
trial court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law regarding the jury 
verdict of non-infringement of one claim.713  The Federal Circuit also 
vacated the trial court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law with 
respect to the verdict of non-infringement of a second claim, thus 
remanding that claim for a new trial.714  The patent at issue covered a 
type of insect trap.715  The Federal Circuit noted that an erroneous 
jury instruction regarding claim interpretation that impacts a jury’s 
infringement decision is grounds for a new trial,716 but a party must 
show that the erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial.717  When an 
error in a jury instruction could not have altered the outcome, the 
error is harmless.718  Here, the Federal Circuit determined that the 
instruction with respect to the meaning of the word “contain” was 
prejudicial because there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial 
such that a correct instruction could have supported a finding of 
infringement.719 
B. Means-Plus-Function Claims 
A claim limitation may be expressed in means-plus-function format 
in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, which reads as follows: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a 
means or step for performing a specified function without the 
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such 
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, 
                                                          
 711. Id. at 724-25, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
 712. 285 F.3d 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 713. Id. at 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350. 
 714. Id. at 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350-51. 
 715. Id. at 1365-66, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351. 
 716. Id. at 1373, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356 (citing Advanced Display Sys., Inc. 
v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
 717. Id. at 1374, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357. 
 718. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357 (citing Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 
215 F.3d 1261, 1266-67, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Weinar v. 
Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 808, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[A] 
reversal . . . is not available to an appellant who merely establishes error in 
instructions. . . .  Where the procedural error was ‘harmless,’ i.e., where the evidence 
in support of the verdict was so overwhelming that the same verdict would necessarily 
be reached absent the error, or the error was cured by an instruction, a new trial 
would be mere waste and affirmance of the judgment is required.”), cert. denied, 470 
U.S. 1084 (1985)). 
 719. Id. at 1374-75, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357-58. 
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material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents 
thereof.720 
The use of the term “means” creates a presumption that the 
inventor intentionally invoked § 112, ¶ 6.721  This presumption may be 
overcome where a claim element uses “means” and does not recite a 
corresponding function.722 Section 112, ¶ 6 also can be avoided even 
where a claim element uses “means” and describes a function, so long 
as it also includes “sufficient structure or material for performing that 
function.”723  A claim term recites sufficient structure if it has a 
“reasonably well understood” meaning in the field.724  However, the 
mere use of the word “means” after a limitation does not make that 
limitation a means-plus-function limitation.725 
In BBA Nonwovens Simpsonville, Inc. v. Superior Nonwovens, L.L.C.,726 
where the technology at issue related to the manufacture of 
spunbond nonwoven fabric, the Federal Circuit found that the claims 
were properly interpreted to be means-plus-function claims.727  The 
Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s interpretation of “corona 
means” as subject to § 112, ¶ 6, and rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the “means” was limited to a specific location on the 
claimed device.728  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
identification of the recited function, finding that the function 
corresponding to the “means” in claim one stemmed from the word 
“corona,” and that proper reading of the claim was “means for 
forming a corona.”729  The district court had observed that Superior 
Nonwoven’s proposed construction ignored the word “positioned” in 
claim one, and the Federal Circuit here stated that the expression 
following the word “positioned” described where the corona means 
was located, constituting a separate limitation not subject to § 112, 
                                                          
 720. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000). 
 721. York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574, 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1623 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 722. Rodime P.L.C. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1302, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1429, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 723. Id., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. But see Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 
F.3d 524, 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“To invoke [§ 112, 
¶ 6], the alleged means-plus-function claim element must not recite a definite 
structure which performs the described function.”). 
 724. Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880-81, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1838 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 
1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 725. Cole, 102 F.3d at 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 726. 303 F.3d 1332, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 727. Id. at 1335, 1343, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260, 1266. 
 728. Id. at 1343-44, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
 729. Id. at 1344, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
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¶ 6.730  The Federal Circuit noted the difference between the “corona 
means” itself and its location, and ultimately found Superior 
Interwoven’s argument—that the “corona means” must be “within” 
the slot draw attenuator—was misplaced.731 
The Federal Circuit held that § 112, ¶ 6 was inapplicable in Epcon 
Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc.,732 finding that the district 
court erred in construing a process claim to be subject to § 112, ¶ 6.733  
In so doing, the Federal Circuit pointed out that the claim included 
no language indicating a “step plus function” form, and that the 
claim should not be interpreted as subject to § 112, ¶ 6 simply 
because a similar apparatus claim was subject to § 112, ¶ 6.734  In 
determining that § 112, ¶ 6 was not applicable, the Federal Circuit 
noted that the claim recited a series of steps without reciting a 
function.735  After finding the district court’s use of the claim 
preamble as a source for a function to be misplaced,736 the Federal 
Circuit determined that a preamble statement of purpose does not 
necessarily supply a function for a “step plus function” form.737  Thus, 
the Federal Circuit held that the claim was merely a “garden-variety 
process claim.”738  By construing the claim outside of § 112, ¶ 6, the 
Federal Circuit found that there was a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the direct infringement of the claimed method, thereby 
reversing the district court’s summary judgment.739 
In Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc.,740 the Federal 
Circuit found that the district court improperly applied § 112, ¶ 6, 
vacating the district court’s judgment holding that Bartell Industries 
infringed Allen Engineering’s patent related to riding trowels.741  The 
Federal Circuit found that the district court failed to construe the 
claim limitations at issue and conduct a limitation-by-limitation 
comparison.742  In doing so, the Federal Circuit distinguished when 
§ 112, ¶ 6 is applicable by relying on Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,743 and 
                                                          
 730. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
 731. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
 732. 279 F.3d 1022, 1028, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 733. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475. 
 734. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475. 
 735. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475. 
 736. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475. 
 737. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (citing O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 
1576, 1583, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777, 1782 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 738. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475. 
 739. Id. at 1034, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479. 
 740. 299 F.3d 1336, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 741. Id. at 1342, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 742. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 743. Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
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noting that when a claim describes elements with detailed recitations 
of structure, as opposed to function, it cannot be construed as a 
means-plus-function claim.744  In contrast, the Federal Circuit found 
that where a claim recites merely a function such as “closure 
means . . . for controlling access,” it is properly construed as a means-
plus-function limitation.745  Using this analysis, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that although the patent at issue used “means” in its 
claims, the detailed recitation of structure clearly removed the claims 
from the ambit of § 112, ¶ 6.746 
C. Literal Infringement 
Literal infringement of a claim occurs when a claim limitation 
reads on (is found in) the device at issue.747 
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc.,748 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting Tate’s 
motion to enjoin Interface from infringing claims of Tate’s patent for 
raised access flooring panels.749  On appeal, Interface challenged only 
the district court’s determination regarding likelihood of success on 
the merits of Tate’s infringement claim.750  First, the Federal Circuit 
held that there was no “practicing the prior art” defense to literal 
infringement.751  The Federal Circuit also found that Interface’s 
asserted defense—that its accused device was an adoption of the 
teachings of the prior art—was an improper interpretation of the 
law.752  Under the proper test, literal infringement is not determined 
by comparing the alleged infringement device to the prior art, but by 
construing the claims and comparing them to the accused device.753  
                                                          
 744. Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1347, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (quoting Cole, 102 
F.3d at 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006). 
 745. Id. at 1347-48, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (quoting Sage Prods., Inc. v. 
Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1428, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)).  This is because “a function was recited for the means and the claim did not 
‘explicitly recite[] the structure, material, or acts needed to perform [the 
function].’”  Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 ((quoting Sage Prods., Inc. 126 F.3d at 
1428, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110). 
 746. Id. at 1348, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 747. Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1583, 34 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Amhil Enters., Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 
F.3d 1554, 1562, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 748. 279 F.3d 1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 749. Id. at 1360, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 750. Id. at 1364, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 751. Id. at 1365, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (citing Baxter, 49 F.3d at 1583, 34 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126). 
 752. Id. at 1365-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (stating that the holding in 
Baxter expressly forecloses any such defense). 
 753. Id. at 1366, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (citing Baxter, 49 F.3d at 1583, 34 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126 (“There is no requirement that the accused device be 
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The Federal Circuit asserted that, just as the doctrine of equivalents 
could not extend so widely as to encompass prior art, claim language 
must be construed in a manner that preserves validity.754  Prior art is 
relevant to literal infringement when it affects the construction of 
ambiguous claims, except where the interpretation is clear in light of 
the specification and is properly supported by the patent’s 
disclosure.755  The Federal Circuit also rejected Interface’s attempt to 
prove non-infringement by the reverse doctrine of equivalents.756 
In Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.,757 the Federal Circuit 
required the patentee to show that the accused device contained 
every limitation in the asserted claims; if even one limitation was 
missing from the accused device, or not met as claimed, there would 
be no literal infringement.758  The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas had affirmed as a matter of law a jury 
verdict of infringement, which included damages.759  Shell 
Exploration appealed that decision and Riles cross-appealed because 
the district court vacated the jury’s finding of literal infringement.760  
The Federal Circuit held that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the jury’s finding of literal infringement.761 
The Federal Circuit noted that there were three limitations of 
Riles’s patent claim in dispute and that only the “Depending Support 
Leg” limitation was literally met by Shell’s oil drilling platform.762  The 
district court construed “stabbing connection” to mean an end-to-end 
joining of two metal tubes by the insertion of an extension attached 
to the end of one of the tubes into the end of the other.763  The 
                                                          
nonobvious in light of the prior art, or otherwise be itself patentable.”)). 
 754. Id. at 1367, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (citing Whittaker Corp. v. UNR 
Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 709, 712, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742, 1744 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 755. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.  The courts generally give patentees the 
full benefit of clear claim language and so bind the patentees in accordance with the 
principles of fairness and the public-notice function of patent law.  Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1654. 
 756. Id. at 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (noting that the Federal Circuit has 
never affirmed a finding of non-infringement based on the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents).  The reverse doctrine of equivalents is “where a device is so far changed 
in principle from a patent article that it performs the  same or similar function in a 
substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the 
claim.”  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 330 (1950). 
 757. 298 F.3d 1302, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 758. Id. at 1308, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (quoting Mas-Hamilton Group v. 
LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1010, 1014-15 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 759. Id. at 1305, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 760. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 761. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 762. Id. at 1308-09, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823-24. 
 763. Id. at 1308, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
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district court also found that neither Shell’s leveling porch nor its 
leveling piling had an extension, and that the Shell process did not 
insert either one into the other.764  The Federal Circuit held that the 
district court did not err in finding insufficient evidence in the 
record to support the jury’s finding—that Shell’s process literally met 
the “stabbing connection” limitation.765 
In examining another limitation, the district court construed 
“metal-to-metal bearing contact” to mean “‘a weight bearing contact 
between two metal surfaces.’”766  The Shell process guided the piling 
through the sleeve, resting it on the layer of wooden timbers, rather 
than directly on the metal plate of the leveling porch.767  Ultimately, 
the Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err with 
respect to the jury’s finding that Shell’s process met the “metal-to-
metal bearing contact” limitation literally,768 and found that the 
district court properly granted a judgment as a matter of law with 
regard to literal infringement.769 
D. Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents 
If one or more of the claim limitations are not literally present in 
the accused device, thus precluding a finding of literal infringement, 
the claim may still be considered infringed if equivalents of those 
limitations are present.770  These equivalents are assessed on a 
limitation-by-limitation basis; this focus on individual limitations, 
rather than on the accused device as a whole, enhances a court’s 
vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate any 
claim limitations completely.771  Equivalence may be established by 
showing, by preponderant evidence, that an element of an accused 
device “does substantially the same thing in substantially the same way 
to get substantially the same result” as the claim limitation.772  The 
                                                          
 764. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.  Moreover, the district court held that 
Shell’s process merely “guides the leveling piling through the guide sleeve to rest on 
the leveling porch.”  Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 765. Id. at 1308-09. 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 766. Id. at 1309, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (citation omitted in original). 
 767. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 768. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 769. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 770. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (1997). 
 771. Id. at 40, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 772. Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 266 F.3d 1367, 1370, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. 
U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1260, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1962, 1969 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); 
see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 85 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 330 (1950). 
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courts also consider claim elements as equivalently present if only 
“insubstantial differences” distinguish the two elements.773 
In 2002, the Supreme Court heard the case of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,774 which addressed infringement under 
the doctrine of equivalents.  This decision, on the permissible scope 
of equivalents, seriously departed from the Federal Circuit’s previous 
practice, and thus became a seminal decision in this area of law.775 
The Festo Corporation owned two patents for an industrial 
device.776  After the patent examiner rejected the initial application 
for the first patent, due to defects in its description, the application 
was amended to add the new limitations.777  The defendant, the 
alleged infringer, marketed a device that contained a structure 
substantially the same as Festo’s, but different with regard to the 
structure of the amended limitation.778  The district court determined 
that Festo’s patents covered the defendant’s device under the 
doctrine of equivalents, but the Federal Circuit disagreed by 
determining that a limitation amendment that narrowed the claim 
was an absolute bar to arguing equivalence under the doctrine of 
equivalents.779  Thus, the Supreme Court was faced with two issues:  
(1) can prosecution history estoppel arise from any narrowing 
amendment that occurs during prosecution?; and (2) when 
prosecution history estoppel arises, does it bar suit against every 
equivalent to the amended claim element?780 
The Supreme Court held primarily that any amendment could 
narrow the scope of possible equivalents, but if the amendment was 
truly insignificant, then it would not narrow the scope of the patent 
or prevent its enforcement.781  Thus, any amendment made in 
response to a statutory rejection (for example, a rejection under 35 
U.S.C. § 112)—and not only those amendments made in response to 
rejections based on prior art—may give rise to prosecution history 
estoppel.782  In this regard, the Court fully adopted the view of the 
Federal Circuit majority.  The Court also found that the “absolute 
                                                          
 773. Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 285 F.3d 1353, 1359, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon 
Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 774. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
 775. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705. 
 776. Id. at 728, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 777. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 778. Id. at 729, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708-09. 
 779. Id. at 729-30, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 780. Id. at 726-27, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 781. Id. at 734, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 782. Id. at 735, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
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bar” rule adopted by the Federal Circuit was erroneous.783  Instead, 
the Court articulated a presumption, created by the act of an 
amendment, that an alleged equivalent has been disclaimed.784  The 
burden of the presumption falls on the patent holder to demonstrate 
that the embodiment in question is an infringing equivalent that was 
not disclaimed.785 
Citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,786 the Court 
criticized the Federal Circuit for not following its previous cautions to 
courts adopting changes that upset the “settled expectations of the 
inventing community.”787  The Court held, much as it did in Warner-
Jenkinson, that a patentee bears the burden of proving that an 
amendment was not made for a reason that would give rise to 
estoppel and does not surrender the particular equivalent in 
question.788  According to the Court, although prosecution history 
estoppel can bar challenges to many equivalents, this action requires 
an inquiry into the subject matter surrendered by the narrowing 
amendment.789  While a complete bar was simpler, the Court found 
that it was inconsistent with the initial purpose of applying the 
estoppel—to tie the inventor to the contentions made during the 
application process and any resulting reasonable inferences.790  Thus, 
the Court required a more thorough and searching inquiry than the 
Federal Circuit’s position.791 
Moreover, the Supreme Court pointed out that a narrowing 
amendment need not:  (1) “relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at 
the time of the amendment”; (2) “relinquish equivalents beyond a 
fair interpretation of what was surrendered”; or (3) “foreclose claims 
of equivalence for aspects of the invention that have only a peripheral 
relation to the reason the amendment was submitted.”792  Finally, in 
requiring the patentee to bear the burden of showing that an 
                                                          
 783. Id. at 737, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 784. Id. at 737-38, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 785. Id. at 741, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713-14. 
 786. 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997). 
 787. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 788. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.  The standard announced by the Court was 
that: 
Th[e] presumption [that prosecution history bars an equivalence] is not, 
then, just the complete bar by another name . . . .  The patentee must show 
that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not 
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally 
encompassed the alleged equivalent. 
Id. at 741, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 789. Id. at 737, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 790. Id. at 737-38, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 791. Id. at 738, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 792. Id. at 738, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
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amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question, 
the Court demanded a factual inquiry, which suggests that summary 
judgment on this issue might be difficult.793 
Before Festo was decided, the Federal Circuit sat en banc in Johnson 
& Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co.794 to determine whether 
Johnson & Johnston was entitled to a finding of infringement under 
the doctrine of equivalents.795  A severely split Federal Circuit reversed 
the district court’s finding of infringement on the issues of the 
doctrine of equivalents, willfulness, damages, attorneys’ fees, and 
expenses.796  In reversing the trial court’s finding of infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit, as a matter of 
law, held that when a patent drafter discloses but does not claim 
subject matter, the drafter effectively releases the unclaimed subject 
matter into the world for public consumption.797  The Federal Circuit 
reasoned that otherwise, the primacy of the claims in defining the 
scope of the patentee’s exclusive rights would be undermined.798  
Further, the Federal Circuit reasoned that if the patentee were 
allowed undefined and unrecaptured subject matter, then patentees 
would narrow claims as a means of avoiding USPTO prosecution, and 
would use the doctrine of equivalents as a basis for post-issue 
infringement, citing the specification’s broad disclosure.799  Finally, 
the Federal Circuit noted that there are two remedies for patentees to 
recapture subject matter that was disclosed and inadvertently left 
unclaimed.800  First, within two years of an original patent grant, 
under 35 U.S.C. § 251, a patentee may file a reissue application to 
enlarge the scope of the original claims.801  Second, a patentee can 
file a separate continuation application under § 120 to claim 
disclosed but previously unclaimed subject matter.802 
In another pre-Festo case, Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs 
Manufacturing Co.,803 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine 
                                                          
 793. Id. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 794. 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 795. Id. at 1048, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226. 
 796. Id. at 1055-72, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231-43.  Judges Clevenger, Rader, 
Dyk, and Lourie filed separate concurring opinions, while Judge Newman filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 797. Id. at 1054, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 798. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 799. Id. at 1054-55, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 800. Id. at 1055, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 801. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231; see 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
 802. Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1055, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231; see 35 
U.S.C. § 120 (2000). 
 803. 285 F.3d 1353, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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of equivalents, because the Federal Circuit found that genuine issues 
of material fact existed.804 Here, infringement pivoted on one 
limitation, “support wires,” in the claims for a box spring.805  In this 
instance the prosecution history was unhelpful in assessing 
equivalency because the patent had issued without any 
amendments.806  Although the alleged infringer contended that its 
product met the function and result prongs of the function-way-result 
test, the accused admitted that its product differed in its result.807  The 
Federal Circuit noted that whether the support cups served a 
substantially identical function to that of the “support wires” 
described in the patent at issue was primarily a matter of fact.808  The 
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment because the evidence was not such that no 
reasonable jury could determine whether the two elements were 
equivalent, and that the competing affidavits in the case created a 
genuine issue of material fact.809  The Federal Circuit thus remanded 
the case to the district court.810 
In Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft,811 which was 
decided after Festo, the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-
in-part the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-
infringement of two accused devices.812  The district court granted 
summary judgment—that Putzmeister’s Bastardring II concrete 
pump did not infringe Schwing’s patent under the doctrine of 
equivalents—because the prosecution history of the patent in suit 
barred the application of the doctrine.813  The Federal Circuit 
disagreed with the district court’s application of the doctrine of 
equivalents, determining that the applicant’s remarks to the USPTO 
did not preclude the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the 
accused concrete pumps—the Bastardring II and the modified 
Bastardring II.814  The Federal Circuit explained how Festo modified 
the doctrine of equivalents application from its application in the 
district court’s decision, stating that the Supreme Court had rejected 
a “complete bar,” instead requiring “an examination of subject 
                                                          
 804. Id. at 1355, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267. 
 805. Id. at 1357, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269. 
 806. Id. at 1358, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270. 
 807. Id. at 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270. 
 808. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270. 
 809. Id. at 1360, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271. 
 810. Id. at 1362, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272. 
 811. 305 F.3d 1318, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 812. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641. 
 813. Id. at 1326, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 814. Id. at 1327, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
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matter surrendered by the narrowing amendment.”815  The Federal 
Circuit cited the Supreme Court finding that it was possible for the 
patentee to overcome the rebuttable presumption that a narrowing 
amendment surrendered the equivalent at issue.816  Specifically, the 
The Federal Circuit noted the Supreme Court holding that a 
patentee could “overcome the presumption that prosecution history 
estoppel bars a finding of equivalence” by illustrating:  the 
unforeseeability of the equivalent; the tangential relationship 
between the rationale of the amendment and the equivalent; or that 
it was unreasonable to expect the patentee to describe the substitute 
at issue.817  Given the change in the law of equivalency, the Federal 
Circuit agreed that the case should be remanded to the district court 
to determine whether Schwing could rebut the Festo presumption 
that the applicant’s narrowing amendment precluded the application 
of the doctrine of equivalents to the modified Bastardring II.818  
Finally, the Federal Circuit determined that statements in Schwing’s 
specification precluded the application of the doctrine of equivalents 
to the Bastardring II pump.819 
In another post-Festo case, Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow 
Communication Laboratories, Inc.,820 the Federal Circuit vacated a 
summary judgment decision by the district court that there was no 
infringement, and remanded the case for trial.821  The Federal Circuit 
noted that there are two limits to the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents.822  First, prosecution history estoppel can prevent use of 
the doctrine when patentees relinquish subject matter, by 
amendment or argument, while prosecuting the patent.823  Second, 
the all-limitations rule,824 which renders the question of 
insubstantiality of the differences inapplicable if a claim limitation is 
missing from an accused device, also limits the application of the 
                                                          
 815. Id. at 1329, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648-49 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002)). 
 816. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 817. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649. 
 818. Id. at 1329, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649. 
 819. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649. 
 820. 305 F.3d 1303, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 821. Id. at 1306, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 822. Id. at 1315, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-89. 
 823. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 (citing Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan 
Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
 824. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489 (“No claimed [limitation], or an equivalent 
thereof, can be absent if the doctrine of equivalents is invoked.”) (quoting Kustom 
Signals Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1333, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1135 (Fed. Cir. 2001))). 
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doctrine of equivalents.825  In light of these limits, the Federal Circuit 
reviewed the prosecution history and determined that nothing in the 
history gave rise to prosecution history estoppel.826  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that although the all-limitations rule states that a 
claim limitation cannot be missing from the accused device for a 
finding of equivalents, that rule can be satisfied if one element in the 
device corresponds to several claim limitations.827 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit found no prosecution history 
estoppel bar to the doctrine of equivalents in Riles v. Shell Exploration 
& Production Co.,828 where Shell attempted to evade a finding of 
infringement by arguing that the “metal-to-metal bearing contact” 
limitation was not entitled to a scope of equivalents encompassing its 
offshore oil platform.829  Here, the Federal Circuit found that the 
district court correctly did not interpret this claim term to require 
direct metal on metal contact, instead requiring “a weight bearing 
contact.”830  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit noted that even without 
a direct metal-to-metal contact, a reasonable jury could have found 
Shell’s platform used the equivalent of “metal-to-metal bearing 
contact.”831  Further, the Federal Circuit stated that the doctrine of 
prosecution history estoppel did not preclude Riles employment of 
the doctrine of equivalents on this claim element.832  During 
prosecution of his patent, Riles attempted to distinguish the patent by 
stating “‘Graham does not describe a metal-to-metal bearing contact 
for transferring loads to the legs of the platforms.’”833  In context, the 
Federal Circuit found this statement was not an unmistakable 
surrender of subject matter of the claim coverage beyond the direct 
metal-on-metal contact.834  The Federal Circuit also noted that Riles’s 
prosecution statement neither suggested a preference for weight 
bearing contacts, such as metal-on-metal, metal-on-wood, or metal-on-
concrete, nor mentioned the directness of the contact for the weight 
transfer.835  Instead, the Federal Circuit found that the core of the 
                                                          
 825. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488-89 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton 
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 (1997); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 
833 F.2d 931, 934-35, 939 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739-40 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en 
banc)). 
 826. Id. at 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 827. Id. at 1317, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. 
 828. 298 F.3d 1302, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 829. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824-25. 
 830. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824. 
 831. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824-25. 
 832. Id. at 1310, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825. 
 833. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825 (citation omitted in original). 
 834. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825. 
 835. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825. 
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statement expressed the transfer of compressive load.836  Graham 
involved a semi-submersible platform tied to a structure attached to 
the sea floor by tension tie rods, and did not transfer compressive 
load to the anchored structure.837  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
held that Riles only explained that his invention transfers load onto 
an anchored structure, and that Riles’s statements did not equal a 
surrender of claimed subject matter, or an unmistakable surrender.838  
E. Prosecution History Estoppel 
Prosecution history estoppel can restrict the availability of the 
doctrine of equivalents.839  This doctrine bars a patentee from 
asserting, as an equivalent, subject matter surrendered during 
prosecution of the patent application.840  The arguments and 
amendments contained in the prosecution history must be examined 
to determine the meaning of terms in the claims,841 thus excluding 
interpretations that were disclaimed during prosecution of the 
patent.842  In addition, arguments attempting to overcome prior art 
may lead to narrow claim interpretations because the public can rely 
on these statements.843 
For example, estoppel may result from amendments that narrow 
the scope of a claim to satisfy requirements of the Patent Act.844  In 
Festo, the Supreme Court found that narrowing amendments create a 
rebuttable presumption of estoppel,845 with its scope dependent on 
                                                          
 836. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825. 
 837. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825. 
 838. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825. 
 839. See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376, 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that a patentee may not use 
the doctrine of equivalents if that patentee had surrendered the subject matter at 
issue in a prior prosecution). 
 840. Am. Permahedge, Inc. v. Barcana, Inc., 105 F.3d 1441, 1445-46, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 841. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1673, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 842. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676-77 (citations omitted); see also Spectrum 
Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068-69 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that a patentee’s explicit arguments to overcome prior art 
during application prosecution may narrow the scope of a claim); Standard Oil Co. v. 
Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 296 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(noting that prosecution history prevents a court from permitting an interpretation 
of a claim that the patentee surrendered during the patent application prosecution). 
 843. Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1347, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1418, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 844. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1711-12 (2002). 
 845. Id. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (1997)). 
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reasonable inferences from the amendment.846  However, a patentee 
is not barred from asserting “equivalents unforeseeable at the time of 
the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of what was 
surrendered,” or those that “have only a peripheral relation to the 
reason the amendment was submitted.”847  Nor is recourse to the 
doctrine of equivalents foreclosed where there is a reason that 
suggests that the patentee could not reasonably have been expected 
to have explained the alternative in question.848  The patentee bears 
the burden of overcoming this presumption by illustrating that the 
amendment does not surrender the equivalent at issue.849  An 
estoppel also may be found on the basis of arguments made during 
prosecution of the application to secure the allowance of claims.850 
In Abbott Laboratories v. Dey, L.P., the Federal Circuit outlined the 
standards of prosecution history estoppel.851  First, a court must 
identify which claim limitations are allegedly met by equivalents, then 
it must determine if such limitations were amended during patent 
prosecution.852  If there are no such amendments, then the doctrine 
of equivalents will not be barred by amendment-based estoppel,853 but 
the doctrine may be barred by argument-based estoppel depending 
on the statements made by the applicant during prosecution.854 
In Abbott Laboratories, a “phospholipid” limitation in the patent in 
suit was at issue.855  The Federal Circuit found that the limitation was 
not amended during prosecution, and therefore, no amendment 
estoppel and no argument-based estoppel existed.856  In the decision 
below, the district court found prosecution history estoppel based on 
the prosecution of a related application.857  The Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 846. Id. at 737-38, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 847. Id. at 738, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 848. Id. at 740-41, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713-14. 
 849. Id. at 739, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 850. See Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the scope of coverage of the claims may 
change if a patentee has relinquished a possible claim construction in an 
amendment or argument to overcome or distinguish a reference); Southwall Techs., 
Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583-84, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1683 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (holding that once a term is interpreted in one claim, the patentee is 
estopped from using the doctrine of equivalents to allow the claim if that term is 
included in a later claim). 
 851. 287 F.3d 1097, 1103, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 852. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549. 
 853. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549. 
 854. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (citing Elkay Mfg., 192 F.3d at 979, 52 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113; Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 
1373, 1376-77, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 855. Id. at 1103-04, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549-50. 
 856. Id. at 1104-05, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549-50. 
 857. Id. at 1104, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549-50. 
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vacated the district court’s finding of non-infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents,858 holding that there was no basis for the 
conclusion that statements made about the characteristics of one 
patent should be attributed to another because the two patents have 
a common assignee and inventor, as well as a similar subject matter.859  
Therefore, statements made during the prosecution of the first 
patent did not create an estoppel with respect to the second patent.860  
The Federal Circuit further held that the prior art first patent did not 
limit the scope of equivalence in the second patent’s claims because 
the first patent disclosed a limitation argued to be equivalent to the 
second patent’s claimed subject matter.861  The Federal Circuit based 
its holding on the fact that the claims of the second patent contained 
limitations not found in the prior art and, on that basis, an examiner 
could have found such differences to be non-obvious during a 
hypothetical examination of such a claim.862 
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the prosecution 
history of a related application can be used in limiting the scope of 
the claims of the patent in suit in Middleton, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining 
& Manufacturing Co.863  The Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s summary judgment of non-infringement based on the district 
court’s erroneous claim interpretation based on meaning of 
“uniform.”864  The district court relied on the prosecution history of a 
related application to determine the meaning of uniform.865  In 
reviewing the use of the disputed term in a related application, the 
Federal Circuit found that the prosecution history of a parent 
application that included claims directed to bowling alley surfaces did 
not limit the definition of “uniform” for the CIP application.866  Thus, 
the Federal Circuit remanded the case for proper application of the 
doctrine of equivalents based on its new claim construction and the 
intervening Festo case.867 
                                                          
 858. Id. at 1108, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553. 
 859. Id. at 1105, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 860. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 861. Id. at 1106, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 862. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 863. 311 F.3d 1384, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 864. Id. at 1387-89, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140-42. 
 865. Id. at 1388, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141. 
 866. Id. at 1388-89, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141 (“The broader continuation 
applications claimed floor surfaces in general, not just smooth sporting surfaces.  
Therefore, the prosecution history in the context of varnishes for smooth bowling 
alleys does not limit the broader claims to other flooring surfaces.”). 
 867. Id. at 1389-90, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.  The district court previously 
applied the Federal Circuit’s Festo holding and found a complete bar based on the 
addition of the term “uniform” during prosecution, and which the district court had 
erroneously construed.  Id. at 1386, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40. 
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In Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft,868 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part the district court grant of 
summary judgment of non-infringement of two accused devices:  
Putzmeister’s Bastardring II concrete pump, which was held not to 
infringe Schwing’s patent under the doctrine of equivalents, and the 
modified Bastardring II pump, which did not infringe either literally 
or under the doctrine of equivalents.869  In assessing claim 
construction, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court 
erred in interpreting the claims to include a functional requirement 
that was not found in the language of the claim itself.870  The Federal 
Circuit noted that the prosecution history cannot limit a claim’s 
scope unless the patentee’s remarks before the USPTO would cause a 
competitor to believe that the patentee had disavowed the concerned 
subject matter.871  In addition, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s finding that Schwing had not demonstrated a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the modified Bastardring II pump literally 
infringed, despite the Federal Circuit’s disagreement with the district 
court’s claim construction.872 
With respect to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, 
the Federal Circuit determined that the applicant’s remarks to the 
USPTO were “equivocal at best” and did not preclude the doctrine’s 
application to either the Bastardring II or the modified Bastardring 
II.873  However, the Federal Circuit agreed that the case should be 
remanded to the district court to determine whether Schwing can 
rebut the Festo presumption that the applicant’s narrowing 
amendment precluded the application of the doctrine of equivalents 
to the modified Bastardring II.874 
Prosecution history estoppel precluded the patentee in Rheox, Inc. 
v. Entact, Inc.875 from claiming that Entact infringed its patent under 
the doctrine of equivalents.  Rheox owned a patent to a method of 
remediating lead from contaminated soil by applying calcium 
orthophosphate.876  The district court limited the term “calcium 
orthophosphate” to “tricalcium orthophosphate” and found that 
Rheox disclaimed monocalcium orthophosphate and triple super 
                                                          
 868. 305 F.3d 1318, 1319, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1642 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 869. Id. at 1323, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 870. Id. at 1323-24, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-45. 
 871. Id. at 1324, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 872. Id. at 1325-26, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47. 
 873. Id. at 1327, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 874. Id. at 1329, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649. 
 875. 276 F.3d 1319, 1320, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 876. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369. 
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phosphate (“TSP”).877  On appeal the Federal Circuit noted that when 
assessing whether a patentee relinquishes a claim, it considers the 
totality of the prosecution history, including arguments or 
amendments.878  In affirming the non-infringement holding of the 
district court, the Federal Circuit found that the patentee had 
disclaimed claims to TSP—a necessary element to any finding of 
infringement.879 
In Talbert Fuel Systems Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp.,880 the Federal 
Circuit applied prosecution history estoppel, thus eliminating the 
possibility of the application of the doctrine of equivalents as a basis 
for infringement.  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s 
claim construction, where the prosecution history reflected that the 
patentee, in attempting to distinguish his invention from the prior 
art, disclaimed the plaintiff’s asserted claim construction.881  The 
limitation at issue was a boiling point range limitation of 121-345°F.882  
The district court construed the claim as limited to gasoline with a 
final boiling point of 345°F, and excluded gasoline with a higher final 
boiling point.883  The Federal Circuit reviewed the prosecution history 
and found that Talbert relied on 345°F as the final boiling point in 
overcoming § 112 rejections and in distinguishing the prior art.884  In 
affirming a finding of non-infringement based on prosecution history 
estoppel, the Federal Circuit rejected Talbert’s argument that the 
narrow claim construction excluded the preferred embodiment 
because the nature of the subject matter and the arguments made in 
the prosecution history warranted the narrow claim construction, and 
precluded the application of the doctrine of equivalents such that 
Unocal’s product would be found to be infringing.885 
F. Inducement of Infringement 
Inducement of infringement is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), 
which provides that “whosoever actively induces infringement of a 
patent shall be liable as an infringer.”886  In order to succeed on a 
claim of inducement, the patentee must show; first, that there has 
                                                          
 877. Id. at 1324, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371-72. 
 878. Id. at 1326, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373. 
 879. Id. at 1326-27, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373-74. 
 880. 275 F.3d 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 881. Id. at 1376, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. 
 882. Id. at 1374, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365. 
 883. Id. at 1375, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365. 
 884. Id. at 1375-76, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365-66. 
 885. Id. at 1376-77, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. 
 886. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000). 
FINALPATENTSUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:41 PM 
976 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:891 
been direct infringement,887 and second, that the alleged infringer 
knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to 
encourage another’s infringement.888  In other words, the plaintiff 
must show that the infringer’s actions caused the infringing acts, and 
that the infringer knew, or should have known, these actions would 
induce infringements.889 
In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Chemque, Inc.,890 the 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that Chemque 
did not induce infringement.891  On appeal, Chemque alleged that 
there was no inducement because there was no literal infringement.892  
The Federal Circuit disagreed, determining that there was indeed 
literal infringement,893 and therefore, the Federal Circuit held that 
substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of infringement by 
inducement.894  According to the Federal Circuit, Chemque knew 
about the 3M patents and even gave customers instructions on how to 
be use the infringing product.895  The fact that this would lead to 
infringement was evidence of inducement.896 
G. Infringement Under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
The Hatch-Waxman Act provided a new means by which a patentee 
can sue for infringement.897  With the enactment of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, Congress sought to strike a balance between two 
competing policy interests.898  The first interest was encouraging the 
research and development of new drugs, and the second interest was 
to allow competition in the form of low-cost, generic pharmaceutical 
alternatives.899  Under the Act, pharmaceutical manufacturers may 
                                                          
 887. Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1033, 61 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 888. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  But see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb 
Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(“[P]roof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a 
necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”) (footnote omitted). 
 889. Manville, 917 F.2d at 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1594. 
 890. 303 F.3d 1294, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 891. Id. at 1298, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271. 
 892. Id. at 1305, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 893. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 894. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 895. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 896. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 897. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc & 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 
(2000). 
 898. Andryx Pharm. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1414, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 899. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415. 
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submit an ANDA to seek expedited approval from the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) of a generic version of a previously approved 
drug.900  In the course of submitting an ANDA, the generic drug 
manufacturer must certify, inter alia, that the previously approved 
drug’s patent is no longer valid, or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug disclosed in the 
ANDA.901  Congress has deemed that this paragraph IV certification is 
itself an act of infringement, and thus, upon receiving notice of the 
ANDA, the patent holder may sue the ANDA filer for infringement.902 
In Abbott Laboratories v. TorPharm, Inc.,903 the Federal Circuit 
examined whether the generic drug product was covered by Abbott 
Laboratories’ patent.  Specifically, the Federal Circuit reviewed 
TorPharm’s attempt to introduce a generic version of Depakok, an 
anticonvulsant medication approved for the treatment of epilepsy 
and manufactured by Abbott Laboratories.904  Abbott Laboratories 
listed two patents in the “Orange Book” as corresponding to the 
epilepsy medication, and sued TorPharm after TorPharm filed an 
ANDA with the FDA.905  The district court granted summary judgment 
of infringement against TorPharm based on TorPharm’s product 
description in its package insert and based on Abbott Laboratories’ 
test data indicating that TorPharm’s biobatch material had a high 
molecular weight—similar to material prepared according the two 
Abbott Laboratories patents.906  On appeal, the Federal Circuit found 
no error with the lower court’s claim construction.907  However, the 
Federal Circuit held that the lower court erred in finding no issue of 
material fact with respect to the oligomeric structure of TorPharm’s 
product.908  In particular, TorPharm’s expert provided an alternative 
analysis of the identification of the mass spectrum of TorPharm’s 
product corresponding to species with molecular weights claimed by 
the Abbott Laboratories patents.909  Therefore, the Federal Circuit 
remanded the case for consideration of the alternative analysis.910 
                                                          
 900. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
 901. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 902. Andrx Pharm., 276 F.3d at 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415; 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(2)(A) (2000). 
 903. 300 F.3d 1367, 1370, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 904. Id. at 1370, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
 905. Id. at 1370-71, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930-31. 
 906. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930-31. 
 907. Id. at 1372, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931. 
 908. Id. at 1380-81, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937-38. 
 909. Id. at 1376-77, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934-36. 
 910. Id. at 1381, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1938. 
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In Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp.,911 Bayer brought two infringement 
actions:  (1) asserting that the defendant infringed its high blood 
pressure drug (Adalat) patent by seeking ANDA approval of a 60mg 
generic version of the drug; and (2) by marketing a 30mg generic 
version.912  The district court granted summary judgment to Biovail 
holding that Bayer was collaterally estopped on both claims based on 
a previous finding of non-infringement by the Federal Circuit in a 
similar 30mg Adalat ANDA infringement case.913  The Federal Circuit 
vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment of collateral 
estoppel because the district court’s prior construction of the claims 
of the patent in suit did not address all of the issues contained in the 
present suits.914  In the prior cases, the district court construed claims 
in light of an ANDA specification.915  In the present actions, 
information regarding actual products manufactured in accordance 
with the ANDA was submitted.916  As such, the Federal Circuit held 
that the district court was required to construe the claim with respect 
to measurement of the manufactured products.917  Further, with 
respect to manufactured products made in accordance with the 
ANDA specification of the prior action, the Federal Circuit held that 
“infringement under § 271(e)(2)(A),918 by submission of an ANDA, is 
not synonymous with infringement under § 271(a) by a commercial 
product” and, therefore, the patentee should have “a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue of infringement by the commercial 
tablets” despite a finding of non-infringement under 
§ 271(e)(2)(A).919 
In Andrx Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Biovail Corp.,920 the Federal Circuit 
again considered infringement in the context of the filing of an 
ANDA.  Andrx, a generic drug manufacturer, had previously been 
awarded a judgment of non-infringement of Biovail’s diltiazem 
patent.921  Prior to the final resolution of the first suit, Biovail had 
acquired an exclusive license for a patent on an extended release 
version of diltiazem, and was successful at getting this drug listed in 
                                                          
 911. 279 F.3d 1340, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1675 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 912. Id. at 1342, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 913. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 914. Id. at 1349-50, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682-83. 
 915. Id. at 1344, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678. 
 916. Id. at 1346-47, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679-80. 
 917. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679-80. 
 918. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000). 
 919. Bayer, 279 F.3d at 1350, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 920. 276 F.3d 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1414 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 921. Id. at 1372, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416. 
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the Orange Book.922  Andrx protested the listing of this new patent, 
but was unsuccessful in its request to have the drug delisted.923  Andrx 
sued Biovail in a second infringement action seeking an adjudication 
of non-infringement of the extended release patent.924  Andrx also 
sued the FDA for improper handling of its ANDA and refusal to delist 
the extended release patent.925  In the second suit at the district court, 
Andrx received a judgment shortening the statutory stay from ANDA 
approval from thirty months to five months.926  Biovail appealed, and 
the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s order, finding that the 
lower court exceeded its authority in:  (1) shortening the statutory 
thirty-month delay of approval of Andrx’s pending ANDA by the 
FDA, and (2) ordering that the ANDA be granted approval by the 
FDA.927  The Federal Circuit held that the district court exceeded its 
authority in shortening the thirty-month stay because there was little 
evidence that the parties were not complying with statutory 
requirements to cooperate in expediting the case.928  Further, the 
Federal Circuit noted that although claims may be brought under the 
APA to compel the FDA to act in accordance with the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments, the complaint in this instance, failed to assert 
jurisdiction under the APA.929 
H. Design Patent Infringement 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 171, design patents may be obtained by the 
inventor of any “new, original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture.”930  The determination of design patent infringement 
requires a court to engage in:  (1) construction of the patent claim, 
and (2) a comparison of the construed claim to the accused 
product.931  In construing a design patent claim, the scope of the 
claimed design encompasses the patent’s visual appearance as a 
whole and the visual impression it creates.932  Design patent 
infringement may be found even where the accused design and the 
                                                          
 922. Id. at 1372-73, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416-17. 
 923. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417. 
 924. Id. at 1373, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417. 
 925. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417. 
 926. Id. at 1374, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418. 
 927. Id. at 1375, 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418, 1422. 
 928. Id. at 1376, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419. 
 929. Id. at 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422. 
 930. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000). 
 931. Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1417, 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 932. Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 104-05, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1788, 1791 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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patented design are not identical.933  In fact, the courts more heavily 
weigh the appearance of the design as a whole as compared to the 
accused product.934 
At issue in Hoop v. Hoop935 was a motorcycle windshield design 
consisting of a pair of eagle-shaped motorcycle fairing guards, which 
were created by brothers Jeffrey and Stephen Hoop.936  The Hoops 
hired Lisa and Mark Hoop to create drawings and models of the 
designs.937  Both sets of parties applied for, and received, a design 
patent.938  In subsequent litigation, the district court found that the 
Hoop brothers were the true inventors and granted them a 
preliminary injunction.939  On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s preliminary injunction enjoining the plaintiffs 
from acts constituting infringement of the Hoop brother’s patent.940  
The Federal Circuit stated that design patents and utility patents must 
meet the same standard of inventorship, i.e. the person who 
conceived the patented invention is the true inventor.941  The Federal 
Circuit noted that the inventor retains his or her  rights to the patent 
even where the patentee uses the services, ideas, and aid of others in 
the process of realizing the invention.942  Accordingly, the Federal 
Circuit found that, in addition to the undisputed facts that the Hoop 
brothers conceived of the eagle-shaped fairing guards and enlisted 
the assistance of Mark and Lisa Hoop, the accused patent lacked the 
requisite inventive quality and the Hoop brothers therefore remained 
the true inventors.943  Upon review of the accused patent, the Federal 
Circuit agreed with the lower court’s determination that the design 
was only a refined variation of the first design, thus rejecting the 
contention that the accused patentees were the true inventors 
because of additional detailed three-dimensional molds outlined in 
                                                          
 933. Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 820, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 934. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1641, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 935. 279 F.3d 1004, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 936. Id. at 1005, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443. 
 937. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443. 
 938. Id. at 1006, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443. 
 939. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443. 
 940. Id. at 1008, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444. 
 941. Id. at 1007, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443-44 (citing In re Rousso, 222 F.2d 
729, 731, 106 U.S.P.Q. 99, 101 (CCPA 1955) (rejecting the assertion that a lesser 
standard of invention applies to design patents than to mechanical patents); C.R. 
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998)). 
 942. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 (quoting Ethicon, Inc. v. United States 
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)).  
 943. Id. at 1008, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444. 
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the accused patent.944  Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the 
creators of the original design, the Hoop brothers, were the true 
inventors because they conceived of the invention and the accused 
design lacked the requisite inventive quality.945 
In another design patent case, Contessa Food Products, Inc. v. 
Conagra, Inc.,946 the district court found, on summary judgment, that 
Conagra infringed Contessa’s design patent on a serving tray for 
shrimp party platters.947  The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded 
the district court’s decision, finding that the district court erred in 
limiting its infringement analysis to “features visible at the point of 
sale,” during which the underside of the tray—illustrated in the 
patent drawings—was not visible.948  The Federal Circuit stated that in 
determining design patent infringement, the “ordinary observer” 
analysis must consider features beyond just one phase or part of the 
useful life of the accused design.949  The Federal Circuit held that the 
features of the accused products must be examined individually and 
compared overall with the patented design as a whole, as depicted in 
all figures, to determine design patent infringement.950  Thus, all of 
the ornamental features illustrated in the figures must be considered 
in evaluating design patent infringement.951  On remand, the Federal 
Circuit directed the district court to apply the “ordinary observer” test 
where the hypothetical purchasing decision made by such an 
observer included all ornamental features visible at any time during 
the normal use of the product.952 
I. Willful Infringement 
In Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Services, Inc.,953 Transclean sued 
Bridgewood for patent infringement and a jury found that 
Bridgewood willfully infringed the patent and engaged in false 
advertising.954  The district court granted Transclean’s motion for 
summary judgment and held that Bridgewood infringed Transclean’s 
patent as a sanction for Bridgewood’s failure to answer an 
                                                          
 944. Id. at 1007-08, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444. 
 945. Id. at 1007, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444. 
 946. 282 F.3d 1370, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 947. Id. at 1375-76, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066-67. 
 948. Id. at 1378-79, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
 949. Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (citing KeyStone Retaining Wall 
Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1450-51, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297, 1302 
(Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 950. Id. at 1381, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 951. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 952. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 953. 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 954. Id. at 1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
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interrogatory about Bridgewood’s ground for its defense of non-
infringement.955  However, the district court overturned a portion of 
the jury’s damages award and denied Transclean’s motion for 
enhanced damages based on the principle of willful infringement.956  
Applying regional circuit law, the Federal Circuit held that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the sanction.957  
The Federal Circuit found that Transclean was entitled to a reply to 
its interrogatory concerning grounds for its defense of non-
infringement.958  The district court was within its discretion to impose 
a sanction because Transclean was clearly prejudiced by its inability to 
conduct discovery on the infringement issues.959  The Federal Circuit 
concluded by refusing to find that the district court abused its 
discretion because this would impair the district court’s ability to 
police its own proceedings, which ensures transparency and 
predictability, and would impair the court’s ability to discourage 
mischievous conduct by parties.960 
J. Repair and Reconstruction 
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have through the years 
grappled with the distinction between repair of a patented item and 
reconstruction.961  In Husky Injection Molding Systems Ltd. v. R&D Tool 
& Engineering Co.,962 the Federal Circuit determined that there are at 
least three types of repair and reconstruction circumstances.  First, 
there is the instance where the patented item is spent, or expired, 
and the accused infringer reconstructs the item, thus making the 
patented item usable again but also infringing on the original 
patent.963  A second, and non-infringing scenario, is where only part 
of the spent patented item is replaced.964  A third permissible 
situation is where part of the patented item, although not spent, is 
                                                          
 955. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 956. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 957. Id. at 1373, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 958. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 959. Id. at 1373-74, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 960. Id. at 1374, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 961. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd. v. R&D Tool & Eng’g Co., 291 F.3d 780, 
784-85, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834, 1837 (Fed. Cir. 2002); DONALD S. CHISUM, 5 
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[3], at 16-159 (1997). 
 962. 291 F.3d 780, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 963. Id. at 785, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837 (citing Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 
106 U.S. 89 (1882)). 
 964. Id. at 785-86, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837-38 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961)). 
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replaced, thus enabling the object of the patent to perform a 
different function.965 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment of non-infringement, holding that R&D’s replacement of 
parts in the patented system were appropriately considered 
permissible repair, rather than reconstruction, of the patented 
system.966  Husky asserted its patent against R&D for contributory 
infringement; Husky’s patent covered a device for producing hollow 
injection-molded plastic articles used in conjunction with a “carrier 
plate.”967  Neither the molds nor the carrier plates were separately 
patented.968  Customers who used Husky’s patented machine regularly 
switched molds and carrier plates when their manufacturing needs 
changed, and R&D manufactured and replaced molds and carrier 
plates which could be used in Husky’s machine.969  The Federal 
Circuit considered the parts in question to be readily replaceable, 
primarily because Husky’s machine design allowed the carrier plates 
and molds to be replaced.970  In accordance with substantial 
precedent, the Federal Circuit held that there was no infringement 
because the parts were readily replaceable, and that marketing 
replacement parts did not support Husky’s claim of contributory 
infringement.971  Further, the Federal Circuit rejected Husky’s 
argument that the replaceable parts were essential to the invention, 
finding such argument irrelevant.972  Finally, the Federal Circuit 
stated that the purchasers of the machines were within their rights to 
replace the carrier plates and molds, thus precluding claims of 
contributory infringement, which is itself based on direct 
infringement.973 
K. Bona Fide Purchaser Doctrine 
In an unusual case, Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics 
Corp.,974 the Federal Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc 
to decide whether its decision in Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Loebach975 was 
                                                          
 965. Id. at 786, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838 (citing Surfco Haw. v. Fin Control 
Sys. Pty. Ltd., 264 F.3d 1062, 1065, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 966. Id. at 782, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834. 
 967. Id. at 782-83, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835. 
 968. Id. at 782, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835. 
 969. Id. at 783, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835. 
 970. Id. at 788, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840. 
 971. Id. at 789, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840. 
 972. Id. at 788, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839. 
 973. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839. 
 974. 284 F.3d 1323, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 975. 145 F.3d 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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binding authority on the issue of whether the bona fide purchaser 
doctrine applies to patent licenses.976  In Rhone-Poulenc, the Federal 
Circuit decided that Heidelberg was not binding and vacated the 
previous panel decision, while issuing a new decision.977  Previously, 
Rhone-Poulenc Agro (RPA) and DeKalb jointly developed 
biotechnology related to specific genetic materials.978  During that 
period, an RPA scientist developed, and patented, an optimized 
transit peptide that helps herbicide-resistant corn grow.979  DeKalb 
was given a license to use the patented technology with the right to 
sublicense, which it did to Monsanto.980  RPA sued DeKalb and 
Monsanto alleging that DeKalb procured the license by fraud, and 
Monsanto defended on the grounds that it held a valid (sub)license 
from DeKalb.981  The district court found that Monsanto, as a 
sublicensee, “‘could be considered a bona fide purchaser because it 
had paid value for the right to use the technology without knowledge 
of any wrongdoing by DeKalb.’”982  The Federal Circuit defines “bona 
fide purchaser” as one who in good faith obtains legal title to 
property in exchange for valuable consideration, free from notice of 
any other claim of interest in the property.983  The Federal Circuit 
here relied on 35 U.S.C. § 271 to determine the meaning of “without 
authority” to make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention.984  
In examining the statute, the Federal Circuit departed from 
precedent and determined that § 261 reflects a Congressional finding 
that as a matter of law, only an assignee of all substantial rights can 
benefit from protection of the statute for a bona fide purchaser.985  
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that there was no available bona fide 
purchaser defense because Monsanto’s license was not exclusive, and 
                                                          
 976. Rhone-Poulenc, 284 F.3d at 1325, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1188.  The Federal 
Circuit has noted that “a bona fide purchaser is one who purchases legal title to 
property in good faith for valuable consideration without notice of any other claim of 
the interest in the property.”  Id. at 1329, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (citing Realty 
Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also RESTATEMENT 
OF RESTITUTION § 172 (1937). 
 977. Rhone-Poulenc, 284 F.3d at 1325, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1188-89. 
 978. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189. 
 979. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189. 
 980. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189. 
 981. Id. at 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189. 
 982. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. 
Monsanto Co. and DeKalb Genetics Corp., No. 1:97CV1138, slip op. At 56 (M.D.N.C. 
Feb. 8, 2000)). 
 983. Id. at 1329, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (citing Realty Portfolio, Inc. v. 
Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1997)); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 
976, § 172. 
 984. Rhone-Poulenc, 284 F.3d at 1327, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190; 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271 (2000). 
 985. Id. at 1333, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195; 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) 
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there was no argument from the parties that the license agreement 
transferred all substantial rights.986 
IV. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND OTHER DEFENSES 
A. Prosecution Laches 
Prosecution laches is a defense to an infringement action involving 
new claims stemming from ongoing applications that might prejudice 
intervening adverse public rights.987  If an intervening patent is issued 
more than two years before the filing of a divisional application, the 
burden is imposed upon the divisional applicant or patentees to show 
circumstances justifying the delay.  This rule is applicable to any 
statutory bar; for example, a public use or sale.988  In the absence of 
intervening rights, no excuse must be shown for a lapse of more than 
two years in presenting the divisional application.989  
In Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research 
Foundation LP,990 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s 
holding that prosecution laches was unavailable as a matter of law.991  
The Federal Circuit held that “the equitable doctrine of laches could 
be applied to bar the enforcement of patent claims that issued after 
an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution, despite the 
applicant’s statutory and regulatory compliance.”992  In so doing, the 
Federal Circuit rejected the argument that (1) the doctrine was 
limited to interference actions under Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf 
Electrical Co.,993 and its progeny; (2) the Patent Act of 1952 foreclosed 
the application of prosecution laches; and (3) two of the Federal 
Circuit’s non-precedential opinions rejecting prosecution laches 
defenses should, in fact, bind the court.994  Beyond affirming the 
viability of this defense, the Federal Circuit did not elaborate 
regarding how it should be applied.995 
                                                          
 986. Id. at 1334, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195. 
 987. Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 277 F.3d 
1361, 1364, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 988. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Jeffrey-DeWitt Insulator Co., 22 F.2d 277, 
279 (2d Cir. 1927). 
 989. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167-68 
(1938). 
 990. 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002).   
 991. Id. at 1363, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.  See also supra notes 475-81 
(discussing the concept of prosecution laches). 
 992. Symbol Technologies, 277 F.3d at 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520. 
 993. 264 U.S. 463 (1924) (holding that an unreasonable eight-year delay rendered 
the claims unenforceable). 
 994. Symbol Technologies, 277 F.3d at 1365-68, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518-20. 
 995. Id. at 1363-68, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-20. 
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In In re Bogese II,996 the Federal Circuit applied the prosecution 
laches doctrine in the context of delayed patent prosecution.  The 
court affirmed a decision by the USPTO Board finding that Bogese 
forfeited his right to a patent.  In doing so, the Federal Circuit held 
that the USPTO could reject a patent application where the applicant 
failed to advance prosecution for an unreasonably long period, 
provided the USPTO gave notice of this consequence.997  In 
approving the Board’s findings, the Federal Circuit found that the 
patentee’s intentional or negligent conduct of delaying the patent’s 
issuance, hereby extending its term, was presumptively unreasonable 
because it eroded patent law policy of promoting science and the 
useful arts.998  The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board’s holding 
that forfeiture of a patent was appropriate when a patentee either 
intentionally or negligently acted in a manner that unnecessarily 
postponed the date that the public could rightfully and freely use the 
invention.999  This holding effectively made USPTO power to punish 
undue delay even broader than district court power to hold a patent 
unenforceable.1000 
In her dissent, Judge Newman stated that the majority had 
effectively given patent examiners additional powers to deny patents 
on the basis that the applicant was not timely in prosecution.1001  The 
Judge found this reason inconsistent with In re Henriksen,1002 where the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated that “there was no 
statutory basis for fixing an arbitrary limit to the number of prior 
applications [in] a chain of co-pending applications.”1003  Judge 
Newman noted the USPTO’s equitable power was limited to relieving 
distress, not causing it.1004  Although the GATT change to a twenty 
years from filing standard would make these situations more rare, 
Judge Newman added that USPTO’s new power would impose a great 
burden on all applicants while only occasionally punishing a 
transgressor.1005 
                                                          
 996. 303 F.3d 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 997. Id. at 1367-68, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53. 
 998. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451. 
 999. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451 (citing Ex parte Bogese II, slip op. at 35-36, 
No. 86-1699, 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 16, 1987)). 
 1000. Id. at 1367, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452. 
 1001. Id. at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1002. 399 F.2d 253 (C.C.P.A. 1968). 
 1003. Bogese II, 303 F.3d at 1370, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (quoting In re 
Henriksen, 399 F.2d at 254). 
 1004. Id. at 1370-71, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55. 
 1005. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
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B. Inequitable Conduct 
In Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Vincent,1006 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the patent in suit was 
unenforceable because of the patentee’s inequitable conduct before 
the USPTO.  In affirming the conduct ruling, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the argument that the patent should be enforced on behalf 
of the innocent inventor because the inequitable conduct was not by 
the true inventor.1007  The Federal Circuit reiterated the long held 
rule that “one bad apple spoils the entire barrel,” even as to otherwise 
innocent individuals, confirming that the patent in suit “may not be 
enforced by innocent co-inventors.”1008  Moreover, the Federal Circuit 
noted that the wrongdoers (as opposed to the innocent inventor) 
prosecuted the patent in suit, thereby making the patent 
unenforceable.1009 
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,1010 the Federal Circuit 
reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling, in favor of Orange 
Bang, that the patent at issue was invalid on the basis of prior use and 
was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit 
held that the record was devoid of substantial evidence to support the 
jury’s verdict because there was no evidence showing that the prior 
use device satisfied every limitation of the claimed invention.1011  The 
Federal Circuit also held that the uncorroborated oral testimony 
presented to show prior public use failed to constitute the “clear and 
convincing evidence necessary to invalidate the patent for prior 
public knowledge.”1012  With respect to the first of two declarations of 
misconduct submitted to the USPTO, the Federal Circuit stated that 
every statement of the declaration relating to the invention was true 
and therefore did not constitute inequitable conduct.1013  With respect 
to the second declaration, the Federal Circuit stated that the accused 
infringer did not identify specific statements that Juicy Whip knew 
were false.1014  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that the 
evidence of materiality and intent to deceive was lacking.1015 
                                                          
 1006. 292 F.3d 1363, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1007. Id. at 1377, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 1008. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 1009. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 1010. 292 F.3d 728, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1011. Id. at 738, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257-58. 
 1012. Id. at 743, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1013. Id. at 744, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1014. Id. at 745, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. 
 1015. Id. at 744-45, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262-63. 
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C. Use of the Invention by the United States Government 
In Madey v. Duke University,1016 the Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court’s partial dismissal, reversed the district court’s summary 
judgment which applied the experimental use defense to Duke 
University’s use of Madey’s patented technology, and affirmed the 
district court’s summary judgment that Duke University did not 
infringe the patents because it did not own or control the accused 
infringing equipment.1017  Previously, the district court dismissed 
several of Madey’s claims on the grounds that Duke University’s use 
of the patents was under the authority of a government research 
grant and that the case should be brought in the Court of Federal 
Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).1018  Thus, the district court 
determined that it did not have jurisdiction over those claims.1019  In 
reversing this partial dismissal, the Federal Circuit determined that 
the district court erred by failing to apply Federal Circuit law and by 
providing no findings or analysis upon which to base a review of the 
decision.1020 
In granting summary judgment to Duke University, the district 
court determined that Madey failed to create a genuine issue of 
material fact that Duke University was engaged in a commercial 
enterprise.1021  Upon reversal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
district court had used an overly broad formulation of the 
experimental use doctrine, which is typically “very narrow and strictly 
limited.”1022  The Federal Circuit indicated that the correct focus of 
the experimental use defense should be on whether Duke 
University’s use was for legitimate non-commercial purposes, rather 
than examining Duke University’s non-profit status.1023  Further, the 
Federal Circuit noted that Duke University aggressively pursued a 
patent licensing program, from which it derived a substantial revenue 
stream.1024 
In Toxgon Corp. v. BNFL, Inc.,1025 the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded the district court’s determination that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction in an infringement action.1026  The patentee filed 
                                                          
 1016. 307 F.3d 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1017. Id. at 1352, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737-38. 
 1018. Id. at 1358-60, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744; 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
 1019. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740. 
 1020. Id. at 1359-60, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744. 
 1021. Id. at 1355-57, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740-42. 
 1022. Id. at 1361-62, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 1023. Id. at 1362-63, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. 
 1024. Id. at 1363 n.7, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 n.7. 
 1025. 312 F.3d 1379, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1026. Id. at 1380, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1147. 
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suit, alleging infringement by BNFL’s process for treating and 
removing radioactive material using a pilot melter, described as a 
single-chamber vitrification system that converts nuclear waste into 
glass.1027  In response, the accused infringer asserted, under Rule 
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the 
infringement occurred under the authority of and for the sole 
benefit of the United States, thus requiring the claims to be heard in 
the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).1028  Section 
1498(a) restricts suits against the United States to monetary 
compensation for infringement and also relieves federal contractors 
of liability where the contractor uses or manufactures an infringing 
invention for the United States.1029  Consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, the Federal Circuit long has held that § 1498(a) is not a 
jurisdictional bar but can be used as an affirmative defense in a suit 
between private litigants.1030  As such, the Federal Circuit found that 
the district court inappropriately dismissed the infringement suit 
under Rule 12(b)(1).1031  According to the Federal Circuit, a more 
appropriate remedy for defenses arising under § 1498(a) should be 
addressed by summary judgment under Rule 56.1032 
D. Estoppel 
In University of West Virginia v. VanVoorhies,1033 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of the 
University’s claim that a co-inventor of a patent breached his duty to 
assign inventions developed during the course of the co-inventor’s 
graduate studies at the University.1034  First, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that while questions of contract law are matters of state 
law, the question of whether a patent application was a continuation-
in-part of an earlier filed patent application, and thus covered by a 
previously executed assignment, was a question of patent law as 
interpreted under federal law.1035  Moreover, the Federal Circuit held 
that under the University’s patent policy, the defendant was obligated 
to assign patent applications to the University even without a signed 
contract requiring such an assignment.1036 
                                                          
 1027. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147. 
 1028. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147-48; 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
 1029. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
 1030. Toxgon, 312 F.3d at 1381, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 1031. Id. at 1382, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 1032. Id. at 1382-83, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 1033. 278 F.3d 1288, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1034. Id. at 1299, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455. 
 1035. Id. at 1296-97, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1036. Id. at 1298, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455. 
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In affirming the district court’s rejection of the defendant’s 
argument that a previously executed assignment was invalid, the 
Federal Circuit clarified that “while the doctrine of assignor estoppel 
precluded challenges to the validity of a patent itself, it did not 
preclude challenges to the validity of a contract assigning the 
patent.”1037  Finally, the Federal Circuit held that an inventor’s act of 
providing technical information to the University’s patent counsel 
and executing the necessary documents for prosecuting a patent 
application did not give rise to an attorney-client relationship 
between the University’s counsel and the defendant inventor, nor did 
these circumstances require disqualification when the University and 
the inventor’s interests became adverse.1038 
V. REMEDIES 
A. Preliminary Injunction 
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc.,1039 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction 
enjoining Interface from infringing claims of its patent for raised 
access flooring panels.1040  Interface appealed only the lower court’s 
conclusion regarding the likelihood of success based on the merits of 
Tate’s infringement claim.1041  The Federal Circuit first held that 
there was no practicing prior art defense to literal infringement.1042  
Next, the Federal Circuit rejected Interface’s argument that the lower 
court’s interpretation of the term “border,” which “encompass[es] 
the simple beveled edges in the accused floor panels” was an 
erroneous construction.1043  The Federal Circuit found that a person 
of ordinary skill in the art of raised access floor panels would know 
                                                          
 1037. Id. at 1301-02, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457-58; see also Diamond Sci. Co. v. 
Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2028 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  The court 
in Diamond Scientific held: 
Assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents one who has 
assigned the rights to a patent (or patent application) from later contending 
that what was assigned is a nullity.  The estoppel also operates to bar other 
parties in privity with the assignor, such as a corporation founded by the 
assignor.  The estoppel historically has applied to invalidity challenges based 
on “novelty, utility, patentable invention, anticipatory matter, and the state 
of the art. 
Id. at 1224, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2031 (citation omitted). 
 1038. VanVoorhies, 278 F.3d at 1303-04, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 1039. 279 F.3d 1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2002).   
 1040. Id. at 1360, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 1041. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 1042. Id. at 1369, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 1043. Id. at 1370, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
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that the term “border” referred to “the area or zone forming an edge 
or trim framing the decorative surface of the panel.”1044  In reviewing 
the patent, the Federal Circuit found no requirements in the 
specification or claims that “the ‘border’ be horizontal or formed of a 
single layer.”1045  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that the 
accused’s panels infringed the patentee’s panels and that Tate met 
the “likelihood of success on the merits” prong of the preliminary 
injunction test.1046 
B. Damages 
1. Other than reasonable royalty 
In Vulcan Engineering Co. v. FATA Aluminum, Inc.,1047 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of patent validity, 
infringement, and a damages award of lost profits, but remanded to 
determine whether the patentee was entitled to additional price 
erosion damages.1048  The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district 
court’s denial of damages as to other infringing processes, attorney 
fees, enhanced damages, and a new trial.1049  In denying damages for 
other infringing processes, the Federal Circuit held that the 
patentee’s grant of an express license to a third party user of the 
patented process was inconsistent with an assertion of damages for 
infringement against the defendant.1050  After determining that the 
patentee reserved only the right to damages for failing to obtain the 
business of providing the infringing process, the district court did not 
award damages because the patentee failed to prove the amount of 
the relevant damages with certainty.1051 
In Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co.,1052 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s determination that a defendant’s motion 
to reopen and vacate a damages judgment, two years after entry of 
that judgment, should be denied.1053  Hunt filed a motion for relief of 
judgment based on Rules 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, seeking vacatur of the damages award based on 
new evidence allegedly showing that Fiskars was not entitled to lost 
                                                          
 1044. Id. at 1370, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 1045. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1046. Id. at 1372, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 1047. 278 F.3d 1366, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1048. Id. at 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554. 
 1049. Id. at 1378-80, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552-54. 
 1050. Id. at 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 1051. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 1052. 279 F.3d 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1053. Id. at 1379, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852. 
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profits.1054  The Federal Circuit first found that Federal Circuit law 
applied in this case, and that Rule 60(b)(6) was available only in 
extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here.1055  The 
Federal Circuit also rejected Hunt’s contention argument that 
damages for lost profits should be reexamined post-trial where 
probative market data about acceptability becomes available—after “a 
non-infringing alternative replaces the infringing product in the 
marketplace.”1056  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit also agreed with the 
district court’s finding that the evidence, which arose nearly two years 
after trial, did not create such extraordinary circumstances as to 
invoke Rule 60(b)(6).1057 
2. Reasonable royalty 
In Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.,1058 the district court 
refused to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law which 
would overturn a jury verdict of infringement and award of damages.  
The Federal Circuit agreed that “substantial evidence supported the 
jury’s finding of infringement,” but that the damages were “excessive 
and unsupported by evidence.”1059  With respect to damages, Riles’s 
damages theory was that if Shell had a patented method of 
construction on the platform, it could result in an injunction on the 
use of the entire platform.1060  Such an injunction would force Shell to 
either abandon its $84 million platform or to pay Riles a percentage 
royalty.1061  The Federal Circuit found this theory to be legally 
incorrect, because Shell could lawfully use its platform without 
infringing Riles’s patent, and the Federal Circuit therefore found that 
the record did not support a percentage royalty based on the cost of 
the entire platform.1062 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that Riles’s damages model 
was incorrect because it did not pair the proposed royalty with the 
value of the patented method—but rather with the unrelated cost of 
the entire Shell platform—which included costs outside of the costs 
of anchoring without mud mats.1063  In remanding the case for a re-
                                                          
 1054. Id. at 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
 1055. Id. at 1382, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854 (citing Marquip, Inc. v. Fosber Am. 
Inc., 198 F.3d 1363, 1370, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1015, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 1056. Id. at 1383, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 1057. Id. at 1381-83, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 1058. 298 F.3d 1302, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1059. Id. at 1305, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1060. Id. at 1311, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825. 
 1061. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825. 
 1062. Id. at 1311-12, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826. 
 1063. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826. 
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determination of damages, the Federal Circuit held that the market 
would not award Riles a royalty for his method that was separated 
from relations to potential non-infringing alternative methods.1064 
In Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Services, Inc.,1065  a jury found that 
Bridgewood willfully infringed the patent and engaged in false 
advertising.  Transclean subsequently appealed the district court’s 
reversal of part of the jury’s damages award and its denial of 
Transclean’s motion for enhanced damages based on willful 
infringement; in turn, Bridgewood cross-appealed the findings of 
validity and infringement.1066  The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s finding of patent validity.1067  With regard to damages, the 
district court disallowed the allocation of a percentage of the sale of 
Bridgewood’s business to Transclean as a reasonable royalty.1068  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed this decision, stating that for purposes of 
calculating a base from which to determine reasonable royalties, 
there was no concrete relation between the value of a business’s 
goodwill at sale and the sales from infringing goods.1069  Further, with 
regard to the denial of enhanced damages, the Federal Circuit found 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion.1070 
3. Attorney fees and costs 
In Pickholtz v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc.,1071 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-
infringement, but affirmed the district court’s denial of Pickholtz’s 
motion for infringement.1072  In so ruling, the Federal Circuit vacated 
the district court’s refusal to award attorney fees to Pickholtz, finding 
that the language of Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
did not allow pro se lawyers to receive fees for their own time.1073  
Upon remanding the case, the Federal Circuit noted, however, that 
the court’s inherent power could be invoked, even where a 
procedural rule exists that sanctions the same conduct, to determine 
                                                          
 1064. Id. at 1312, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826. 
 1065. 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1066. Id. at 1367, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866-67. 
 1067. Id. at 1373, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1068. Id. at 1375, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873 (citing Transclean Corp. v. 
Bridgewood Serv., Inc., No. 97-2298, slip op. at 3 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2001)). 
 1069. Id. at 1376-77, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 1070. Id. at 1377, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 1071. 284 F.3d 1365, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1072. Id. at 1367-68, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341. 
 1073. Id. at 1376-78, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347-49; FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
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whether Pickholtz was entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to this 
power.1074 
In Kohus v. Cosco, Inc.,1075 Kohus’s patent infringement suit had 
failed and Cosco sought to recover litigation costs from Kohus.1076  
The district court awarded Cosco $975.90 for deposition costs and 
$12,950.00 for exhibit expenses.1077  The Federal Circuit reversed 
these awards, finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provided the only remedy 
for awarding costs.1078 The Federal Circuit held that the video was 
neither an exemplification nor a copy of a paper, and the district 
court had no statutory authority to award costs to the defendants for 
the video.1079  In doing so, the Federal Circuit considered a Sixth 
Circuit decision, Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,1080 to determine 
whether the video could be considered “drawings, charts, or physical 
models.”  The court in Swan allowed costs to be awarded for drawings 
and charts, but not for physical models.1081  In applying Swan and 
denying cost recovery of the video, the Federal Circuit held that the 
defendant’s video was a physical model, because it was a substitute for 
a physical model and was created to assist counsel’s arguments and 
expert witness’ explanations.1082  Judge Dyk dissented, stating that, in 
fact, a video should be included in the costs covered by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1920(4).1083  Judge Dyk also stated that the language of the statute 
could be construed to include “after-invented technology.”1084 
C. Attorney Conduct 
1. Contempt 
In Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Communication Laboratories, Inc.,1085 
the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, which 
held that there was no violation of a protective order.  The Federal 
Circuit also vacated a summary judgment decision by the district 
court that there was no infringement and remanded the case for 
                                                          
 1074. Pickholtz, 284 F.3d at 1376-78, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348-49. 
 1075. 282 F.3d 1355, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1076. Id. at 1356, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (citing Kohus v. Cosco, Inc., 250 
F.3d 758 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curium)). 
 1077. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. 
 1078. Id. at 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148-49; 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000). 
 1079. Kohus, 282 F.3d at 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1148-49. 
 1080. 149 F.2d 476, 65 U.S.P.Q. 386 (6th Cir. 1945). 
 1081. Id. at 477, 65 U.S.P.Q. at 387. 
 1082. Kohus, 282 F.3d at 1360-61, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149-50. 
 1083. Id. at 1361, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150 (Dyk, J., dissenting); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1920(4). 
 1084. Kohus, 282 F.3d at 1361, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1085. 305 F.3d 1303, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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trial.1086  During discovery and under a protective order, Arrow 
(Arcom) produced a confidential and pending patent application to 
Eagle.1087  Under the belief that Eagle had rights to the subject matter 
in the application, Eagle’s attorney made copies of the patent 
application and filed the copies as two separate applications with the 
USPTO.1088  In a letter to Arcom nine days later, Eagle’s attorney 
explained that he was seeking to preserve Eagle’s rights.1089  When 
Arcom petitioned the district court to hold Eagle’s attorney in 
contempt, Eagle argued, and the district court agreed, that the 
attorney’s actions did not violate the protective order because the 
disclosure was to the USPTO, which already possessed the pending 
patent application.1090 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, finding 
that the conduct of Eagle’s attorney was “egregious” and that the 
district court’s failure to find a violation of the protective order was 
most certainly an abuse of discretion.”1091 
2. Pre-filing investigation under Rule 11 
In Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Companies, Inc.1092 the Federal 
Circuit vacated and remanded the district court decision to 
determine whether counsel for Antonious failed to conduct 
reasonable pre-filing factual investigations.1093  The Federal Circuit 
held that plaintiff’s attorneys could be sanctioned under Rule 
11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a reasonable 
attorney would have found the claim construction frivolous.1094  In 
finding the claim construction was not frivolous, the Federal Circuit 
remanded for a determination as to whether plaintiff’s counsel’s 
investigation was thorough enough to satisfy the Rule 11(b)(3) pre-
filing investigation requirement.1095 
                                                          
 1086. Id. at 1306, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 1087. Id. at 1311, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1088. Id. at 1311-12, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. One patent application 
identified only an Eagle employee as inventor; the other identified Eagle and Arcom 
employees as joint inventors.  Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 1089. Id. at 1312, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 1090. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 1091. Id. at 1314, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487-88 (“[C]opying a competitor’s 
patent application obtained through discovery and submitting it as your own—for 
whatever reason—is not using the material for purposes of litigation.”). 
 1092. 275 F.3d 1066, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1093. Id. at 1068-69, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246. 
 1094. Id. at 1072, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
 1095. Id. at 1077, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1252. 
FINALPATENTSUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:41 PM 
996 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:891 
In Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc.,1096 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part the summary judgment of 
non-infringement of the district court.1097  The claims on appeal 
related to a method and apparatus for playing a “fantasy” football 
computer game.1098  Following an infringement analysis, the Federal 
Circuit denied Yahoo!’s motion for attorney fees and costs because 
Fantasy had conducted a proper pre-filing investigation, which 
included setting forth a reasonable claim construction under which 
the defendants literally infringed.1099 
3. Attorney statements 
In Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil 
Co.,1100 the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and 
remanded a decision of the district court finding non-infringement 
of Union Carbide’s patents.1101  Union Carbide patents covered 
ethylene oxide silver catalysts with improved efficiency, and the 
claims contained an “efficiency equation.”1102  Among other things, 
Union Carbide argued that it was entitled to a new trial because of 
improper statements made by Shell’s counsel about Union Carbide’s 
past copying of Shell patents, which allegedly tainted the jury, thus 
precluding a fair verdict.1103  The district court found the statements 
“improper,” but concluded that they had not influenced the jury 
verdict.1104  In noting the lower court’s need to monitor attorneys 
appearing before it, the Federal Circuit found the statements 
“unacceptable,” but ruled that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion; the statements went more to invalidity—which was 
ultimately not a jury question—than to infringement.1105 
CONCLUSION 
In 2002, the Federal Circuit continued to play a major role in the 
field of patent law, securing its position as one of the most important 
courts in the United States.  It was an unusual year for the court as it 
saw two of its cases taken up by the Supreme Court, Holmes Group, Inc. 
                                                          
 1096. 287 F.3d 1108, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1097. Id. at 1111, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1098. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1099. Id. at 1120, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 1100. 308 F.3d 1167, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1101. Id. at 1171, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547. 
 1102. Id. at 1171-72, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547-48. 
 1103. Id. at 1180, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555. 
 1104. Id. at 1183, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556. 
 1105. Id. at 1183-84, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556. 
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v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.1106 and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushki Co., Ltd.,1107 both resulting in reversals.   
The Federal Circuit also issued two en banc decisions.  In Johnson 
& Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc.,1108 the court clarified 
the law on the doctrine of equivalents post-Festo.  And, in Rhone-
Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,1109 the court decided that the 
previous decision in Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Loebach1110 was not 
binding authority on the issue of whether the bona fide purchaser 
doctrine applies to patent licenses.   
Nevertheless, for the most part, the Federal Circuit continued to 
play its important role of ensuring that the patent laws are applied in 
a uniform manner. 
                                                          
 1106. 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002). 
 1107. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
 1108. 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1109. 284 F.3d 1323, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1110. 145 F.3d 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
